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Abstract  
What type of political association is the European Union? From the start of the European 
integration process, this question has puzzled scholars. Many different answers have been 
offered, but in the absence of an agreed response, most scholars implicitly avoid the issue 
by suggesting that the European Union is ‘sui generis’. In contrast, this thesis maintains 
that the European Union is a federation (Bund): a political union of states founded on a 
federal treaty-constitution that does not constitute a new federal state. The thesis 
maintains, further, that the federation is a discrete form of political association on a par 
with, though differentiated from, the empire and the state. The thesis aims to make three 
contributions. First, to contribute to the constitutional theory of the European Union by 
solving the mystery of its political form. Second, to contribute to the constitutional theory 
of the federation through an in-depth case study of the European Union as a federal union 
of states. Third, to contribute to both European Union studies and federalism studies by 
showing, first, how some of the most profound constitutional questions of the 
contemporary European Union raised by the rise of authoritarianism in Poland and 
Hungary and the Eurozone crisis can be properly understood on the basis of the 
constitutional theory of the federation. Second, by demonstrating how these 
contemporary issues shed light on the most difficult question for the constitutional theory 
of the federation: whether, to what extent and under what circumstances the Union has 
authority to intervene in the internal constitutional affairs of its Member States.  
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“Classical political theory, (…) the kind that begins with Machiavelli and Hobbes and ends 
somewhere in the nineteenth century, seemed to be of little direct help in comprehending the process 
by which states unite with one another after the fashion of the Rome Treaty. Classical political 
theory performs the invaluable service of revealing the leading characteristics of the state (…) 
However, classical theory does not positively indicate why or how states join together voluntarily 
to create a body capable of legislating for their own citizens—indeed, precisely because of the 
emphasis on state sovereignty, it tends to make one deeply sceptical of the possibility of such a 
development, and to deny in the name of theory the reality that exists before one’s eyes”  
— Murray Forsyth, Union of States: The Theory and Practice of 
Confederations (New York, Leicester University Press, 1981), ix-x. 
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Introduction 
 
 The legal and political nature of the European Union (EU) remains an enigma for 
academics and the general public alike. For many years, the latter could happily ignore the 
question of what the EU really is, yet the multiple crises characterising the last decade of 
European history—the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, the rise of authoritarianism in 
Poland and Hungary, and Brexit—have prompted a new interest in the EU. For example, 
one of the most googled questions in the UK after the result of the Brexit referendum 
was announced in the early hours of 24th June 2016 was: “What is the EU?”1. Within 
academia, the constitutional nature of the EU has been debated for decades without ever 
solving the mystery, and for some time, the tacit consensus was to avoid the issue 
altogether by declaring the EU to be unique or ‘sui generis’. While the ‘sui generis’ thesis 
might have been a viable position in times of relative stability, the government of the 
Eurozone crisis—significantly extending the powers of the executive branch of 
government at both Union and Member State level and relying on governmental 
instruments of dubious legality—forces us to confront the question: With what right are 
the citizens and states of Europe governed? To answer these questions of European 
politics, it is necessary to address the question of the constitutional nature of the EU. 
 This thesis takes up the challenge of developing a constitutional theory for the 
EU. The point of departure is that, contrary to what is maintained by the ‘sui generis’ 
thesis, the EU, from the perspective of constitutional theory, is neither unique nor 
unprecedented. The EU, this thesis maintains, is a union of states of a special kind: a federal 
union or a federation. That is, a political union of states founded on a federal treaty-constitution that 
does not absorb the Member States into a new federal state. The thesis argues, further, that the 
federation is a discrete form of political association on a par with though distinct from 
the other political forms of modernity, i.e., the empire and the state. As such, the EU is 
not unique in world history. Multiple manifestations of this political form predate the EU, 
most importantly the antebellum United States, the 19th century German Federation and 
the Swiss Confederation before the constitution of a federal state in 1848. 
To be sure, it is not submitted that there are no unique aspects of the EU’s 
constitution or its law and politics—all actual political associations are unique in one way 
or another—but these singular features do not make the EU any less a federation. 
                                                          
1 B Fung, “Britons are frantically Googling what the EU is after voting to leave it” (The Washington Post, 
24 June 2016). 
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Germany, Poland and the UK all have unique constitutional attributes and are 
constitutionally very different from one another, but they are no less states because of 
that. The same applies to federations, including the EU. A study of the constitutional 
nature of the EU must abandon the imaginary of ‘sui generis’ and start to think of the EU 
in the context of what in constitutional terms it is comparable to, namely, federal unions 
of states. 
 This thesis is not the first study of the EU in light of federalism. Several volumes 
have been dedicated to the subject2, however, most of the literature in the field is of 
limited relevance to this thesis. The reason is that these studies are generally not concerned 
with questions of constitutional theory. Besides, in the few cases where they are, they 
almost invariably set about with a flawed understanding of the federation as a federal state. 
Nearly all available studies, in other words, do not begin with an understanding of the 
federation as a discrete form of political association differentiated from that of the state 
and therefore tend to understand the EU as an ‘incomplete federation’3.  
Only a few scholars defy this general trend by comparing the EU not with 
contemporary federal states but with federations. Robert Schütze is one of the few 
scholars on federalism who identifies the federation as an autonomous form of political 
association irreducible to that of the state. Schütze has written extensively on the legal 
transformation of the EU in comparison to the early history of the United States4, with a 
special focus on the development of the internal market as a federal market5, and 
explicated EU constitutional law as a concrete manifestation of a federation6. His interest 
in the subject, however, is more practical than theoretical, and he does not develop a 
constitutional theory of the federation. Similarly, Sergio Fabbrinni also starts out from the 
understanding that the EU is a federal union of states which he juxtaposes to a federal 
                                                          
2 K Nicolaïdis and R Howse (eds), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States 
and the European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2001); DR Kelemen, The Rules of Federalism: Institutions and Regulatory 
Politics in the EU and Beyond (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2004); F Laursen (ed), The EU and 
Federalism: Polities and Policies Compared (Farnham, Ashgate, 2011); A Menon and MA Schain (eds), 
Comparative Federalism: The European Union and the United States in Comparative Perspective (Oxford, OUP, 
2006); M Cappelletti, M Seccombe and JHH Weiler (eds), Integration Through Law: Methods, Tools and 
Institutions: Vol. 1 Book 1: A Political, Legal and Economic Overview (Berlin, De Gruyter, 1986); A Trechsel, 
Towards a Federal Europe? (Abingdon, Routledge, 2006). 
3 JE Fossum and M Jachtenfuchs, “Federal Challenges and Challenges to Federalism. Insights from the 
EU and Federal States” (2017) Journal of European Public Policy 24(4), 470. 
4 R Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law (Oxford, OUP, 
2015). 
5 R Schütze, From International to Federal Market: The Changing Structure of European Law (Oxford, OUP, 
2017). 
6 R Schütze, European Constitutional Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2015). 
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state7. His interest in the theory of the federation, however, is not that of constitutional 
theory, but comparative politics and political sociology—questions relating to division of 
competences, institutional dynamics and legitimacy and accountability. Fabbrinni simply 
assumes the EU to be a federal union8. 
An important reason for the general lack of studies of the EU based on the 
federation as an autonomous political form, and hence as distinct from studies of 
contemporary federal states, is that the constitutional theory of the federation is 
underdeveloped. The great bulk of contemporary writings on federalism has to do with 
the government and structure of the federal state9 and it is therefore of limited relevance 
to the development of a constitutional theory of a federal union like the EU. The main 
exception is Olivier Beaud, who undoubtedly is the most important contemporary scholar 
of the constitutional theory of the federation. His Théorie de la Fédération10 [Theory of the 
Federation] is the first monograph dedicated exclusively to the development of a 
constitutional theory of the federation as an autonomous legal and political form. Though 
Théorie is inspired by the problem of the constitutional nature of the EU11, Beaud does 
not endeavour to apply his theory to the EU in any systematic manner12 and the book 
ends on the following note: “We see that there is still ample material for another book, 
just as there is a need for another to answer the inaugural question of this work: is the 
European Union a federation?”13.  
 This thesis takes on the challenge of answering the question posed by Beaud. 
While no study has yet attempted to do that, both Murray Forsyth and Christoph 
Schönberger have developed legal and political theories for the EU in light of a genuine 
theory of the federation and their works have provided invaluable material for this thesis. 
With his pioneering, Union of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederations14, Forsyth 
                                                          
7 S Fabbrinni, Which European Union: Europe after the Eurozone Crisis (Cambridge, CUP, 2015), xxii; S 
Fabbrinni, “Intergovernmentalism in the European Union. A Comparative Federalism Perspective” 
(2017) Journal of European Public Policy 24(4), 582. 
8 Fabbrinni, Which European Union, xx. 
9 M Burgess, In Search of the Federal Spirit: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives in Comparative Federalism 
(Oxford, OUP, 2012); M Filippov, PC Ordeshook and O Shvetsova, Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-
Sustainable Federal Institutions (Cambridge, CUP, 2004); J Bednar, The Robust Federation: Principles of Design 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2009); TO Hueglin and A Fenna, Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry (Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 2006); Arthur Benz and Jörg Broschek, Federal Dynamics Continuity, Change, 
and the Varieties of Federalism (Oxford, OUP, 2013); M Burgess and AG Gagnon (eds), Comparative 
Federalism and Federation (New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). 
10 O Beaud, Théorie de la Fédération (Paris, PUF, 2007). 
11 Beaud, Théorie, 1. 
12 See, however, O Beaud, “Histoire. Fédération, l'Europe écrit ton nom” (Libération, 25 January 1995).  
13 Beaud, Théorie, 425, my translation. 
14 M Forsyth, Union of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederations (New York, Leicester University Press, 
1981). 
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presents a comprehensive overview of the history of federal political thought, develops 
the idea of the economic confederation15 as a federal ‘subspecies’ and demonstrates how 
the political theory of the federation applies to the then European Economic Community 
(EEC). Notwithstanding the impressive contributions made by Union of States, the 
discussion of the EEC is limited to one chapter, and as such it does not provide a 
comprehensive account of the EEC as a federation. Furthermore, almost four decades 
have passed since the publication of Union of States, and a new study is long overdue.  
Christoph Schönberger responded to that need both with his seminal article “Die 
Europäische Union als Bund”16 (from which this thesis borrows its title) and his magnum 
opus Unionsbürger: Europas föderale Bürgerrecht in vergleichender Sicht17 [Union Citizen: Europe’s 
Federal Citizenship-law in Comparative Perspective]. Unionsbürger provides a comprehensive 
comparative study of EU citizenship based on the principles of federal citizenship law 
and as such it sheds light on a core pillar of the constitutional theory of the federation 
and the EU as a manifestation thereof. Because of the more or less exclusive focus on 
citizenship in Unionsbürger and the limited scope of “Die Europäische Union als Bund”, 
Schönberger’s writings do not exhaust the need for the development of a general 
constitutional theory of the EU as a federation.  
 Notwithstanding the significance of the contributions of Beaud, Forsyth and 
Schönberger, the theory of the federation remains underdeveloped. The task of answering 
the question asked by Beaud—is the EU a federation?—does therefore not merely consist 
in applying a pre-existing theory to the case of the EU. In order to account for 
contemporary constitutional problems in Europe such as the constitutionality of the 
government of the Eurozone crisis and the rise of authoritarianism in Poland and 
Hungary it has been necessary to develop hitherto unexplored or less developed aspects 
of the constitutional theory of the federation. Important constitutional questions such as 
those relating to emergency politics or constitutional guardianship and constitutional 
identity and homogeneity have only to a very limited degree been touched upon by 
previous scholars of the theory of the federation. For that reason, this thesis aims at 
contributing to several literatures. On the one hand, the thesis aims at contributing to EU 
                                                          
15 As will become clear later in this thesis, Forsyth’s concept of confederation is identical to my use of the 
concepts of federation and federal union of states. The reason I do not use the term confederation is not 
that it is theoretically or historically inadequate per se but that it is associated with the distinction between 
Staatenbund and Bundesstaat that has hindered the development of a constitutional theory of the federation 
as a discrete political form (Chapter 1). 
16 C Schönberger, “Die Europäische Union als Bund” (2004) AöR 129(1). 
17 C Schönberger, Unionsbürger: Europas föderale Bürgerrecht in vergleichender Sicht (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 
2005). 
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law scholarship by solving the mystery of the constitutional nature of the EU. On the 
other hand, the thesis aims at contributing to the theory of the federation, first, by 
developing less studied aspects of the theory of the federation such as those of 
constitutional guardianship and constitutional identity, and second, by an in-depth 
constitutional study of the EU—perhaps the only contemporary manifestation of a 
federation.  
 The overall aim of this thesis is to develop a constitutional theory of the EU as a 
federation in light of the contemporary constitutional problems raised by the manifold 
crises of the past decade. There are several ways in which such a task could be attempted. 
An obvious way would be a ‘deductive’ approach that first develops the theory of the 
federation and then applies it to the case of the EU. This approach was attempted and 
later discarded, both because it proved unhelpful for stylistic and didactic reasons, but 
more importantly because I realised that it did not allow for the ‘inductive’ aim of the 
thesis, namely, to show in what ways a study of the EU can contribute to the theory of 
the federation. Instead, the thesis is organised in accordance with a number of problems 
or themes in the constitutional theory of the federation that are important for a proper 
understanding of the contemporary constitutional order of the EU. Each chapter aims at 
developing a certain aspect of the theory of the federation and shedding light on an 
important constitutional problem or aspect of the EU. As the thesis unfolds, I hope to 
convey two stories to the reader: one about the constitutional history and contemporary 
problems of the EU, another about the federation as a discrete political form characterised 
by its own virtues and vices. 
 The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 is concerned with the 
constitutional nature of the EU and the federation as an autonomous political form. The 
chapter shows how the federation can answer the problem of the generally understood 
enigma of the EU, namely, that it does not fit the theory of the state because it can neither 
be explained by public law nor by international law. The chapter argues that the legal and 
political form of the EU is that of a federation: a discrete legal and political form on a par 
with the state and the empire. It is maintained that whereas the federation is founded by 
a treaty between the federating states, it does not belong to the world of international law 
because the federation leads to a constitutional change in the contracting states by 
constituting among them a new political and public law existence, the Union, through 
which they henceforth govern themselves as ‘Member States’. It is further argued that the 
federation is incompatible with the concept of sovereignty and for that reason a genuine 
14 
 
constitutional theory of the federation has to be developed as a public law form without 
sovereignty. The federation is an autonomous political form that can only be 
misunderstood if it is conceptualised on the basis of the concepts of the state. 
 Following the development of the general principles of the constitutional theory 
of the federation, the thesis goes on to discuss the origins of the federation as a political 
form in general and the EU in particular. Chapter 2 maintains that previously relatively 
independent states decide to come together in a federation when they, for one reason or 
another, are incapable of maintaining their own political autonomy and existence. The 
medieval and early modern federations were constituted between smaller states and free 
cities in order to protect themselves by common military means from a strong 
neighbouring empire: they were ‘defence federations’. With the industrial revolution, 
economic governance and the construction of larger internal markets became crucial for 
states to maintain their political autonomy. One way this was achieved was through 
imperialism (internal market creation by domination), another was through federation 
(internal market creation through free and equal contract). Federations that have 
economic governance/welfare as the primary aim are termed ‘welfare federations’. The 
chapter maintains that the EEC/EU was born out of the collapse of the state as a political 
form in Europe after WWII. In the post-WWII period, there was a general consensus in 
the Western European and American elites that federation was the answer to the collapse 
of the European state-system. The chapter shows that the post-WWII period is 
characterised by attempts to constitute both a ‘defence federation’ and a ‘welfare 
federation’ in Western Europe but that only the latter was successful. The chapter 
concludes that the EU remains a ‘welfare federation’ with defence as a subsidiary aim. 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the foundations and principles for the exercise of 
public power in the federation, that is, the principles of federal public law. The chapter 
maintains that the federation has a unique structure of public law that differs from that 
of the state. In contrast to the state, the key concept of the public law of the federation is 
not sovereignty. The federation is a union of states, a double political existence, with a 
dual governmental apparatus composed of the Union institutions and the governmental 
institutions of the Member States. Neither of these governmental structures govern ‘as 
states’. The Union institutional framework is not a new omni-competent ‘super state’. It 
is characterised by the principles of teleology and specialisation. That is, the Union 
institutions exercise public power to achieve the aims for which the Union was constituted 
and it only has the powers necessary to achieve those aims. The Member States govern 
15 
 
themselves as ‘Member States’ meaning, in the context of the EU, ‘constrained states’. 
This constrained statehood has to be constitutionally internalised. In the EU Member 
States this has been done either by ‘stealth’, through the constitutional imaginary of 
‘constrained democracy’, or through the employment of ‘the return to Europe’ as a 
political myth.  
Having provided an analysis of the federation as a discrete political form (Chapter 
1), and explained both its origins (Chapter 2) and how it governs itself as a political order 
without sovereignty (Chapter 3), Chapters 4 and 5 expound the internal contradictions of 
the federations as a political form and their contemporary manifestations in the EU.  
The federation is born out of the impotence or collapse of the state as a political 
form. Nevertheless, Chapter 4 argues, the federation is itself characterised by internal 
contradictions that constantly threaten its survival. The federation is at the same time 
committed to preserving the autonomy and diversity of its Member States and committed 
to constituting an ‘ever closer union’ between the peoples of the Union. The federal 
balance between these two contradictory ends can be maintained when there is a relative 
constitutional homogeneity between the Member States. In the case of the EU, the 
constitutional homogeneity is that of ‘constrained democracy’. However, a comparative 
constitutional analysis of the Member States shows that they have internalised this 
constitutional identity to varying degrees. This means that the federal balance—in the EU 
known as ‘constitutional tolerance’—can in no way be taken for granted. In order to 
preserve the federal balance, federations tend to claim the right to intervene in the internal 
constitutional affairs of its Member States if they diverge significantly from the 
constitutional identity of the Union. Notwithstanding the importance of such 
interventions for the stability and survival of a federal union, such interventions—like the 
EU’s potential actions against the rise of ‘illiberal democracy’ in Poland and Hungary—
are nevertheless highly controversial because they threaten the political autonomy of its 
Member States. 
Chapter 5 is concerned with the emergency government of the Eurozone crisis. 
It is argued that the government of the Eurozone crisis can be understood according to 
the theories of constitutional defence and emergency politics in the federation. The 
chapter maintains that the reason the government of the Eurozone crisis does not 
conform to the theory of the ‘state of exception’ is that the EU is a federation and not a 
state. The chapter first develops a theory of federal constitutional defence primarily based 
on the theory and praxis of the pre-civil war United States (the doctrine of states’ rights) 
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and the 19th century German Federation (the theory of federal execution and federal 
intervention). Based on these theories of federal constitutional defence, the chapter 
analyses both ‘Eurocrisis law’ and the contestation of the emergency government of the 
Eurozone crisis by EU Member States.  
The thesis relies on a wide array of sources and literatures that are not often, if 
ever, brought in contact with one another. In terms of literatures, the thesis touches upon: 
(a) EU law scholarship, including, constitutional pluralism, constitutional tolerance, 
integration through law, Eastern enlargement, legal scholarship on Article 7 TEU, and 
‘Euro crisis law’, (b) history of European integration and EU law, (c) theory and 
intellectual history of the federation, (d) theories of emergency politics, (e) nationalism 
studies, (f) social movement studies on the contestation of the government of the 
Eurozone crisis. In terms of sources, the thesis relies on (a) EU primary and secondary 
law, (b) speeches by EU and Member State officials, (c) meeting minutes from 
conventions between EU Member States, (d) legal material from previous federations, 
most importantly the 1781 Articles of Confederation, 1787 US Constitution and the 
constitutional documents of the German Federation, (e) constitutional and political 
debates in previous federations, most importantly the Federalist Papers and the debates 
between John Calhoun and Daniel Webster.  
By relying on a wide array of sources and literatures, I hope to provide a politically 
and historically grounded constitutional theory of the EU as a federation. Two of the 
most important reasons why the constitutional nature of the EU remains a mystery is, 
first, that, aside from the EU, we have no contemporary experience of the federation as 
a political form, and for that reason, we have to turn to history to find that which we 
ought to compare it to in constitutional terms. Second, the main reason for why the 
federation belongs to constitutional theory and not international law is that it is a political 
association. A proper study of the constitutional theory of the EU can therefore not 
afford to dispense with either history or the political.   
Notwithstanding the scope of the thesis and the material it relies on, the focus of 
the thesis is limited to the development of a constitutional theory of the EU. It is therefore 
important to stress that the purpose of the thesis is not to explicate the body of EU 
constitutional law in light of the theory of the federation18. The aim of this thesis is at a 
fundamental level to understand the foundations for authority in the EU, both of the 
Union and of the Member States. One of the core insights of the theory of the federation 
                                                          
18 This is the aim of Schütze’s European Constitutional Law. 
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is that a union of states has “two coexistent structures of government, one at the centre, 
and one at the level of the Member States”19. For that reason, a study of the question, with 
what right are the citizens and states of Europe governed? has to focus on the foundations of 
authority of both the Union and the Member States. The thesis aims to study the EU as 
a political association composed primarily of other political associations, namely the 
Member States. Central to the thesis therefore is the relationship between these two kinds 
of political associations the Union and its Member States. In contrast to many other 
studies of EU authority, the thesis is not concerned to any significant extent with the 
institutional dynamics between different EU institutions or their legal frameworks20. 
The thesis is also not concerned with a more sociological understanding of EU 
authority as legitimacy. There is no treatment in the thesis of questions such as whether 
or why or to what extent the states and peoples of Europe believe in the legitimacy of the 
exercise of public power in Europe. Instead, the thesis is concerned with ‘constitutional 
imagination’. That is, the thesis aims to understand with reference to what principles and 
ideas authority is claimed and public power is exercised by the Union and its Member 
States. Neither is the thesis concerned with questions of normative legal or political 
theory, such as whether the EU is legitimate or not, or whether the federation is an 
inherently good or bad form of political association. The aim of the thesis is analytical in 
the sense that it aims to provide a better understanding of the foundations of authority in 
Europe. 
  
                                                          
19 M Forsyth, “The Relevance of Classical Approaches” in JJ Hesse and V Wright (eds) Federalizing Europe? 
The Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems (Oxford, OUP, 1996), 40. 
20 For a study of the dynamics between EU institutions in light of the theory of the federation, see, e.g., 
Fabbrinni’s Which European Union. 
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1 
 
Constitutional Nature 
The enigma of the European Union and the federation as a 
discrete political form  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The debate on the constitutional nature of the European Union (EU) and the 
foundation for its authority is long and there is still no consensus in the field. Authority 
has been contested with regard to the EU, and earlier the European Economic 
Community (EEC), ever since the European Court of Justice (ECJ) declared direct effect 
and supremacy of European law in Van Gend en Loos (1963) and Costa vs. ENEL (1964). 
What is contested is not so much the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect eo ipso but 
their foundations and hence their scope and the ultimate laws and institutions they are 
governed by and subjected to. The central tension in this debate is between the scholars 
who emphasise the constitutional autonomy and sovereignty of the Member States and 
those who emphasise the constitutional status of EU law.  
Scholars who emphasise Member State sovereignty tend to understand the 
foundation of EU authority along the lines of public international law arguing that the 
authority of EU law is rooted in national constitutions and that, ultimately, the Member 
States are the ‘masters of the treaties’1. Within this field, most scholars would not dispute 
the primacy or supremacy of EU law eo ipso but its source and hence its limitations. The 
argument presented is that the foundation for EU law is an interstate agreement and that 
the EU therefore—however complex—must be understood as a treaty organization 
governed by and subject to public international law. Other scholars emphasise the 
supranational level of the governmental structure of the Union arguing on the basis of 
                                                          
1 B de Witte, “The EU as an International Legal Experiment” in JHH Weiler and G de Búrca (eds) The 
Worlds of European Constitutionalism (Cambridge, CUP, 2012); D Grimm, “Sovereignty in the European 
Union” in J Van der Walt and J Ellsworth (eds), Constitutional Sovereignty and Social Solidarity in Europe 
(Bloomsbury, Nomos, 2015); T Schilling, “The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: An Analysis 
of Possible Foundations” in Who in the Law is the Ultimate Umpire of European Community Law (1996) NYU 
School of Law Jean Monnet Working Paper; A Pellet, “Les Fondements Juridiques Internationaux du Droit 
Communautaire” in Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law Vol. 5 Book 2 (The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 1997).  
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the autonomy of the EU legal order, the development of EU fundamental rights 
legislation, the doctrine of implied powers, pre-emption, the fidelity principle and EU 
citizenship, that the EU must be understood as a constitutional order in its own right with 
an autonomous source of authority2. From this perspective, the insistence on the EU as 
a treaty organization of public international law is needlessly legalistic and misses the 
fundamental character of the Union as a legal and political order in its own right governed 
by its own, albeit peculiar, constitution. The EU is ‘sui generis’, the argument continues, 
and we should therefore try to understand its unique features and special nature that 
makes it ‘more’ than a treaty organisation of international law. The underlying consensus 
shared between these two positions is that the authority of the EU must be founded on 
either an international law treaty or a public law constitution. For that reason, the debate 
on the EU—even when it speaks in the language of ‘sui generis’—does not challenge the 
fundamental assumptions of the theory of the state that necessitates a resolute distinction 
between the worlds of international law and of public law. This thesis will challenge this 
underlying consensus. 
Although it is understandable that EU scholars want to insist on the impossibility 
of reducing the EU to the world of international law, the idea of the EU as sui generis, i.e., 
that the legal and political form of the EU is unprecedented, is not correct. From the 
perspective of the history of political thought, the EU’s fundamental characteristic of 
‘international yet constitutional’ is neither new nor unique. The puzzling legal and political 
form characterising the EU and its paradoxical foundations, this thesis maintains, can be 
understood on the basis the constitutional theory of the federation as theorised most importantly 
by Olivier Beaud, Christoph Schönberger, Murray Forsyth and Carl Schmitt3. In their 
writings Beaud, Schönberger, Forsyth and Schmitt use different terms—fédération, Bund, 
confederation, union of states and federal union—however, they all describe the same 
phenomenon, namely, a political union of states founded on a constitutional treaty. In this thesis, 
I will use ‘federation’, ‘federal union’, and ‘union of states’ interchangeably. In spite of the 
fact that Forsyth, the only Anglophone author on whose work I rely, uses the term 
                                                          
2 U Haltern and JHH Weiler, “Constitutional or International? The Foundation of the Community Legal 
Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz” in AM Slaughter, AS Sweet, JHH Weiler 
(eds) The European Courts and National Courts—Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Oxford, Hardt Publishing, 1998); 
JHH Weiler, “In Defense of the Status Quo, Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg” in JHH Weiler and M 
Wind (eds) European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge, CUP, 2003), 7-26. 
3 C Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2008), 97; O Beaud, Théorie 
de la Fédération (Paris, PUF, 2007); M Forsyth, Union of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederations (New 
York, Leicester University Press, 1981); C Schönberger, “Die Europäische Union als Bund” (2004) AöR 
129(1); C Schönberger, Unionsbürger: Europas föderale Bürgerrecht in vergleichender Sicht (Tübingen, Mohr 
Siebeck, 2005). 
20 
 
‘confederation’, I have chosen not to adopt it. The reason is not that it is historically or 
theoretically inadequate to describe the phenomenon in question but that it is associated 
with the ‘statist’ imaginary of the ‘Staatenbund’ that, as will become clear in this chapter, 
has hindered a genuine understanding of the constitutional theory of the federation. The 
statist distinction between Bundesstaat (‘federal state’) and Staatenbund (‘confederation’) that 
will be repudiated in this thesis has possibly been imported to the English language via 
the translation of Louis le Fur’s État Fédérale et Confédération d’États; a direct translation of 
the German distinction between Bundesstaat and Staatenbund4.  
In their works, Beaud, Schönberger, Forsyth and Schmitt build on a much longer 
tradition of legal and political theorists who have struggled to describe an autonomous 
legal and political form irreducible to the other main political forms of modernity, most 
importantly, the state and, perhaps to a lesser degree, the empire. This tradition of legal and 
political thought includes figures such as Althusius, Pufendorf, Madison, Hamilton, 
Calhoun, Webster, de Tocqueville, Waitz, Le Fur and Seydel5. This ‘federal canon’ of 
political thought—less read than the state-centric canon of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, 
Kant and Hegel—was born out of an attempt to understand political associations, 
historical or contemporaneous, that could not comfortably be understood on the basis of 
the theory of the state. The most important examples of such political associations are 
the Old Swiss Confederation (1291-1798), the Restored Swiss Confederation (1815-48), 
the United Provinces of the Netherlands (1579-1795), the German Federation (1815-66), 
the Confederation of the United States of America (1781-9) and the United States of 
American (1789-Civil War).  
In this thesis, I rely on works from the federal canon of legal and political thought 
and draw on important examples from the earlier federal unions of states, most 
extensively the German Federation and the United States. Of central importance, 
however, is the theory of the federation as developed by Beaud, Schönberger, Forsyth 
and Schmitt. In their works, these four scholars have with most clarity given accounts of 
the legal and political theory of the federation as a political association in its own right 
without falling into the ‘statist trap’ that tends to reduce the federation to either a loose 
alliance of sovereign states exclusively governed by international law or a sovereign federal state 
                                                          
4 Forsyth, Union of States, 135. The distinction between ‘Staatenbund’ and ‘Bundesstaat’ was coined by Georg 
Waitz in his article “Das Wesen des Bundesstaates” [“The Nature of the Federal State”] in 1853. 
However, it was only later, perhaps with the publication of Max von Seydel’s Der Bundesstaatbegriff, that it 
got the meaning with which it is currently associated, see R Emerson, State and Sovereignty in Modern 
Germany (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1928), 94-100. 
5 For a review of the ‘federal canon’ of political thought see Forsyth, Union of States. 
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exclusively governed by public law. What Beaud, Schönberger, Forsyth and Schmitt grasp 
is that the federation is a discrete form of political association with its own legal and 
political theory that cannot be understood on the basis of the theory of the state. The 
federation calls into question the state-centric categories we tend to think all political life 
in, most importantly, the idea of sovereignty. This problem of sovereignty in a federal 
union of states will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.  
As previous theorists in the federalist canon, Schmitt, Beaud, Schönberger and 
Forsyth are interested in the theory of the federation in relation to concrete political 
associations. Schmitt was interested in the theory of the federation partly in order to make 
sense of the newly founded League of Nations6 but also, it seems, the Soviet Union. The 
former he did not understand as a federation, the latter he was more ambiguous about. 
He was also interested in the federation in relation to the historical development of the 
German state. The questions of the nature of federalism and whether and to what extent 
the German state should be understood as a federation was still an ongoing debate in 
Germany even after the constitution of the Weimar Republic7. When the Nazis rose to 
power in 1933, the debates on federalism in Germany came to an end. Schmitt is in a way 
part of the closure of the German debate on the theory of the federation. He is part of 
the last generation of German constitutional scholars who found it necessary to present 
an argument for why Germany was a state and not a union of states, i.e., a ‘Bund’8.   
Studies of the EU as a federation constitute a new line in the history of the 
constitutional theory of the federation9. It is in order to understand the EU that Forsyth, 
Beaud and Schönberger turn to the theory of the federation. Schmitt’s theory of the 
federation is one of the main theoretical foundations for this debate. It is at the heart of 
especially Beaud’s and Schönberger’s but also Forsyth’s writings on the federation. 
Following the writings of the authors mentioned, this thesis maintains that the 
constitutional nature of the EU is a federation, i.e., the EU is a European federal union of 
                                                          
6 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 383-4.  
7 Emerson, State and Sovereignty in Modern Germany, 236-53.  
8 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 386. 
9 Together with the substantive work of Beaud, Forsyth and Schönberger, arguments for the EU as a 
federation have been presented by Robert Schütze, Sergio Fabbrinni, Alexander Warleigh and Matej 
Avbelj. See R Schütze, European Constitutional Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2015), 43-76; R Schütze, “Federalism 
as Constitutional Pluralism: ‘Letters from America’” in M Avbelj and J Komárek (eds) Constitutional 
Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012); S Fabbrinni, Which European 
Union: Europe after the Eurozone Crisis (Cambridge, CUP, 2015); S Fabbrinni, “Intergovernmentalism in the 
European Union. A Comparative Federalism Perspective” (2017) Journal of European Public Policy 24(4); A 
Warleigh, “Better the Devil You Know? Synthetic and Confederal Understandings of European 
Unification” (1998) West European Politics 21(3); M Avbelj, “Theory of European Union” (2011) European 
Law Review 36(6). 
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states. The thesis will demonstrate how the theory of the federation can explain the core 
characteristics of the legal and political form of the EU and its paradoxical ‘international 
yet constitutional’ foundations. 
This thesis therefore goes beyond the mainstream constitutional interpretation of 
the EU as ‘sui generis’. Notwithstanding that the EU is ‘more’ than an organisation of 
international law, this thesis maintains that the ‘sui generis’ thesis could only be convincing 
because the political form to which the EU belongs has been forgotten. The encounter 
with the EU—perhaps the only true federation of the contemporary world—will 
‘naturally’ lead us to think that it is unique. Interestingly, Alexis de Tocqueville came to 
the same conclusion regarding the United States: “a form of government was found which 
was strictly neither national nor federal. Things have halted there but the new word needed 
to describe this new state of affairs does not yet exist”10. The description of the EU as ‘sui generis’ 
is problematic not only because of its historical and theoretical inaccurateness. As pointed 
out by Schönberger, the perception of the EU as one of a kind prevents us from 
endeavouring into comparative studies of the EU in relation to other federations or 
unions of states11. Besides, it prevents us from breaking away from the imaginary of the 
state that has co-opted the theory of the federation with the rigid distinction between a 
loose alliance of sovereign states (Staatenbund) and a sovereign federal state (Bundesstaat)12. 
The ‘sui generis’ thesis is merely a ‘superficial’ break with this classical distinction which 
allows for its perpetuation13. This state-centric orientation of EU scholarship leads to 
puzzling negative conceptualisations of the EU such as a ‘statelike non-state’ (staatsanaloger 
Nichtstaat) or a ‘federal state-like non-federal state’ (bundesstaat analoger Nichtbundesstaat)—
in the words of Schönberger14. The political form of the state has been so influential—
politically and theoretically—that we no longer understand political forms that question 
its basic assumptions. The categories of the state have blinded us to federalism15 and so, 
in the name of theory, we have denied the reality existing before our eyes16. 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 A de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (London, Penguin, 2003), 185, emphasis added. 
11 Schönberger, “Die Europäische Union als Bund”, 119. 
12 ibid 83.  
13 ibid. 
14 ibid 84. 
15 Schönberger, Unionsbürger, 45ff. 
16 Forsyth, Union of States, x. 
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I: THE FEDERATION AS A POLITICAL FORM 
 
Besides the EU, the political form of the federation is neither a part of our lived 
experience nor of our political imagination. To understand the EU for what it truly is, we 
therefore need to retrieve the lost meaning of the federation as a discrete form of political 
association. That we have forgotten the federation as a political form does—unfortunately 
for this thesis—not mean that we have stopped using the words ‘federalism’ and 
‘federation’. They just mean something else in contemporary political vocabulary.  To 
understand the constitutional theory of the federation we must first isolate the federation 
as a discrete form of political association from other traditions in ‘federal thought’, more 
prevalent today, before a positive definition can be given. We must, in other words, 
provide a negative definition of the concept of the federation. 
 
A: The Negative Definition of the Federation 
In the contemporary world, federalism is often understood as referring to a 
specific form of state government17 or process where power is devolved from the central 
government to regions, cities or councils18. Federalism is thus reduced to a particular kind 
of devolution or decentralisation19. For the purposes of this thesis, the constitutional 
theory of the federation is neither concerned with a kind of organisation of the state nor 
a system of government or a process of devolution. In contrast, this thesis is concerned 
with the federation as a type of political association distinct from that of state and not 
‘merely’ a form of state government. And while it is indisputably the case that federal 
states have come into being as a result of devolution, e.g., Belgium, these cases are left 
out of this study. The theory of the federation as a political form must be distinguished 
from the process of devolution and ‘federal’ forms of government of the state20. The 
origin of the federation is foedus21—covenant or treaty—requiring multiple political entities 
                                                          
17 DJ Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1987); B Galligan, 
“Comparative Federalism” in RAW Rhodes, SA Binder and BA Rockman (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Institutions (Oxford, OUP, 2006); A Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1999). 
18 CJ Friedrich, Trends in Federalism in Theory and Practice (London, Pall Mall Press, 1968), 3-9, 12, 18. 
19 Friedrich, Trends in Federalism in Theory and Practice, 4-5. 
20 Beaud, Théorie, 33. See also J Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty—Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy and 
Constitutionalism (Cambridge, CUP, 2012), 86. 
21 SR Davis, The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time in Quest of Meaning (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1978), 3; Beaud, Théorie, 112-116; DS Rufus, The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time in 
Quest of a Meaning (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978). 
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coming together in a common union and is thus distinct from a process of political 
devolution or decentralisation of a unitary state22.  
To understand the federation as a discrete form of political association we must 
further isolate it from the ‘universalist’ idea of ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ or the 
‘constitutionalisation of world society’ that historically was manifest in the League of 
Nations23 and today in the United Nations. This is an aspirational idea that historically has 
been presented during the Enlightenment by l’Abbé de Saint Pierre24 and Immanuel 
Kant25 and more recently in the context of the EU by Jürgen Habermas26. Within this 
strand of thought, a federation does not refer to a form of political association, but an 
aspiration to go beyond ‘the political’—most importantly war—as such. The EU is 
cherished by Habermas, not primarily as a political community in its own right, but as a 
stepping stone to a cosmopolitan world order based on Universalist aspirations for 
individual human rights and perpetual peace27. In contrast, the concept of the federation 
developed in this thesis is not a description of a ‘world society’ bound together in 
aspirational terms in order to secure universal human rights and perpetual peace. In this 
thesis, the concept of the federation as a political form refers to an actual territorially bounded 
political association with an outside and an inside28. 
Accepting that the federation is a territorially bounded political association can 
lead to the most common misconception, namely, the equation of a federation with the 
empirical reality of present day consolidated federal states (‘federation=federal state’)29. 
This equation is understandable because federal states are today widespread and 
federations are not. If the EU is compared with a consolidated federal state like the 
contemporary United States or Germany, it is not a surprise that so many scholars 
conclude that the EU is ‘sui generis’ or an ‘incomplete federation’30. Notwithstanding that 
the EU perhaps is the only contemporary manifestation of a federation31 and as such a 
‘unique’ phenomenon in our contemporary world this does not make it ‘sui generis’. The 
                                                          
22 Cohen, Globalisation and Sovereignty, 112. 
23 Forsyth, Union of States, 9.  
24 ibid 86ff. 
25 I Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (1795) available in I Kant, Political Writings translated 
by HB Nisbet (Cambridge, CUP, 1991), 93-115. 
26 J Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union—A Response (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2012). 
27 ibid 54ff.  
28 Forsyth, Union of States, 3; Schönberger, “Die Europäische Union als Bund”, 102; Schönberger, 
Unionsbürger, 157-8. 
29 Forsyth, Union of States, x; Schönberger, Unionsbürger, 41; Beaud, “La Répartition des Compétences dans 
une Fédération. Essai de Reformulation du Problème” (2016) Foundations of Public Law 16, 181. 
30 JE Fossum and M Jachtenfuchs, “Federal Challenges and Challenges to Federalism. Insights from the 
EU and Federal States” (2017) Journal of European Public Policy 24(4), 470. 
31 O Beaud, “Histoire. Fédération, l'Europe écrit ton nom” (Libération, 25 January 1995).  
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equation between the federation and the federal state leads to the unfortunate fallacy that 
since the EU is not a federal state like the United States, the EU cannot be a federation. 
This way of thinking relies on a historical misconception, namely, that since the United 
States is a federal state today this must always have been the case. However, the United 
States was not founded as a federal state but as a federal union of states and it can at the very 
earliest be described as a federal state after the Civil War32 and was generally not described 
in these terms before the late 19th century33. It is worth remembering that the very concept 
of the ‘federal state’ or the ‘Bundesstaat’ was not even introduced in the intellectual history 
of the federation before around 185034 (importantly Georg Waitz’ 1853 Das Wesen des 
Bundesstaates35 [The Nature of the Federal State])—and at that point in history it was meant as 
a conceptualisation of the ‘mixed regime’ of the federation; not a consolidated federal 
state. If the comparison of the EU with other federal polities is to be meaningful, we must 
compare it to that which it is comparable to, namely federal unions of states36.  
In contrast to the federal state, the federation is a union of states based on a contract 
between them, i.e., a treaty. However, not all treaty organisations are federations and not 
all contracts between states are federal in nature. The argument that the federation is 
different from a consolidated federal state, like the contemporary United States, does not 
entail that all treaty organisations are federations. A federation is not ‘merely’ an interstate 
organisation (as e.g. WTO) or even a (temporary) alliance/Bündnis (as e.g. NATO)37. 
These interstate organisations are contractual relationships between two or more states 
that obligate the contracting states in the particular instances described by the contract; they 
are “obligatory commitments with a definable content”38. Notwithstanding that a contract 
of alliance (Bündnisvertrage), following Schmitt, is more significant than other interstate 
contracts because it affects the contracting states’ jus belli, i.e., the right to wage war39, this 
contract does not affect the sovereign or constitutional status of the contracting states 
                                                          
32 Following Bruce Ackerman, the Reconstruction after the Civil War should be understood as a ‘re-
founding’ where an important shift in the source of constitutional authority from federalism to 
nationalism took place, see B Ackerman, We the People II: Transformations (Cambridge MA, The Belknap 
Press of Havard University Press, 1998), 198-200, 204, 209, 245, 269, 413. See also, Schmitt, 
Verfassungslehre, 375: “the war only meant that the character of the constitution was changed and that the 
federation as such ceased to exist”, my translation. 
33 Forsyth, Union of States, 41-2.  
34 P Riley, “Three 17th Century German Theorists of Federalism: Althusius, Hugo and Leibniz” (1976) 
Publius 6(3), 10. 
35 Forsyth, Union of States, 136. 
36 Beaud, Théorie, 27; TC Fischer, “Federalism in the European Community and the United States: A Rose 
by Any Other Name…” (1994) Fordham Int’l LJ 17(389), 391. 
37 Beaud, Théorie, 271; Beaud, “La Répartition des Compétences dans une Fédération”, 182. 
38 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 282-3. See also Schönberger, “Die Europäische Union als Bund”, 111. 
39 According to Schmitt (Constitutional Theory, 282-3) the right to wage war constitutes the decisive 
expression of the political existence of the state. 
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since they do not transfer their jus belli as such to a third party40. A state is not made ‘half-
sovereign’ by its entrance into an alliance41. In most cases, neither do interstate trade 
organisations challenge the sovereign status of the contracting states because these 
organisations cannot make laws or measures which are directly binding in and on the states 
that created them42. They do not fundamentally alter the principle of the political 
autonomy and self-determination of the contracting states43. 
The main remaining obstacle to a positive definition of the federation is an 
academic distinction originating in the German debates on federalism from the 1870s 
onwards on the basis of which all federations still tend to be perceived and classified: the 
distinction between Bundesstaat (‘federal state’) and Staatenbund (translated as either ‘state 
federation’ or, unfortunately, ‘confederation’)44. The distinction between Bundesstaat and 
Staatenbund relies on the assumption that all actual federations can be made sense of as 
either one sovereign state or many sovereign states; either public law subject or international 
law relationship; either constitution or treaty. The problem with this distinction is that while 
it presents deceptively clear alternatives, it also makes it impossible to understand the legal 
and political reality of the federation. It achieves jurisprudential clarity but ignores reality. 
Schmitt presents an explicit argument for the inadequacy of this distinction. The theory 
of the federation, he writes, must be developed independently of the distinction between 
Staatenbund and Bundesstaat: 
 
“[This distinction] presents seemingly clear and striking alternatives, yet ones that are in 
fact logically peculiar or impossible. The Staatenbund should be a purely international law 
relationship, in contrast to a Bundesstaat, which is an unadulterated public law subject. The 
one rests on an international law treaty, the other has a public law constitution; the one is 
legal relationship, the other is legal subject, etc. With such schematic and convenient 
formulas, the common fundamental concept of the entire problem is left out of account 
(…) Today, this simple method is no longer possible”45. 
 
                                                          
40 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 282-3. See also Forsyth, Union of States, 14. 
41 ibid.  
42 Forsyth, Union of States, 13-4; Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 382-3; Schönberger, Unionsbürger, 155-7. 
43 Forsyth, Union of States, 13-4. 
44 C Friedrich, “Federal Constitutional Theory and Emergent Proposals” in AW MacMahon (ed) 
Federalism: Mature and Emergent (New York, Doubleday & Company, 1995), 510-1. 
45 Amended translation of Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 384 (or. Verfassungslehre, 366). Arguments for the 
inadequacy of the Staatenbund-Bundesstaat distinction have also been presented by Beaud, Théorie, 97; 
Beaud, “La Répartition des Compétences dans une Fédération”, 184-5; Schönberger, “Die Europäische 
Union als Bund”, 82ff; Schönberger, Unionsbürger, 145-6. 
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The theory of the federation has developed in order to describe political 
associations that could not be explained by the theory of the state. In contrast, the 
distinction between Bundesstaat and Staatenbund is created as an attempt to make the 
political non-state entity of the federation—Bund—conform to the theory of the state. 
But actual federations do not conform to the neat division into either one sovereign state 
(Bundesstaat) or an association of sovereign states (Staatenbund)46. This distinction, following 
Schmitt, endeavours to solve the problem of the political form of the federation by 
evading it47. The attempt to ‘solve’ the problem of the federation by literately ‘attaching’ 
the concept of the state to the federation—either ‘state-federation’ (Staatenbund) or 
‘federal state’ (Bundesstaat)—is therefore not satisfactory. In order to understand the 
federation as a political form we must, in the words of Beaud, leave ‘the orbit of the 
state’48. 
 
B: The Positive Definition of the Federation 
In his discussion of the constitutional nature of the EU, Joseph Weiler accepts 
the rigid distinction between ‘federal’ (Bundesstaat) and ‘confederal’ (Staatenbund) and, on 
that basis, mistakenly identifies the EU as ‘sui generis’: “Architecturally, the combination 
of a ‘confederal’ institutional arrangement and a ‘federal’ legal arrangement seemed for a 
time to mark Europe’s Sonderweg—its special way and identity”49. This mistaken 
conclusion is bound to be made if the distinction between Bundesstaat and Staatenbund is 
applied. In fact, the prevalence of the faulty distinction between Bundesstaat and 
Staatenbund is, following Forsyth, an important reason why the EEC/EU has not been 
understood in federal terms. He gives the interesting example of the adherence to this 
distinction by the first President of the Commission, Walter Hallstein50. If, on the one 
hand, Hallstein argued, a confederation was defined by its lack of the possibility of 
legislating directly for the individual members of the union, the EEC was indisputably 
‘more’ than a confederation. On the other hand, the EEC was also clearly not a state and 
was for that reason not a federal state. “What was the Community then?”, Forsyth writes 
                                                          
46 M Forsyth, “The Relevance of Classical Approaches” in JJ Hesse and V Wright (eds) Federalizing Europe? 
The Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems (Oxford, OUP, 1996), 32. 
47 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 390. See also ER Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789, Band I: 
Reform und Restauration 1789 bis 1830 (Stuttgart, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1957) [herinafter Huber, DV I], 
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49 JHH Weiler, “Federalism Without Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg” in K Nicolaïdis and R 
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“Hallstein was wary of calling it a federal body, and preferred to refer to it simply as a 
‘Community’, but he also interestingly termed it a ‘union of states’”51. The allure of the 
distinction between Staatenbund and Bundesstaat is that it protects the neat division between 
international law and public law on which the political theory of the state relies. It makes 
it possible to think of the public power and authority of any given federal union as being 
founded on either a treaty or a constitution, either a creature of international law or a creature 
of public law. The problem is—as illustrated by Hallstein’s and Weiler’s problems of 
fitting the EEC in either category—that the reality of the federation contradicts this 
separation because the federation is founded on a treaty that is also a constitution.  
A federation can positively be defined as follows: A federation is a permanent union of 
two or more states that rests on a free agreement of all Member States with the common goal of self-
preservation. This agreement politically changes the constitutional status of the Member States in relation 
to their common aim52. We will now explicate the meaning of this definition. From a purely 
formalistic view it is difficult to distinguish the federation from the family of ‘international 
organisations’ because it always relies on a treaty between its Member States53. This treaty, 
however, is also a constitution because it gives birth to a new political existence and 
transforms its Member States’ constitutions politically54. The federation relies on a status 
contract/treaty (Statusvertag) that encompasses the Member States in their entirety and gives 
them a new status55. A status contract, following Schmitt, differs from other contracts by 
founding  
 
“an enduring life relation that takes into account the person in his existence and 
incorporates the person into a total order, which exists not only in definable individual 
relations and which cannot be set aside through voluntary termination or renunciation. 
Examples of such a status contract are engagement and marriage, the establishment of 
civil servant relationships, and in other legal orders, vassalage contracts and covenants 
(conjugations), etc.”56 
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52 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 383-4. 
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54 Huber, DV I, 661. 
55 “The genuine constitutional contract is always a status contract. The general constitutional contract presupposes 
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A federation rests on a status contract between its Member States that establishes 
a new comprehensive status encompassing the Member States in their entirety and, beyond 
the merely individual, contractual obligations, alters them fundamentally by giving them 
a new status57. In this way, the federation establishes a constitution in the positive sense. The 
federal treaty is an independent constitutional order contracted in perpetuity that 
simultaneously is a component of the constitutions of all the Member States58.  
That the federal treaty is in ‘perpetuity’ or ‘permanent’ does not mean that it 
necessarily lasts forever. The ‘permanence’ is part of the intention of the federal contract. 
A status contract is meant to bind the contracting partners ‘forever more’. That the federal 
contract, in actual historical cases, tends not to bind the contracting partners ‘forever more’ 
is another matter. To illustrate the meaning of ‘permanence’ we can look at another more 
common status contract: marriage59. While the average duration of a marriage in the UK 
is around 11 years60, it is not possible to go into a predetermined time-limited marriage. 
There is no such thing as a wedding vow stating, “I take you to be my wedded 
wife/husband for the next 11 years”. Similarly, in political history, city states, republics, 
empires, nation-states and federations alike have come into being and collapsed but in 
their foundational intention they tend to be in ‘perpetuity’ or ‘permanent’. Schmitt 
therefore qualifies the idea of the federation as a permanent constitutional order as 
follows:  
 
“The federal treaty aims to establish a permanent order, not just a provisional regulation. 
That also follows from the concept of a status because a merely provisional individual 
regulation that can be promulgated and defined cannot establish status. So every 
federation is an ‘eternal one’, in other words, a federation is counted on for the long 
term”61.  
 
                                                          
57 ibid 119.  
58 ibid 385. 
59 For a comparison of marriage as a status contract with the federal contract as a status contract, see C 
Hughes, Confederacies: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered in the University of Leicester 8 November 1962 (Leicester, 
Leicester University Press, 1963), 12. 
60 See report by Office for National Statistics, “Statistical bulletin: Divorces in England and Wales: 2015”, 
available via: 
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Federal treaties tend therefore to be of ‘unlimited duration’. This is also the case with the 
EU treaties62 and was expressed by the ECJ in Costa in the following manner: “The 
transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of 
the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of 
their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept 
of the Community cannot prevail”63. 
The status treaty on which the federation relies leads to a political change in the 
constitutions of its Member States. This constitutional change of the Member States does not 
necessarily entail a change of constitutional law in the Member States64. The constitutional 
change regards something far more important, namely, “the concrete content of the fundamental 
political decisions on the entire manner of the existence of the state”65. There is, following Schmitt, a 
fundamental distinction between a constitution and constitutional laws. The constitution 
is not the sum of the constitutional laws66. The constitution—in its positive sense—consists 
in the fundamental political decision(s) on the political form and the fundamental 
structure of the state; its ‘identity’ or ‘mode of being’. In this way, Schmitt exemplifies, 
the fundamental decision on democracy is encapsulated in the preamble to the Weimar 
Constitution: “the German people provided itself with a constitution”, “state authority 
derives from the people” and “the German Reich is a republic”67. In the current German 
Basic Law, the ‘identity’ or the ‘constitution’—meaning the fundamental political decision 
made by the German constituent power—is encapsulated, or so the German 
Constitutional Court argues, in Art 168 and 2069 of the German Basic Law together with 
article 79.370 (the so-called ‘eternity clause’) that makes the two first provisions 
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unamendable by law71. The constitution in its positive sense, however, is a dynamic entity 
subject to reinterpretation and can therefore never be fully absorbed by a written 
constitution72; not even by an ‘identity clause’. 
In less legalistic constitutional settlements than the German Basic Law, it will be 
more difficult to pinpoint the constitution in its positive sense in any one text or, perhaps, 
in any text at all. That does not mean that these less legalistic constitutional settlements 
are without a constitution in its positive sense. The constitution or the identity is the body 
of principles characterizing the fundamental structure and manner of the existence of the 
state in its entirety73. The constitution in its positive sense relates to the fundamental 
characteristics of how a political association governs itself. It is this identity that the federal contract 
leads to a change in and it is for that reason that the federation ought to be understood 
as constitutional in nature. Following Schmitt, the legal foundation of the validity of a 
federal treaty-constitution is the political will of the contracting states and the existence 
of the federation that rests on it74. The constitutional nature of a federation is determined 
by the political change of its Member States and the concrete existence of a new political 
being, the common Union. Independently of whether this is discernible from a purely 
legal analysis, the federation is of a constitutional nature because it changes its Member 
States politically by virtue of their membership in the new common Union.  
Juristically, it is indisputable that the EU relies on a treaty. From a purely legalistic 
perspective, the EU is therefore a treaty organization and as such it belongs to the world 
of international law as has correctly been pointed out by Bruno de Witte75. Nevertheless, 
it is wrong to conclude on that basis that it is without a constitution according to the 
theory of the federation. Politically, it is not meaningful to understand the EU as ‘merely’ 
a creature of international law because the EU has subordinated its constituent units in a 
way that has changed the fundamental state structure and constitutional identities of the 
contracting states and their relations inter se: “Once they have come together in a federal 
union, the Member States are no longer truly sovereign states, nor are they strangers to 
one another”76. The creation of the EU has led to a political change in the constitution of the 
Member States and it is this constitutional change—a change that affects the very identity of 
the contracting states—which distinguishes the EU from being ‘merely’ a creature of 
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public international law: “if the federation is neither an alliance nor an international 
organisation, it is because it is a political entity”77. Jacques Chirac, therefore, 
(unknowingly) described the constitutional nature of the EU when he was asked about 
whether the Constitutional Treaty was a constitution or a treaty: “Legally a treaty, but 
politically a constitution”, he said78. As other federations, the EU is founded on a federal 
constitutional treaty/contract. This concept is not an oxymoron, in contrast to what is often 
maintained due to the prevalence of the statist categories79. Following the theory of the 
federation, Dieter Grimm’s analysis that the EU cannot have an autonomous 
constitutional order because it relies on a treaty is therefore incorrect80.  
 
 
II: THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY 
 
A: The Concept of the Federal Constitutional Treaty 
The federal constitutional treaty is a contractual constitution because it presupposes 
two or more politically existing states, each of which contain within them one subject of 
the constituent power81. The federation rests on a constitutional contract between the subjects 
of the constituent powers of all the Member States82. Within the modern state, a 
constitution will, in Schmitt’s view, always be a one-sided decision by the sovereign people 
or prince as the sole carrier of the constituent power83. The federal constitution is in this 
way a contract between two or more national subjects of the constituent power entered into 
on a free and equal basis84. Whereas the constitution of a state (ideal-typically) is born out 
of an exercise of will, the constitution of a federation is born out of a contract between its 
Member States. The constitution of a federation is therefore both a ‘federal treaty’ 
(Bundesvertrag) and a ‘constitutional contract’ (Verfassungsvertrag)85. There are no perfect 
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English translations, however, a federal- and constitutional ‘covenant’, ‘treaty’, ‘contract’ 
or ‘compact’ are all possible. 
The ideal-typical example of a federal constitutional contract is the 1787 
Constitution of the United States. Due to the debates between the Federalists and the Anti-
federalists it is also one of the best documented. We therefore have extensive knowledge 
of how the constitution of the United States was perceived at the time of the 
constitutional convention.  In Federalist 39, Madison argued that the foundational act 
establishing the constitution of the United States was a contract between the peoples of the 
United States and not an act by a unitary American constituent power exercising its unitary 
sovereign will. The constitution was, following Madison, to be ratified directly by the ‘the 
people themselves’ by which he meant via a referendum and not by the legislative 
authority. It was, in other words, to be ratified not by the constituted power but by the 
constituent power. However, the US constitution was made not by the American 
constituent power (in the singular) but by the American constituent powers (in the plural). 
The authority of the constitution was at the time of the founding derived from a contract 
between the people of the states. The contractual nature of the foundational act was, 
according to Madison, expressed in the single consideration that the constitution was 
ratified by the will of the people—not as one nation—but as a  
 
“result from the UNANIMOUS assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing 
no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the legislative 
authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this 
transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the 
United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the majority in each State 
must bind the minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either by a 
comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States 
as evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these 
rules have been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, 
independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act”86. 
 
The contractual basis is not altered by the fact that the Founding Fathers broke with the 
Articles of Confederation in their decision that the Constitution could rest on the 
ratification of 9 out 13 states. As is clear from Article seven of the original Constitution, 
a hypothetical ratification of the Constitution by nine states would only bind these nine 
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states and not the remaining four: “The Ratification of the Conventions of nine states, 
shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying 
it”87. It was not possible for a majority of the states to enforce the constitution against a 
minority of the states.  The federal constitution is thus a contract between several states, 
entered into on a free and equal basis. All federations are founded on a free and equal 
contract between the federating states.   
The notion of a ‘free and equal contract’ is exclusively concerned with the 
question of the relationship between the federating states and not the internal relationship 
between governors and governed within the federating states. A federation is, in other 
words, not necessarily a union of democratic or republican states founded on an act or 
acts of the constituent power of the people. Historically, there are several examples of 
federal unions of internally ‘unfree and unequal’ states. Whereas the founding of the United 
States is a helpful ideal type for understanding the concept of a federal constitutional 
treaty, it is also easy to overgeneralise its meaning. The US Constitution had a ‘popular 
founding’ but that is not the case for all federations. The German Federation of 1815-
1866 provides a good example of a non-democratic/non-republican federation not 
constituted by or in the name of the people(s). With the exception of the four ‘free cities’ 
(Bremen, Frankfurt, Hamburg and Lübeck), the German Federation of 1815 was a federal 
union of monarchs (Monarchenbund) founded on a constitutional treaty between the 
monarchical constituent powers of the German states and two foreign monarchs: the 
King of Denmark on behalf of Lauenburg and Holstein and the King of the Netherlands 
on behalf of Luxemburg and Limburg88. The federation is therefore not necessarily 
founded by an act of popular constituent power. The principle of the free and equal 
contract means that a federal union of states cannot be founded by an act of force or 
domination by one state over another. The origins of a federal union is foedus89 (covenant, 
treaty, compact) and not imperium (command).  With regard to its founding, the freedom of 
the states in their decision to come together in a common union is what distinguishes the 
political form of the federation from the political form of another kind of union of states, 
namely, the empire: “The federation is a free union of states whereas the empire is a 
coercive union of states. The federation stems from a mutual agreement, most often 
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formalised (a federal covenant), whereas the empire rests on pure fact, the conquest of a 
state or country, or coercion”90.  
In contrast to the empire, the federation does not commence by an act of violence, 
force or domination91. A federation is based on the free consent of the contracting parties 
in order to perpetuate their political existence as free and equal members of a common 
Union. The constitution of the common Union by the federal constitutional contract 
does, for that reason, neither eliminate the constitutions of the Member States nor their 
political existence92. On the contrary, a federation is created in order to perpetuate the 
political existence of its Member States as equal members of a common Union.  
 
B: The Constitution of a United Europe 
Due to historical circumstances, the foundation of the EU/EEC differs in several 
important ways from the ideal typical example of the 1787 Constitution of the United 
States. The constitutional history of the EU will be discussed at length in Chapter 2, but 
two important differences have to be discussed immediately because they are central to 
why the constitutional and federal nature of European integration and especially of the 
early period is often disregarded. First, the lack of ‘extra-ordinary politics’93 in the 
ratification of (early) European treaties and, second, the lack of explicit constitutional 
vocabulary. 
The constitutional imaginary of the 1787 Constitution of the United States is that 
of the modern republican revolution bringing to life the notion of the constituent power 
of the people. As pointed out by Hannah Arendt, the revolutionary concept of the 
constituent power does not necessarily entail a doctrine of popular sovereignty. In On 
Revolution, Arendt argued that an important reason for the success of the American 
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Revolution, and the failure of its counterpart in France, was its rejection of the idea of 
popular sovereignty manifest, most importantly, in the American exceptionalism 
consisting of the federal nature of the Confederation and the pre-given republican 
institutional structure manifest most importantly in the town halls94. Notwithstanding the 
important differences between the two great modern revolutions, they bear, however, an 
important similarity, namely, a fundamental understanding that the constituent power of 
the people, which could express itself in acts of extra-ordinary politics was a source of 
power and freedom to be used for the creation of new constitutional orders.  
The post-WWII European constitutional imaginary is fundamentally different 
from that of the modern revolutions. In contrast to the modern revolutionary 
constitutions, the post-WWII European constitutions, following Arendt, were written by 
experts ‘as puddings made from a recipe’ and imposed after the revolutions had failed95: 
“Their purpose was to stem the tide of revolution, and if they too served to limit power, 
it was the power of the government as well as the revolutionary power of the people 
whose manifestation had preceded their establishment”96. Despite still speaking in the 
language of ‘We, the people’, the constituent power of the people was generally perceived 
as something dangerous that ought to be constrained97. The general fear of ‘people’s 
power’ manifested itself in a general scepticism against plebiscites, especially in Germany 
and the German Basic Law of 1949 was not ratified via a referendum. With regard to the 
ratification of European treaties in the early post-WWII years, Charles de Gaulle was the 
only contemporaneous leader who seemed to have an appetite for ratifying European 
treaties by referenda in the Member States in the early days of European integration. The 
original European treaties, in contrast to the 1787 Constitution of the United States, were 
not ratified by acts of extra-ordinary politics but by acts of parliaments and, in formal 
terms in the BENELUX countries, by royal assent.  
Leaving aside the case of Germany that to this day outlaws referenda, the general 
fear of ratification via referendum in the context of Europe has changed significantly over 
the years with the Enlargements of the Union. With the first round of enlargements, 
referenda on membership were held in 1972 in France (accepting the enlargement of the 
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EEC) and in Ireland, Denmark and Norway (the latter rejecting membership)98. In 1975, 
the UK held a referendum on membership ex post facto. Except for Portugal, Bulgaria and 
Cyprus, all acceding Member States have had referendums on membership in the 
EEC/EU. That the first European treaties were not ratified by acts of extraordinary 
politics does therefore not mean that they are not constitutional in nature. Rather the lack 
of referendums is an expression of the predominant constitutional imaginary of the post-
WWII world appositely named ‘constrained democracy’ by Jan-Werner Müller99 (Chapter 
3). 
In contrast to the 1787 Constitution of the United States, the European treaties 
include constitutional vocabulary only to a very limited degree. The reason for this lack 
has to do with the genesis of the project of European integration. Whereas the 1787 
Constitution of the United States was born out of the revolutionary development of what 
started out as a (modest) political project of amending the Articles of Confederation, the 
EEC was born out of the failure of a much grander constitutional project for a United 
Europe that spoke in crystal clear constitutional language (Chapter 2). In the 1957 Treaty 
of Rome, all the constitutional vocabulary of the newly collapsed constitutional projects 
of the European Defence Community and the European Political Community was left 
out except for the most important aim of European integration of clear political and 
constitutional significance, namely, the aim of ‘an ever-closer union among the peoples 
of Europe’. This constitutional aim became a key point of reference in the legal 
construction of European authority in the years to come through the process of 
‘integration through law’. A precedent of achieving constitutionalism through the ‘back 
door’ or ‘by stealth’ was established that has haunted the project of European integration 
ever since, in recent years most openly and explicitly with the Lisbon Treaty that ratified 
most of the content of the Constitutional Treaty but left out the constitutional vocabulary. 
In constitutional terms, the European treaties have been attributed to expressions 
of the will of the peoples of Europe—in the same way as the German Basic Law has been 
attributed to the will of the German people—irrespectively of whether they are founded 
on acts of ordinary or extra-ordinary politics. Dieter Grimm has, e.g., argued that “[t]he 
national parliaments when ratifying a treaty decide as representatives of their peoples. The 
result is attributed to the peoples. Hence, the Lisbon Treaty can be regarded as an 
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expression of the will of the peoples of the Member States”100. A similar understanding 
of the source of constitutional authority of EU law was expressed by Advocate General 
Maduro in Kadi: the Treaty, he argues “is not merely an agreement between states but an 
agreement between the peoples of Europe” that creates a “municipal legal order of 
transnational dimension, of which it forms the ‘basic constitutional charter’”101. 
Irrespectively of the relative lack of constitutional language in the treaties, the 
project of European integration has established a constitution in the positive sense. It has 
united its Member States into a new concrete political order and created institutions 
capable of legislating directly for its citizens leading to a political change in the 
constitutions of the Member States. The development of the constitutional logic of the 
EEC/EU thus adheres to the core principles of the federation that will be discussed in 
the next section, namely, the double constitutional moment of ‘birth and transformation’. 
III: CONSTITUTIONAL BIRTH AND TRANSFORMATION 
 
 
A: The Double Constitutional Moment 
The federal constitutional treaty differs from treaties of international law because 
it binds not merely the states but also the peoples in an ‘ever closer union’. A federation 
is simultaneously a union of states and peoples (‘Staaten- und Völkerverbindung’)102. By 
entering into the federal contract, a new constitutional unity encompassing all the 
contracting states and their citizens is born. The federal constitutional contract is at the 
same time an interstate treaty and the foundation for the new federal legal order103: “The 
federal contract is at the same time treaty and constitution”104. The federal contract 
transforms the identity of the contracting states by the establishment of a new political 
relation of governors and governed that is not ‘international’ in nature. For republican 
and democratic states, this new relationship is (actively) established by a contract between 
the popular constituent powers of the Member States. The federal constitutional treaty is, 
in this way, a contract between all the peoples and states of the Union. The federal 
contract thus lies in between an ‘interstate contract’ (a contract of international law 
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between sovereign states) and an ‘intrastate contract’ (the ‘social contract’ that forms the 
political community as such)105.  
The constitution of a federation is characterised by a double constitutional 
moment of transformation and birth: the transformation of the contracting states and the 
birth of a new a ‘federal existence’106. When coming together in a common Union, the 
contracting states give birth to a new political unity encompassing themselves and their 
citizens in their entirety107. However, the act of coming together in a common Union also 
changes the status, or ‘statehood’, of the founding states108. They are no longer ‘monadic’ 
independent states; they are Member States belonging to the Union at large109. The change 
in status from ‘monadic’ independent state to ‘Member State’ is manifest in that the 
contracting states, by coming together in a common political union, no longer have a 
purely ‘external relation’ to one another of international law. Their relation is primarily an 
‘internal relation’ governed by the internal public law of the Union110. Moreover, the birth 
of the new constitutional order changes the status of the contracting states in that it 
bypasses the contracting states monopoly of public power within their own territories and 
over their populations by establishing a direct link with the Member States’ citizens. It is 
this double moment that makes the federal contract constitutional and distinguishes from 
other interstate contracts.  
The change from independent monadic state to Member State has two 
dimensions in the context of the EU, interstate and intrastate. These dimensions, however, 
are inextricably linked to one another. The interstate transformation is manifest in a change 
of the mutual relationship between the Member States and the change in the relationship 
between the Member States and non-EU states. The relationship between the Member 
States is changed by the establishment of a common Union. After the contracting states 
have established among themselves a common union, the states no longer (primarily) 
relate to one another via international law: “the Member States of a federation are no 
longer foreign countries to one another. They no longer have the relationship described 
by classical international law as impermeable entities vis-a-via one another”111. In contrast, 
                                                          
105 Forsyth, Union of States, 15-6; Beaud, Théorie, 271; Schönberger, “Die Europäische Union als Bund”, 
111. 
106 Beaud, Théorie, 132; Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 398-9. 
107 Schönberger, “Die Europäische Union als Bund”, 111. 
108 Schmitt, Constitutional Treaty, 117; Schönberger, “Die Europäische Union als Bund”, 111; Huber, DV I, 
661-2. 
109 Beaud, Théorie, 205. 
110 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 397; Beaud, Théorie, 206; Forsyth, Union of States, 48; Huber, DV I, 662-3. 
111 Schönberger, “Die Europäische Union als Bund”, 116, my translation. See also Schönberger, 
Unionsbürger, 113. 
40 
 
they appear in front of each other as equal Member States, with equal rights, of a common 
Union112. Their mutual relations, cooperation and conflict are mediated via EU 
institutions and EU law. Any agreement concluded by the Member States inter se has to 
conform to EU law113. Though the Member States, in a sense, remain autonomous, they 
are at the same time interdependent114. 
The Member States can furthermore no longer treat the nationals of other EU 
Member States as aliens115. As other federal unions, the EU breaks with the bipolar 
distinction of the nation-state between national and alien, inclusion and exclusion, and 
introduces in its place a tertiary distinction between citizen of a Member State, citizen of 
the Union and non-Union foreigner116.  The category of Union citizenship allows a citizen 
of one Member State to become ‘quasi-citizen’ of another Member State. The ‘quasi’-
citizenship of the federation can be termed ‘interstate citizenship’117 in that it differs from 
the citizenship of a nation-state and a consolidated federal state. The core of ‘interstate 
citizenship’ is that, as a matter of Union law, the Member States have a duty to treat the 
citizens of the other Member States—subject to certain limits118 and conditions119—as 
they treat their own120 (Chapter 2). Schönberger uses the concept ‘Indigenat’ that originally 
described the fundamental principle of federal citizenship in the North German 
Federation of 1867121. The common ‘indigenat’ granted a right of a citizen of one Member 
State to be treated as a ‘non-alien’ in another Member State, i.e., the right to be treated 
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equally with the ‘natives’ (indigena, Eingeborener) in the other Member States122. In the North 
German Constitution, Article 3(1) it is stated:  
 
“In the entire extent of the federal area there exists a common Indigenat with the effect 
that the national (subject, state-citizen) of any constituent state must be treated as a non-
alien in any other constituent state, and accordingly must be admitted under the same 
conditions as an indigenous person for the purposes of settled residence, economic 
activity, public offices, acquisition of land, acquisition of the right of state-citizenship and 
the enjoyment of all other civil rights, also that he or she is to be treated equally with 
regard to prosecution and legal protection”123.  
 
The EU Treaties guarantee the EU citizens the right to move and reside freely 
within the EU124, the right to vote and stand for municipal elections in the Member State 
that the EU citizen chooses to reside in125, and the right to consular and diplomatic 
protection126. The substantial rights of EU citizenship, however, are primarily derived 
from the principle of non-discrimination127. When residing in Member States other than 
their own, the citizens of an EU Member State have the right to equal treatment with the 
nationals of the Member State they reside in within most areas of state life (with political 
rights as the main exception)128. This principle of horizontal mutual recognition is 
equivalent to that of Indigenat. As in other federations, ‘interstate citizenship’ of the EU is 
based on the principle of horizontal mutual recognition129.  The status of ‘interstate-
citizenship’, in the case of the EU as in other federations, is not based on international 
law but on the internal public law of the Union130. In the relationship between the EU 
states inter se, the distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ is no longer applicable in the 
same way as for ‘monadic’ states131.   
The relationship between Member States and non-EU states is furthermore 
changed. Where the Treaties provide for it or where it is necessary in order to obtain an 
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objective of the Treaties, the Union can make international agreements that are binding 
and directly applicable on the Member States as well as on the Union institutions132. 
Furthermore, by being a part of the common Union, the Member States’ relationship and 
agreements with non-EU states cannot be against the interest of the Union133. Before 
undertaking any actions on the international scene which could affect the interest of the 
Union, the EU Member States are obliged to consult the other Member States in the 
European Council or the Council134. If the Member States conclude agreements of 
international law with third countries, these agreements will be understood by the Union 
as forming part of national law and they will therefore have to yield to Union law in case 
of conflict135. A hierarchy is thereby established between the Member States’ internal 
relations inter se as governed by the Union which enjoys primacy over the Member States’ 
external relationship with non-EU third countries. Commitments made by EU states 
within international law can, as a rule136, not be honoured if they conflict with the internal 
commitments of the Union.  
The intrastate transformation is manifest in the alteration of the relationship between 
the contracting states and their own citizens which happens as a consequence of the 
establishment of the common Union. The governmental apparatus of the EU can, as 
pointed out by Weiler, be distinguished from other structures of ‘governance beyond the 
state’ because it has imposed its norms, not so much on the Member States as in the 
Member States137. Through the preliminary reference procedure, the EU has by way of 
the confluence of the principles of direct effect and supremacy bypassed the principle of 
state responsibility pertaining to public international law138. The individual citizens are 
directly governed as a subject of rights by the European legal order139.  
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The direct governmental link between Union institutions and the citizens of its 
Member States is not a unique feature of EU law but a fundamental character trait 
pertaining to most federations140. The direct link between the Member State citizens and 
the legal order of the Union shows the shortcomings of the ‘statist’ distinction between 
international law and public law pertaining to the distinction between Staatenbund and 
Bundesstaat respectively141. Notwithstanding that the EU is founded on a contract of 
international law (a Staatenbund principle) it has established a direct governmental link with 
the citizens of its Member States and exercises public power under a system of internal 
public law (a Bundesstaat principle). The EU, as other unions of states, carries 
characteristics of both a Staatenbund and a Bundesstaat. A federal union of states is, in 
Madison’s words, a ‘mixed regime’ with both ‘national’ and ‘federal’ characteristics142. 
As is the case with Union citizenship in other federations, EU citizenship 
fundamentally challenges the relationship between governors and governed within the 
Member States in that the monopoly of force of the state over its citizens no longer is in 
place. In the ‘mixed regime’ of the EU, the ‘inter-state privileges’ of EU citizenship allows 
the EU citizens to ‘escape’ their own states, if they so wish, and enjoy equal treatment 
with nationals in whichever Member State they choose to reside in143. The EU citizens are 
endowed with rights that they can claim against their own states and governments; most 
fundamentally and radically, the rights of free movement and non-discrimination.  
Through EU law, citizens of the Union can emancipate themselves from their states 
because they have a real possibility, through EU law, of enjoying the rights of ‘quasi-
citizens’ in another state144. The relationship between governors and governed is 
fundamentally altered because the governed equally belong to another constitutional 
order on whose protection they can rely against their own states and other states of the 
Union.  
 
B: The Double Political Existence 
The political change in the constitutions of the Member States that brings the 
federation beyond international law consists in the constitution of a new permanent 
constitutional order that simultaneously encompasses the Member States in their entirety 
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and makes up a part of the individual Member States’ constitutions. The double 
constitutional moment of birth and transformation is therefore inherently connected. It 
is the creation of a public law framework consisting of governors and governed with a 
(nascent) political identity of its own that leads to a political change in the constitutions 
of the Member States. The constitutional change of the Member States consists in the 
establishment of a permanent order that includes the Member States in a common political 
existence145. The federation is characterised by a double political existence: those of the Member 
States and that of the Union as a whole: “existing alongside one another in every 
federation are two types of political existence: the collective existence of the federation 
and the individual existence of the Member States”146. The federation is (paradoxically) a 
political unity that is composed of other political unities147. 
In the case of the EU, this double political existence has been written into the 
preamble of the EU Treaties from Rome to Lisbon as the political aim (finalité politique) of 
the Union: “DETERMINED to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples 
of Europe”. From the perspective of the theory of the federation, it is crucial that this 
common political existence does not eliminate the existence of the individual Member 
States, the federation and the states exist politically alongside one another148: “Both types 
of political existence must continue to coexist as long as a federation is to remain in 
place”149. The ever-closer union is not supposed to eliminate the constitutional existence 
of a multiplicity of peoples: “The collective existence of the federation must not subsume 
the individual existence of the Member States, nor can the existence of the Member States 
subsume that of the federation”150. 
The double political existence of the federation can be illustrated with the example 
of federal citizenship. In contrast to the unitary nature of citizenship in a nation-state, 
federal citizenship is by definition dual151: federal citizenship implies “dual citizenship of the 
same person at the state and the federal level”152.  Whereas dual citizenship is an anomaly in the 
nation-state, it is the norm in the federation153 because the citizens of the Member States 
also are citizens of the federation. They belong simultaneously to two political entities: a 
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Member State and the Union. With the birth of the federation, a new status comes into 
being, federal citizenship, through which the citizens of the Member States become direct 
subjects of federal authority154. Within their respective jurisdictions, the Union and the 
Member States create rights and obligations for their citizens155. The establishment of 
federal citizenship constitutes the establishment of a nascent ‘people’ or ‘nation’, albeit 
not an exclusive nationality that abolishes the nationality of the individual Member States. 
The establishment of federal citizenship does not imply the abolishment of the original 
status of Member State citizenship. Citizenship of a federation and of its Member States 
exist alongside one another. In EU law, this principle is expressed in Article 9 TEU: 
“Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship and shall not replace 
it”. This dual political existence is what characterises the political form of the EU as a 
federal union of states. 
 
 
IV: THE TWIN SOURCES OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY 
 
A: The Union and the Member States 
Since the federal constitutional contract entails a double constitutional moment 
that gives birth to a new constitutional order and transforms the constitutions of the 
Member States, the federal constitution has two sources for its authority: the new federal 
political existence and the transformed contracting states that have become Member 
States. This is manifest in the dual nature of the federal constitution the content of which 
simultaneously is the federal treaty and a part of the constitutions of the Member States156.  
The constitution of the federation does in this way include all its Member States in a 
common whole and makes up a part of their constitutional orders. In contrast to the 
authority of a state that ultimately relies on the unitary political existence of the state 
expressed in the will of the people or the prince, the federation, being a double political 
existence, has twin sources of public power: the political existence of the Union and the 
political existence of its Member States. Governmental authority in a federation can be 
wielded legally, and ultimately extra-legally, in the name of the security of the Member 
States and for the wellbeing of their citizens and in the name of the security of the Union 
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as a whole and for the wellbeing of its citizens157 (Chapter 5). That is, authority can be 
wielded in the name of the people as one or the peoples as many; in the name of the union 
of states or the union of states.  
From the acknowledgement of the dual political existence of the federation, the 
question of their relationship inter se presents itself: is either the Union or its Member 
States subordinated to the other part? From the perspective of the theory of the 
federation, this question must be answered in the negative: “The Member States are not 
simply subordinated, subjects of the federation, nor is the federation subordinated to and 
subject to them. The federation exists only in this existential connection and in this balance”158. In 
contrast to a state, a federation is characterised by a double political existence where 
neither the Union nor the Member States are subordinated to each other. For that reason, 
the different public powers in the federation constantly have to be balanced and 
coordinated159 (Chapter 4). 
The limitation of the statist distinction between Staatenbund and Bundesstaat 
becomes especially clear when one considers the relationship between the different 
constitutional orders of a federation160.  From the perspective of the statist distinction, it 
is only possible to think in terms of hierarchy: either the Member States are the source of 
authority or the Union is the source authority161. Following the classical distinction, a 
convenient hierarchy is thereby established emanating either from top (Bundesstaat) or from 
bottom (Staatenbund). The federation is thereby made comprehensible to the general 
theory of the state. The same logic of hierarchy is predominant in the debate on the 
foundations of EU authority, where scholars will adopt a ‘particularistic’ or ‘monocular 
view’ favouring either the Union or the Member States in order to establish a hierarchical 
relationship between them162. From the particularistic perspective, it is thus possible to 
construct an EU-centred or a state-centred hierarchy (depending on one’s ‘ideological 
preference’163). The problem is that this conceptualisation, from an empirical point of 
view, is only an adequate description of the weak alliance and the centralised federal 
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state164. A hierarchical relationship between the Union and the Member States does not 
apply to federations165. 
 
B: Constitutional Pluralism 
Constitutional pluralists have long argued that the EU is not characterised by the 
unitary hierarchical structure of the state. Following constitutional pluralism, the EU is 
characterised by a plurality of constitutional orders and claims to foundational authority—
that of the Union and those of the Member States—that are in a heterarchical and 
interactive relationship to one another166. As pointed out by Alexander Somek, there is a 
fundamental resemblance between constitutional pluralism and the theory of the 
federation:  
 
“Had those who introduced the notion of constitutional pluralism to European Union 
law either read Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory or remembered, from their reading, his 
perceptive remarks on the theory of the federal system, they might have addressed 
pluralism by using the characterisation that Schmitt had prepared for its occurrence”167. 
 
What constitutional pluralism unknowingly has identified is a fundamental aspect of the 
constitutional theory of the federation. However, by describing the EU as a new and 
sometimes unique form of constitutionalism, constitutional pluralism—like the ‘sui 
generis’ thesis—unfortunately obscures the federal nature of the EU168. That being said, 
constitutional pluralism succinctly describes some of the fundamental problems relating 
to the relationship between the multiple constitutional orders of a federation in the 
context of the EU and is therefore of great importance to a federal study of the EU. 
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Constitutional pluralism suggests that within the scope of their respective 
jurisdictions, the different constitutions will be interpreted as the highest source of law by 
their highest decision–making authority169. That is, within the domestic constitutional 
orders a domestic court or political institution has the final authority to interpret the 
domestic constitution and within its jurisdiction the domestic constitution is the highest 
source of law. Similarly, the ECJ has the final authority to interpret Union law and within 
its jurisdiction the EU treaties will be the highest source of law. Within each constitutional 
order, the highest decision-making authority will claim Kompetenz-Kompetenz:  
 
“It is for the European Court of Justice to interpret in the last resort and in a finally 
authoritative way the norms of Community law. But equally, it must be for the highest 
constitutional tribunal of each Member State to interpret the interaction of the validity in 
the given state system. Interpretative competence-competence is a feature of the highest 
tribunal of any normative system”170. 
 
If the multiple constitutional orders were completely independent from one 
another, the lack of hierarchy would be unproblematic. In that case, they would merely 
be coexisting parallel legal orders. However, the legal orders, constitutional pluralism 
continues, though independent from one another are also overlapping and interacting171. 
The problem then is how to decide on the borderline or scope of the two constitutional 
orders. In case of a conflictual overlap, the question is what constitution would prevail and 
who would settle that question?  
Constitutional pluralism and the theory of the federation agree that there is no 
legal answer to this question172. Or, more precisely, there are two valid mutually exclusive 
legal answers based in respectively the EU Treaties and the constitutions of the Member 
States as ultimate sources of authority. On the basis of the authority granted by the 
Treaties and with reference to the uniform and efficacious application of EU law173, the 
ECJ has continuously asserted its right174 to decide on the validity of EU law175 and the 
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legality of all acts of the EU institutions176, including the EU Treaties that constitute the 
Union and confer competence upon it, and thereby the right to decide upon the 
boundaries of EU authority. The ECJ thus claims Kompetenz-Kompetenz with regard to 
EU law. However, this claim to authority has generally not been accepted by national 
constitutional courts. With reference to the principle of conferral177 and their own 
constitutions, the national constitutional courts have argued that, ultimately, they are the 
guardians of the boundaries of EU authority. The most vocal proponent of this argument 
is the German Constitutional Court that with reference to German constitutional law and 
the principle of conferral has maintained that it has the ultimate authority to determine 
the boundaries of Union competencies and the legality of EU law178. The EU, the German 
Constitutional Court has argued, has not been endowed with Kompetenz-Kompetenz179. 
Furthermore, all German state institutions have a duty not to apply EU law which the 
German Constitutional Court deemed to be ultra vires180. Despite being bound by the 
principle of fidelity181, the ultimate loyalty of German institutions, the German 
Constitutional Court argues, resides not with the EU but with the German state. 
The question of where Kompetenz-Kompentenz resides in the EU is especially 
salient in Germany and perhaps this has to do with the German debate on federalism and 
sovereignty that took place in late 19th century. In this debate, the question of 
Kompentenz-Kompetenz became understood as the deciding issue for where sovereignty 
lies in a federal polity which again would determine its constitutional nature182. If the 
federal level (Bundesebene) was endowed with Kompetenz-Kompentenz, the Bund was 
really a Bundesstaat; a sovereign federal state. Contrariwise, if the Member States were 
endowed with Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the Bund was really a Staatenbund; an alliance of 
sovereign states. In other words, the question of Kompetenz-Kompetenz became the means 
by which all federal unions could be brought to conform to the political form of the state, 
be that one or many, Bundesstaat or Staatenbund.  
Nevertheless, in the EU, as in other federal unions, there is, as we have seen, no 
legal solution to the question of where Kompetenz-Kompetenz lies. There are always two 
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valid legal answers based, on the one hand, in the constitution of the Union, and, on the 
other hand, in the constitutions of the Member States. The legalistic ‘Kompetenz-
Kompetenz-test’ of federal unions can only be applied if the claims of either the Union 
or the Member States are ignored, that is, the problem can only legally be ‘solved’ by a 
gross reduction of reality. Empirically, Kompetenz-Kompetenz is contested in the EU. 
What is less clear is what that means for the question of where—and whether—
sovereignty persists in the EU. 
V: THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY 
 
A: The Antinomy of Sovereignty 
The question of sovereignty in the federation is much broader in scope than the 
question of a jurisdictional hierarchy between the federation and the Member States and 
much older than the concept of Kompetenz-Kompetenz183. Within the predominant 
tradition of sovereignty beginning with Bodin and Hobbes in response to the European 
civil wars and rebellions that followed the Reformation, sovereignty was understood as 
the absolute and indivisible power and authority of the sovereign to command within a 
territorially bounded political community. Sovereignty became the key concept to 
understand the new political form of the state that was characterised by the triadic unity 
of one people, one territory and one ruling authority that enjoyed autonomy from outside 
intervention. It became the key to understand the autonomy of the state to govern itself 
unilaterally within and the autonomous relationship between the states184. It remains the 
most important concept for understanding the nature of the state, both public law and 
public international law. As valuable as the concept of sovereignty is to understand the 
state as a political form, it only leads to confusions and misunderstandings when it comes 
to the federation. 
The Bodinian and Hobbesian conception of sovereignty is impossible to reconcile 
with the legal and political reality of the federation characterised by a plurality of partly 
overlapping constitutional orders that stand in a heterarchical relationship to one another. 
Within a federal union there is never an absolute or indivisible power to command nor 
any fully autonomous constitutional order. The double political existence of the 
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federation—the Union and the Member States—is, at the same time, characterised by 
political and constitutional autonomy (the federation is per definition characterised by 
political and constitutional pluralism) and interdependence (the federal constitution 
encompasses the Member States in their entirety and makes up part of their constitutional 
orders). The question of who is endowed with ultimate authority is as we have seen 
contested and the exercise of public power is divided between the Union and its Member 
States who stand in a relationship to one another of relative autonomy185. On the basis of 
a study of these features of the EU, Neil MacCormick concluded that “there now coexist 
these two entities or sets of entities, the states of Europe, now not-fully-sovereign states, 
and the European Union, still a non-sovereign Union”186. However, the concept of 
sovereignty cannot allow this to be the case. Its fundamental binary logic demands that 
sovereignty must rely either with the Union or with its Member States187. If an ‘absolute 
and indivisible’ concept of sovereignty is applied, it is not possible to understand the 
federation in terms of sovereignty188: the principle of sovereignty contradicts the 
principles of the federation189. 
In the intellectual history of the federation, innumerable answers have been given 
in response to this predicament, the majority of which falls within the following two 
unsatisfactory categories. On the one hand, there is a cluster of theories that ‘resolve’ the 
antinomy by denying the existence of the federation and reducing it to the political form 
of the state; either Staatenbund or Bundesstaat. These theories are preoccupied with finding 
the ‘locus of sovereignty’, which must rely either with the Union or its Member States. Both 
the American debate between Calhoun and Webster over the constitutional nature of the 
United States prior to the Civil War and the German debates over the constitutional 
nature of the German Federation (1815-66) and the German Empire (1871-1918) can be 
read as contestations of the notion of sovereignty in order to establish its locus either with 
the Unions/Empire or with the individual Member States190. In all these debates, there 
was no consensus on whether the polity in question—German Federation, the German 
Empire or the United States—‘really’ was one sovereign state (Bundesstaat) or several 
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sovereign states (Staatenbund). Acknowledging the division of the exercise of public power 
in federations, these debates tend to define sovereignty not on the basis of capacity (potentia) 
but exclusively on the basis of the ultimate authority (potestas).  The strategy of this position 
is generally to construct a ‘sovereignty test’ that will allow for the trivialisation of the 
significance of either the Member States or the Union. Following Dieter Grimm, the 
German debate was closed with the answer Georg Jellinek gave, namely, that sovereignty 
resided with whomever held ultimately authority (potestas) understood in terms of 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz191. In order to preserve the concept of sovereignty, this cluster 
of theories is forced to reduce the legal and political complexity of the federation and 
resolve the problem by a number of clever but arbitrary tests or by coming up with the 
‘proper definition’. The randomness of some of these conceptual creations led Rupert 
Emerson to comment that “[h]istorical and common-sense explanations having been 
discarded as having no necessary bearing on those of jurisprudence, the juristic 
imagination was free to clothe the given facts in such mystery of legal form as might be 
desired”192. 
On the other hand, there is a cluster of theories that resolves the antinomy by 
trivialising the concept of sovereignty by introducing ideas of ‘double sovereignty’, 
‘pooled sovereignty’, ‘divided sovereignty’, ‘half sovereignty’ or ‘shared sovereignty’193. 
These theories spring from the acknowledgement of the legal and political reality of the 
federation as multiple interacting authorities and public powers. What this cluster of 
theory is not interested in is sovereignty as the ultimate power or authority (potestas) or an 
analytical constitutional quest after the true ‘locus of sovereignty’. In order to do justice 
to the political reality of the federation, these theories reduce the concept of sovereignty 
to the exercise of public power (potentia). In the words of Beaud: “Such a solution has the 
merit of simplicity but it resolves the problem by evading it”194. Tellingly, the most 
dominant position within this cluster in the context of the EU has completely abandoned 
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the concept of sovereignty and speaks instead of ‘multilevel governance’195 and conclude 
that: “Both empirical research and theoretical arguments (…) have pointed out for some 
time now that the idea of the modern state as externally sovereign and internally 
hierarchical is more an idealization of nineteenth-century political thought than a useful 
analytical concept for the reality of the twenty-first century”196. Perhaps for that reason, 
very few studies in political and public law theory are done on the EU. Instead of inquiring 
into the difficult problems related to foundations of governmental authority in Europe, 
the dominant strand of research is concerned with the depersonalised activity of 
‘governance’. 
  
B: Bracketing Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is inadequate as a concept to understanding the federation. It is ‘like 
a scalpel’197, cutting through the complex reality of the mixed nature of the federation 
cleanly dividing it by the force of the binary logic of the state. At the same, any true 
appreciation of the complex reality of the federation might easily lead one to trivialise or 
even deny sovereignty as a concept. A way out of this unsatisfactory dilemma of either 
reducing the federation to the political form of the state or trivialising sovereignty as 
concept has been suggested by Beaud: in order to think the federation as a political form, 
one must bracket the question of sovereignty198. Rather than attempting to do the 
impossible, namely reconciling sovereignty with the federation, or sacrificing the one for 
the sake of the integrity of the other, we should isolate them from each other and 
recognise that they each have their merits in describing ways in which political associations 
can be organised199: “a theory of the federation ought to be developed without recourse to the concept of 
sovereignty because it is an obstacle to thinking [the federation]”200. The theory of the 
federation ought to be “a pure theory of anti-sovereignty”201. Sovereignty as a concept 
forbids us to think the federation as a theoretical possibility and hence, if we want to 
understand the federation, we must not begin with the quest for the location of 
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sovereignty: sovereignty is not the ‘right key’ for entering the political universe of the 
federation202.  
The fundamental incompatibility between the federation and the concept of 
sovereignty is exactly an argument for why the federation has to be understood as a 
discrete political form203. Whereas sovereignty is the preeminent concept for 
understanding the legal and political form of the state, it is useless when it comes to the 
federation. That we cannot make sense of the federation on the basis of sovereignty 
means that the federation cannot be conceptualised on the basis of the theory of the 
state204. Within the federation, sovereignty is not a meaningful concept to understanding 
how public power and authority are derived and exercised. To understand the federation, 
we must ‘forget about sovereignty’205. 
The federation is an autonomous political form characterised by the internal 
absence, repression or contestation of sovereignty. Depending on one’s view of the 
sovereign state, this tends to lead to opposite evaluations of the political sustainability of 
the federation as a political form. The disagreement between Schmitt and Arendt is an 
apt illustration. Despite his recognition of the federation as a political association 
irreducible to that of the statist distinction between Staatenbund and Bundesstaat, Schmitt 
viewed the federation as a mere transitory phenomenon on the road to the constitution 
of a nation-state characterised by a complete political unity206. Due to its political duality 
and lack of hierarchy, the federation was, in Schmitt’s view, a fundamentally unstable and 
contradictory political form that was bound to collapse into the form of the state when 
faced with an internal existential conflict207. Only the state, Schmitt thought, could provide 
political stability. In complete opposition to this view, Arendt maintained that only the 
federation as a political form held any promise for political life and freedom in modernity 
exactly because it was characterised by the internal absence of sovereignty. If the 
foundation for the nation-state was sovereignty, it was a foundation ‘built on quicksand’ 
because the sovereign will, if more than a legal fiction, would be ever-changing208 and 
hence incapable of providing any kind of political stability. With its triadic unity of state-
people-territory, the nation-state, Arendt believed, would always lead to internal 
repression of minorities and external domination and expansion. Sovereignty in political 
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life for Arendt meant nothing but tyranny209. The state was, in Arendt’s view, a 
fundamentally unsustainable political form. Only the federation—founded on a 
constitutional compact instead of sovereign command and entailing a true division of 
power manifest in the multiplicity of the constituting states and in real checks and 
balances—could provide the constitutional conditions for political freedom in the 
modern world210.  
In this thesis, the federation will be treated as a discrete political form with virtues 
and vices of its own and in that sense neither Schmitt’s dismissiveness nor Arendt’s 
veneration will be emulated. Due to its incompatibility with sovereignty, the federation is 
undoubtedly saved from some of the vices of the political form of the state; however, this 
does not mean that it is a panacea. As will become clear in the last two chapters of this 
thesis, the federation is characterised by its own unique internal contradictions that might 
lead to its collapse. Maintaining that the federation is a discrete form of  political 
association entails a treatment of both its strength and its weaknesses on its own terms.  
From a more historical perspective on European integration, Arendt’s 
understanding was prevalent in post-WWII Europe. After WWII, the nation-state was by 
most political elites perceived to be the problem and a European federation was 
understood as the solution (Chapter 2). Whether the absence of war on the European 
continent in the post-WWII era is due to European integration is impossible to answer. 
Whether the EU, and as such the only federal union of our times, will collapse in the near 
or distant future, only time will tell. We do without doubt live in a period with significant 
political demands of a return to the primacy of the nation as a source of authority and a 
resurgence in the demands for the protection of the sovereignty of the state. Whether 
these movements will be successful or not in reforming or abolishing the EU, the EU 
deserves to be treated as more than a transitory phenomenon having been a central part 
of the post-WWII political and constitutional settlement for more than seven decades. To 
do that, we must, as Beaud suggests, leave the orbit of the state and endeavour to 
understand how a federation in general—and the EU in particular—comes into existence 
and governs itself as a political union of states on its own terms without reducing it to the 
categories of the constitutional theory of the state. In short, we have to endeavour to 
understand the federation as a political order without sovereignty211.   
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2 
 
Origins 
Why independent states in general and the post-WWII 
European states in particular have chosen to constitute among 
themselves a federal union 
INTRODUCTION 
Having laid out the main feature of the federation as a discrete form of political 
association in the last chapter, the question of why states choose to come together in a federation 
presents itself. This chapter is about the origins of federal unions of states, hereunder the 
EU, that is, the question of why states decide to constitute among themselves a federal 
union. Federations are constitutional projects and as such they are often created in order 
to realise or perpetuate a specific political identity or ‘way of life’ for its Member States. 
Examples are republicanism in the case of the United States (1781—) and monarchy in the 
case of the German Federation (1815-1866). In Chapters 3 and 4, it will be argued that 
the constitutional project that the EU is meant to help realise for its Member States is 
‘constrained democracy’. However, federations are not primarily concerned with the 
realisation of a specific vision of political life. As a general rule, states only chose to come 
together in a federal union because they are incapable of accomplishing one or more of 
their core aims—external security, internal stability or the wellbeing of their citizens—
themselves. They come together, not only in order to ‘live well’ but out of necessity. 
Federations are for that reason created in order to secure one or more of the core aims 
of its Member States and thereby perpetuate their political existence1. Although public 
power is exercised in a fundamentally different way in the federation than in the state 
(Chapter 3), the substantive aims of the federation as well as those of the state are 
expressions of the same overall principle: Salus populi suprema lex esto.  
Federal unions of states have historically emerged among smaller states or city-
states, in order to secure their core aims, often in response to their relationship with a 
great neighbouring empire. Two of the main historical cases of federations were 
constituted in order to break free from an empire. The United Provinces of the 
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Netherlands was constituted in 1579 against the rule of the Spanish Empire2 and the 
Confederation of the United States of America was constituted in 1781 against the rule 
of the British Empire. The first German Federation was created in 1815 in order to create 
security and stability for the German states and a smaller number of ‘free cities’—and for 
Europe at large—in response to the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire and the end of 
the Napoleonic Wars3. Finally, the Old Swiss Confederation, usually dated from 1291, 
was created in order to ensure the security and stability of the Swiss cantons geographically 
situated in the outskirts of the Holy Roman Empire4.  
 Notwithstanding that European integration has been realised through economic 
and not military integration, this chapter maintains that the EU at a fundamental level has 
origins similar to those of previous federal unions. Created after WWII, European 
integration was the concrete outcome of a political vision of how to secure the core aims 
of Western Europe in a new world order dominated by two imperial ‘super powers’, the 
USA and the USSR, without dissolving the political autonomy of the Western European 
states through the constitution of a new ‘super-state’. As a Western European project, the 
European Economic Community (EEC) was created in order to provide additional 
protection to the liberal Western European states. The EEC was meant to create the 
foundation for stability and security—in a broad sense beyond military security—for the 
Western European states in response to their new geopolitical position. In order to 
understand the project of European integration, an analysis of the political significance of 
its substantive aims is therefore necessary. In order to understand the nature of the project 
of European Union, we need to understand what it was meant to achieve.  
Before we turn to the concrete legal and historical analysis of the EEC/EU, the 
overall theory of the substantive aims of the federation—the federal telos—will be laid 
out. This chapter shows that federations can be subcategorised in terms of the content of 
their substantive aims: defence and/or welfare. Whereas a ‘defence federation’ primarily is 
concerned with military integration, a ‘welfare federation’ is primarily concerned with 
economic integration. Notwithstanding the multiple proposals for a federal European 
defence union after WWII, the chapter maintains that the project of European integration 
that was successfully established in the post-WWII era should be understood (primarily 
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if not exclusively) in terms of a ‘welfare federation’. The fundamental aims of all federal 
unions of states—‘defence federations’ and ‘welfare federations’ alike—is, however, the 
same. Independently of whether a federation is primarily concerned with the government 
of military defence or economic life, a federation is a political union constituted in order to 
perpetuate the political autonomy of its Member States.  
I: THE SUBSTANTIVE AIMS OF FEDERATIONS 
 
A: The Dual Federal Telos of Defence and Welfare 
The federal telos is the raison d’être of a federation5. By the federal telos is meant the 
purpose specific to a concrete federation, i.e., the reason for which it was constituted. An 
investigation into the federal telos is thus concerned with understanding both the political 
form of the federation and the constitutional aims of any actual federation. A study of the 
federal telos is concerned with the existential question of the fundamental mission the 
federation must accomplish if it is to be loyal to the purpose for which it was created6. 
Martin Diamond has expressed the importance of the federal telos, or the ‘ends of 
federalism’, for the study of federations in the following manner: 
 
“Indeed it is only in the light of the ends of federalism that the nature of federalism 
becomes visible (…) At various times, men have sought varying ends from federalism, 
and the variety of federal systems has resulted from that variety of ends; each actual 
federal system differs from all others (…) by the peculiar blend of ends sought from the 
particular federal system”7. 
 
As suggested by Diamond, the ends of federalism vary and for that reason all 
actual federal unions are unique. Within the theory of the federation, there is, however, a 
consensus that the substantive aims of the federations generally can be understood as 
belonging to two overall expressions of salus publica. First, security and second, welfare8 by 
which is meant the government of the economy:  
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“federal unions developed from the inability of the individual states to provide adequate 
defence against actual or possible external threats to their existence, and the fact that 
needs for markets and vital supplies outran the capacity of any one state to satisfy them 
effectively. (…) military and economic problems had become common to all, could no 
longer be handled by each state in isolation, and obviously required the interposition of 
some authority to all the states concerned”9. 
 
The most common reason why states come together in a federal union is to ensure 
collective defence against a common enemy. Often this is a hostile neighbouring empire that they 
only collectively stand a chance against10. Most federations are therefore defensive in 
origin11. The substantive aim of common security signified that the raison d’être of the 
federation is that of providing common defence in order to ensure the political independence of 
its Member States. Federal unions of states that have security, understood in terms of 
military defence, as its primary or exclusive aims will in this thesis be referred to as 
‘defence unions’ or ‘military federations’.  
The federal aim of defence always has a double political subject: the security of 
the Union as a whole and the security of its Member States12. Moreover, the federation’s 
aim of security is directed not merely towards external threats but also towards internal threats: 
“Externally, the federation protects its members against the dangers of war and against 
every attack. Internally, the federation necessarily signifies enduring pacification (…) a ‘civil 
peace’”13. Together with external security the federal aim entails internal security, that is, the 
repression of existential conflicts between and internal uprisings within its Member States14. 
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These aims of federal security are, following Beaud, inextricably linked to one another 
and mutually reinforcing15. If the federation is well protected against external attacks, it 
will be easier for it to develop and protect itself internally, and vice versa, a federation that 
is internally stable will be able to have a stronger unified external protection: “the 
independence and inviolability of the individual Member States could only persist when 
the independence and inviolability of the Federal Union as a whole [Bundesganzen] were 
avouched”16. This interdependence means that the common security of the federation is 
of interest for the security of the individual Member States and that the internal stability 
of the individual Member States is of interest for the security of the Union as a whole, 
and hence of interest to all the other Member States: “a disequilibrium in one part of the 
Federation may have a repercussion in all the other parts”17. The federation is 
characterised by a mutualisation of risk amongst its Member States18 and there is therefore 
no ‘internal affairs’ of the Member States that cannot potentially be understood as a matter 
of common security19. By coming together into a common union, all internal conflicts 
between the Member States and instabilities and crises within the Member States, become 
potential ‘internal matters’ of common security for the Union as a whole20 (Chapter 5).  
 Together with the aim of common security, some federations are constituted in 
order to promote the ‘general welfare’ or ‘prosperity’ of the community: “The prominence 
of economic provisions of all successful federations demonstrates the historic importance 
of economic factors in persuading separate States to unite”21. Welfare is here not 
understood in primarily its 20th century sense of the ‘welfare state’ but as the government 
of population, infrastructure and the economy at large. The simple reason for the 
importance of the welfare aim for federal unions is following Forsyth that “defence and 
security do not exist in a vacuum”22. Military protection is highly dependent on a 
functioning economy, a developed technology and infrastructure23. As is the case for the 
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state, there is a strong interdependence in the federation between the aims of security and 
prosperity—military protection and economic government24—that few of the classical 
examples of federal unions escape: “Thus the old Swiss Confederation and the United 
Provinces of the Netherlands concerned themselves in practice with matters which were 
as much with common welfare as they were with common defence: coinage, trade, health, 
transport, and so on”25.  
Article 3 of the 1781 Articles of Confederation is a clear example of the 
interdependence of the federal aims of security and prosperity that characterises many if 
not most federations:  
  
“The said states hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, 
for their common defence, the security of their Liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding 
themselves to assist each other, against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, 
or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence 
whatever”26. 
 
Despite the explicit inclusion of general welfare as a federal aim, the lack of federal power 
to give it effect led to protectionism and ‘commercial wars’ between the states and hence 
a weakening of the Union27. Some states of the Union erected internal trade barriers that 
were even higher than their external trade barriers to Britain28. These internal commercial 
wars did, in Madison’s eyes, not only lead to negative economic outcomes but to political 
strife and internal alienation of the states of the Union29.  
A key motivation for Madison, and perhaps to an even greater extent for 
Hamilton, for the drafting of the Constitution of the United States of 1787 was to 
strengthen the provisions for welfare contained in the Articles of Confederation30. The 
Annapolis Convention of 1786, the outcome of which was the support of the 
constitutional convention held in Philadelphia the year after, was therefore concerned 
with the question of interstate trade. More particularly, they were commissioned “to take 
into consideration the trade and commerce of the United States, to consider how far a 
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uniform system in their commercial intercourse and regulations might be necessary to 
their common interest and permanent harmony”31. Notwithstanding that their meaning 
and scope were highly contested, common defence and general welfare were intertwined 
and interdependent aims of the United States of America from the very beginning. 
The main historical examples of pure ‘defence unions’—federations with military 
security as their sole purpose—are, first, the Swiss Confederation of 1815-1848. According 
to Forsyth, the Swiss Confederation did, however, ‘prove unpopular’ exactly because it 
was not constituted in order to promote the general welfare32 and for that reason one of 
“the strongest purposes of the Swiss Federal Constitution of 1848 was the elimination of 
the intercantonal trade barriers”33.  The second example is the German Federation of 
181534. Despite the fact that the constitution of the German Federation did include a 
welfare clause (Article 19), it was incapable of giving it effect due to an internal 
disagreement between its two hegemonic states: Austria (favouring protectionism) and 
Prussia (favouring a liberal exchange economy)35. Out of this failure, a new kind of federal 
union emerged between some of the Member States: the German Zollverein (customs 
union) that began functioning in 183436. This economic union—excluding Austria and 
with Prussia as its solitary hegemon—was concerned with the government of the 
economy and it primary aim was the promotion of general welfare37.  
  
B: The Theory of ‘Economic Union’ or ‘Welfare Federation’ 
The theory of economic union or welfare federation has been most succinctly 
developed by Murray Forsyth. Together with the Constitution of the United States of 
America of 1787, the Zollverein is the main historical case on the basis of which Forsyth 
develops his theory of the ‘economic union’; a federal union of states concerned with the 
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promotion of welfare38. By granting the federal government extensive powers to regulate 
internal and external commerce in order to give effect to the federal aim of general 
welfare, the US Constitution is, in one respect, the ‘true beginning’ of the economic 
federation39. In another, the Zollverein is a more ideal typical example in that it had 
welfare as its exclusive aim. In the context of this thesis, federal unions of states with 
welfare as their primary or exclusive aim will be referred to as ‘economic unions’ or 
‘welfare federations’. Whereas the Swiss Confederation of 1815 was a pure ‘military 
federation’ or ‘defence union’, the Zollverein was a pure ‘welfare federation’ or ‘economic 
union’.   
Following Forsyth, it is important to understand that an ‘economic union’ is 
qualitatively different from a free trade agreement. An economic union, is “emphatically 
not a means or technique for the liberalizing the external trade of states”40. Rather, it is “the 
transformation by mutual agreement of external trade into internal trade”41. The process of Member 
State transformation characterising ‘defence unions’ is perfectly mimicked by the 
‘economic union’. By coming together in a common union, the relationships between 
states (external trade) is transformed into an internal matter of the federation (internal 
trade)42. ‘Defence unions’ and ‘economic unions’ alike are characterised by the intrinsically 
linked constitutional principles of birth and transformation (Chapter 1): the birth of a new 
federal union and the constitutional transformation of the constituent states. For the 
welfare federations, this means that there is an intrinsic relationship between free trade 
internal to the union and an external protection of the union by a tariff barrier: a customs 
union43.  
The political significance of the customs union was first theorised by the 
contemporaneous protagonist of the Zollverein, Friedrich List. List maintained that 
“[t]hrough the Zollverein the German nation has for the first time attained to one of the 
most important attributes of nationality”44 namely “the internal freedom of exchange and 
the common external representation that was inherent in the concept of nationality”45. 
Federal unions are always characterised by an outside and an inside. In an economic 
union, this entails a difference between the internal regulation of economic activity 
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between the Member States inter se and the external relationship of the Union with other 
states or organisations. By coming together in an economic union, “trade between states 
or nations was enclosed and subjected to uniform laws passed by a common power”46. 
The aim of the economic union is to transform the trade between states into the single 
internal federal market with a unilateral external representation and protection from 
foreign (economic) powers.  
Notwithstanding the differences between welfare federations and military 
federations, their cardinal telos is the same: to perpetuate the political autonomy of its Member 
States. At the origins of the economic union is the Member States’ wish to remain 
politically autonomous: “Economic confederation begins to crystallize into a distinct form 
alongside security confederation when relatively small states begin to feel their 
independence and statehood threatened as much by the commercial and industrial power 
of larger states as by their military strength”47. As is the case for the defence union, the 
federating states come together in an ‘economic union’ in order to constitute and 
institutionalise a common new power that will protect them from foreign powers: “in 
order to preserve and secure their economic statehood each participating member has to 
place itself as a totality within a new overarching politico-economic body”48. In terms of 
their raison d’être, ‘defence unions’ and ‘economic unions’ alike are for that reason political 
unions constituted to ensure the political autonomy of its Member States.  
This wish for political autonomy was a powerful reason for the 1787 Constitution 
of the United States that provided the federal government with much more extensive 
powers to regulate the commerce of the United States49. After winning the war against 
the British Empire and securing their independence, the United States was exposed to the 
commercial power of their former enemy without any common power of protectionism 
or economic regulation50. The individual states of the Confederation tried to create their 
own protectionist policies. However, these protectionist policies had the negative effect 
of leading to internal strife and instability in the Union and disinclined Britain to enter 
into trade negotiations with the Confederation51.  
The emergence of the Zollverein at the end of the Napoleonic wars is in many 
ways similar to the consolidation of an economic union as part of the constitution of the 
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United States after the war of liberation52. As was the case for the United States, the 
military struggles exposed the German states to both the economic force of the British 
Empire and protectionism from their neighbouring states, notably France and Russia53. 
This led the individual German states to engage in their own protectionist policies that 
harmed the other Member States of the German Federation54. This dire situation led many 
contemporary businessmen and economists—most importantly Friedrich List—to 
petition the Federal Diet in 1819 to create a German customs union within the German 
Federation to protect its Member States and citizens55: “the interests of the German 
people are not only endangered by foreign arms—foreign tariffs are the canker worms 
which devour German prosperity. For this reason we declare it to be the obligation of the 
Confederation to protect us not only by armed might, but by federal tariff”56. 
In contrast to the United States, the German Federation did not create an 
economic union within its constitution. Such attempts were pre-empted by the 
conservative Austria that politically as well as economically and socially belonged to the 
ancien régime57. Instead, a welfare federation or economic union of the Zollverein emerged 
in the north of the German Federation around Prussia58. Despite its indisputable 
hegemonic nature, the Zollverein is viewed as a true federation by both Forsyth and 
Beaud59. The Zollverein is by the German constitutional theorist and historian Ernst 
Rudolf Huber described as a ‘federation in a federation’ (ein Bund im Bund)60.  
 The consolidation of general and mutual welfare in the 1787 Constitution of the 
United States and the formation of the German Zollverein show the emergence of welfare 
as a relatively autonomous aim of federal unions of states. Together with military defence, 
security in terms of economic welfare and stability became understood, at the very latest 
during the industrial revolution, as a vital condition for the political autonomy of the states 
and as such a substantive aim for federal unions of states.  
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C: Economic Federation as a Historical Alternative to Imperialism 
If welfare and economic security became such an important aim in the late 18th 
century in the case of the United States and in the 19th century German Federation, one 
may rightfully wonder why economic federations were mostly if not completely absent61 
between the Zollverein and the post-WWII era? The simple answer to this question, 
following Forsyth, is that economic unions of states did exist in this period, however, they 
were imperial and not federal in nature62. The emergence of the global economy between 
1870 and 1914 was characterised by a growing interdependence of the economies of most 
if not all sovereign states and by the struggle between these self-same states to extend 
their control of the emerging world economy via imperialism: “The classical age of the 
liberal world economic order was, in other words, also a classical age of empire. The 
struggle to extend the internal market thus did not disappear during this period, but took 
place by other means—through domination rather than through confederation”63. 
From the 19th century onwards, it became impossible for most if not all minor 
states to provide security and welfare for their citizens. The conditions of politics could 
no longer be confined to the boundaries of the state—if they ever could. The 
predominant response to this condition was imperialism: market-creation by domination. 
Following Arendt, the predominance of imperialism has to be understood as a symptom 
of the general and systematic crisis of a political system, anchored in the nation-state, that 
no longer could live up to its most basic promises of security and stability: 
 
“[N]ational sovereignty is no longer a working concept of politics, for there is no longer 
a political organization which can represent or defend a sovereign people, within national 
boundaries. Thus the ‘national state’, having lost its very foundations, leads the life of a 
walking corpse, whose spurious existence is artificially prolonged by repeated injections 
of imperialistic expansion”64 . 
 
As is well-known, WWI—the Great War of the European Empires—did not lead 
to a stable new world order. Instead, attempts were made to resurrect the old world order 
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without the acknowledgement that its foundations had been weakened or irretrievably 
lost. The attempts to recreate the old world economy in the first decade after WWI proved 
unsuccessful because its foundations, in particular the strength of the British Empire, had 
been drastically weakened without a new hegemon (the United States) willing to takes its 
place65. Following Forsyth, the last attempt to resurrect the old world of European empire, 
of market creation via domination, in the interwar period was the project of the Nazi 
Großraum: 
  
“Hitler’s expanding Reich may indeed be seen as the last grotesque and extreme example 
of the traditional European effort to create a large internal market by imperial means. 
Having been stripped of its overseas possessions in 1919, Germany sought to establish a 
substitute for them within Europe itself—to make the great spaces of Eastern Europe 
into Germany’s equivalent of the [British] Raj”66 
 
In contrast, an economic federation is the expansion of an internal market on the 
basis of free contract. A federation provides the possibility for the creation of a concrete 
economic order established not on land-grabbing but on mutual promises and pledges. 
In this way, federalism can be understood as a historical alternative to empire: “federalism 
holds out the prospects of organizing the world at large as the alternative to imperial 
domination”67. Economic federalism and imperialism alike are responses to the 
incapability of the state as a political form to govern their markets especially after the 
industrial revolution.  
II: THE AIMS OF POST-WWII EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
 
A: The Crisis of the European Nation-State and the Birth of European 
Integration 
 With the close of WWII, the world order of the Jus Publicum Europaeum came to 
an end68 and Europe was no longer the centre of the world order. On the contrary, Europe 
had become divided in two ‘spheres of influence’ of the two imperial powers of the post-
WWII world: the USA and the USSR. With few exceptions—notably the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland—Europe was at the beginning of the post-
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WWII era a region of more of less failed states in the outskirts of emerging empires or 
‘super powers’. The only two additional unoccupied European states at the end of WWII 
to those already mentioned were Salazar’s Portugal and Franco’s Spain; both under fascist 
or authoritarian rule. With the dawn of the post-WWII era, most European states were 
faced with a long overdue crisis, namely, their fundamental inability to secure even the 
most basic aims of territorial defence and internal stability69. This crisis had its roots in 
the interwar period and did not evolve around one single threat or problem but several. 
Internal stability of the European states had during the interwar period been short-lived 
in most European states leading to civil wars, rebellions and ultimately to the rise of 
authoritarianism, fascism and Nazism. The Great Depression had left the European states 
incapable of providing economic security and stable governmental regimes70. The interwar 
period is characterised by an economic as well as political collapse of the European 
states71. “The truth was”, Hannah Arendt wrote towards the end of WWII, “that the 
national State, once the very symbol of the sovereignty of the people, no longer 
represented the people, becoming incapable of safeguarding either its external or internal 
security”72. 
 The most potent example is perhaps the Weimar Republic that proved 
completely incapable of realising a stable form of government73 leading to wide use of 
emergency decrees74 that ultimately brought the Nazis to power with the promise of 
‘work, freedom and bread’; a promise that temporarily was redeemed by the creation of a 
war economy in Germany in their imperial quest for ‘Lebensraum’. Whether the collapse 
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of the Weimar Republic was caused by a distinctly German problem of nationalism and 
militarism there is no consensus on. The collapse of Weimar should according to Arendt 
not be read as specifically ‘German problem’ but as manifestation of the general collapse 
of the nation-state as a political form. Following Arendt’s perhaps controversial view, 
Nazism and fascism were “anti-national international movements” that should be 
understood as response to the chronic crisis of the nation-state that became acute after 
the end of WWI75. “Actually”, Arendt wrote “the Nationalist Socialist Party, since the end 
of the 1920s, was no longer a purely German party, but an international organization with 
its headquarters in Germany”76. Following Arendt, Nazism was never meant to apply 
merely to the German nation-state: it was the grand plan for a new order committed to 
the creation of a European Groβraum governed by the ‘master race’. 
 The post-WWII project of European unification and integration should be 
understood against the background of this precarious situation in Western Europe77. After 
WWII, Western Europe was under the protection of the United States, however, it was 
widely acknowledged on both sides of the Atlantic that this protection was insufficient to 
ensure its stability and security78. Western Europe would have to recover economically 
and to be remilitarised in order to protect itself from the expansionist ambitions of the 
Soviet Union79. Economic security, in the post-WWI era, became understood as more 
crucial than ever. According to Alan Milward, the post-WWII period was characterised 
by a general change in the understanding of security that strongly emphasised economic 
security80. In the eyes of the new governments—especially the Christian Democratic 
governments that were successful in establishing a political hegemony in the immediate 
post-WWII era—economic security became understood as equally important to military 
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defence. Not merely in order to provide the material conditions for rearming81 but equally 
in order to suppress the internal ‘communist threat’ of a Communist accession to power 
either by a coup d’état or by democratic majority82. In the words of the historian Wolfram 
Kaiser: “Western Europe had to respond to the ideological challenge of communism with 
its boundless promises of human welfare and its apparent technological and socio-
economic advances”83.  
After 1948—marked by both the Czechoslovak coup d'état, in which the 
Communist Party with Soviet backing assumed unlimited control of the government of 
Czechoslovakia initiating four decades of Communist rule and the 1948 Berlin Blockade 
that necessitated the Berlin airlift—the ‘internal communist threat’ as well as the external 
threat of the Soviet Union were felt ever more acutely by the Americans and by the 
European Christian democratic parties84. Economic security was in this regard perceived 
as pivotal for the creation of stable governmental regimes that were capable of securing 
the obedience and loyalty of its citizens and furthermore weaken the communist parties 
and ideology85. “[T]he post-war state in western Europe”, Milward writes “had to be 
constructed on a broader political consensus and show itself more responsible to the 
needs of a greater range and number of its citizens if its legitimacy was to be accepted”86.  
To these manifold threats to the existence, autonomy and stability of the post-
WWII Western European states, European unification became understood as integral to 
the solution. In Milward’s state-centric interpretation, the post-WWII European history 
should be understood as the history of the rescue of the nation-state from its long overdue 
crisis. European integration was a key element in the reassertion of the project of the 
political autonomy of the state because the new post-WWII political consensus on which 
the post-WWII states relied required European integration and the transfer of sovereign 
powers to the Community87: “Without it, the nation-state could not have offered to its 
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citizens the same measure of security and prosperity which it has provided and which has 
justified its survival”88.  
For the ‘Founding Fathers of Europe’, the ‘European rescue’ was furthermore 
part of the ‘spiritual foundation’ of the post-WWII era that should protect the new order 
from the internal threats of fascism and communism. Together with military defence and 
economic stability, a new spiritual foundation for Europe became understood as 
necessary for the creation of political stability in post-WWII Europe in the eyes of the 
Christian democratic parties. ‘Political extremism’ on the right and on the left—the return 
of fascism and the internal uprising of communism—were equally feared by European 
Christian Democratic elites89. German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer thus argued that the 
German people should be offered an alternative system of belief to the void left by 
totalitarianism90. Together with the Christian values, Europeanism became the viable myth for 
the post-WWII Christian democratic parties that came to found the EEC91. Following the 
Italian Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi, a European federation became the Sorellian 
myth of the post-WWII era92. Whereas Sorel believed the class struggle of the proletariat 
could be fuelled by the myth of the general strike93, the post-WWII Christian Democrats 
came to understand Europe as the myth that would allow for the rescue of the European 
states from their—primarily internal—enemies. 
 For most of the European resistance movements, European unification was 
understood as the only viable solution for political stability in the post-WWII world. 
Following Arendt, the main crisis, in the eyes of the European resistances movements, 
was the unsustainability of the nation-state and the main enemy was not Germany but 
fascism94. With Charles de Gaulle as the sole exception, Arendt argues, the solution to 
Europe’s problems in the eyes of the European resistance movements became a 
European federation95. Arendt quotes this interesting passage from the Dutch resistance:  
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“We are experiencing at present … a crisis of state sovereignty. One of the central 
problems of the coming peace will be: how can we, while preserving cultural autonomy, 
achieve the formation of larger units in the political and economic field? … A good peace 
is now inconceivable unless the States surrender parts of their economic and political 
sovereignty to a higher European authority: we leave open the question whether a 
European Council, or Federation, a United States of Europe or whatever type of unit will 
be formed”96. 
 
This path for European security, stability and prosperity constitutes a fundamental break 
with the previous European public law in that it was not sought through a ‘balance of 
power’ but by the constitution of a United Europe. “A mere restoration of the nation-
state system that existed before 1939 with territorial alterations would serve only to revive 
the causes that led to the collapse of Europe”, one scholar remarked in 1946 “[h]ence 
Europe needs to be refounded upon a new principle and not restored upon an old one. 
That new principle is a confederation of Europe”97. This path was consistently defended 
by the Christian democrats: “The Christian democrats were especially strongly united 
behind deeper integration and the long-term goal of European federation”98. The link 
between the perceived unviability of the nation-state and the project of European 
unification was, e.g., clearly expressed in the speeches of Adenauer: 
 
“The age of national states has come to an end. Everybody must feel that a change has 
taken place, that an era has vanished and that a new age is dawning in which men will 
look beyond the borders of their own country and work in fraternal cooperation with 
other nations for the true aims of humanity. Whoever fails to realize this is beyond help. 
This very task and the construction of a Europe dedicated to this goal afford a great 
mission for German youth. And when this Europe, this new Europe, is built, our young 
people will once more find scope for active and peaceful lives. We in Europe must break 
ourselves of the habit of thinking in terms of national states (…) An age of peace and 
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cooperation will dawn only when nationalist ideas are banned from politics. Here in 
Europe, we have made a start in that direction by building plans for European unity”99. 
 
European unification served the political aims of internal European peace and 
pacification and strengthening Europe’s geopolitical position in relation to the USA and 
the USSR100. As other federal union of states, the project of European unification that 
emerged after WWII has to be understood on the basis of the fundamental wish for 
political autonomy on the part of its Member States and their incapability of securing this 
autonomy as fully independent states. This combination of a wish for autonomy and 
impotence in securing it led the states to constitute among themselves a common union 
and confer on it powers to achieve their fundamental aims. It is thus, as correctly pointed 
out by Milward, a fundamental misunderstanding to think of the EEC/EU as antithetical 
to the European states101. The emergence of post-WWII European states and European 
integration are inherently linked to one another.  
 
B: The Post-WWII Projects of ‘Defence Union’ and ‘Economic Union’ 
 In response to the complex security threats to the Western European states in the 
immediate post-WWII era, there was a general and strong consensus amongst the 
Christian democratic leaders across Western Europe as well as the Americans, that 
European unification and ultimately a European federation or federal state was the only 
viable solution. European security could not continue to solely rely on American military 
support, from 1949 manifest in NATO, and American economic support of the Marshall 
Aid (1948-1952). Furthermore, European security and stability had to provide a solution 
to the problem of German remilitarisation that became a central question for the 
pacification of Western Europe. In the immediate post-WWII period, German 
remilitarisation was perceived as posing a contradictory threat to European security: 
German rearmament was feared by many European states after WWII—especially by 
France102—but a weak and unarmed Germany was a threat to the new American 
hegemony in Western Europe103. The only viable solution was a Western European 
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unification including a Franco-German alliance. How this European unification was to be 
achieved was, however, not immediately clear104. 
The first successful proposal for a ‘European’ solution was the Schumann Plan 
that led to the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. 
Even though the ESCS at the time was understood as a step towards the goal of a true 
European federation105 it was itself not a federation106. Despite the ECSC being created 
for deeply political reasons107 and notwithstanding that it established common 
institutions, purely sectoral integration—in this case the common market for coal and steel—
is not federal in nature108. The Zollverein, according to Forsyth, was a federal union 
exactly because it encompassed its Member States in their totality: “the Zollverein was 
not merely an interstate commercial agreement, not a mere functional agency of states 
like the Universal Postal Union, but an acting economic totality of states, in the same way 
that a classical confederation is an acting defensive totality of states” 109. A federal union 
of states encompasses its Member States in their entirety and constitutes a new common 
federal existence.  
Despite the success of the ECSC in facilitating a stronger Franco-German alliance 
and a stronger economic stability for the Six, the problem of German remilitarisation 
remained. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950—widely understood as a prelude 
to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe110—it had become more urgent. A solution was 
proposed in the Pleven Plan—named after Prime Minister of France, René Pleven—in 
1950 namely a proposal for “the creation, for our common defence, of a European Army under 
political institutions of a united Europe”111. The European Army envisioned by the Pleven Plan 
was not to be based on merely “the joining up of national military units”. It was not to be 
a mere alliance112. Rather, the Pleven Plan envisioned that “The army of a united Europe 
composed of men coming from different European countries, must bring about, as near 
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as possible, a complete fusion of its human and material components under a single political and military 
European authority”113.  
This was to be realised by the European Defence Community (EDC) the 
establishing Treaty of which was signed in Paris in 1952114.  The EDC was to create a 
common European Defence Force that was to be composed of Member State units “with 
a view to their fusion”115 wearing common uniform116. Furthermore, no Member State 
“could recruit or maintain national armed forces other than those for which the Treaty 
had made special provisions”117. The Treaty’s duration was 50 years and was therefore not 
formally created as a perpetual union. However, after stating the 50 years’ time duration, 
the EDC Treaty adds that “If, before the establishment of a European federation or confederation, 
the North Atlantic Treaty should cease to be in effect or there should be an essential 
modification in the membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the High 
Contracting Parties shall examine together the new situation”118. 
The EDC was seen as a conscious step119 towards the establishment of a 
European federation120. Article 38 of the EDC treaty is of great importance because it 
committed the states to examine, within six month of signing the Treaty, the “creation of 
an Assembly of the European Defence Community elected on a democratic basis” 
bearing in mind that the transitional organisation created should “be conceived so as to 
be capable of constituting one of the elements of an ultimate federal or confederal structure 
[bundesstaatlichen oder staatenbündischen Gemeinwesens], based upon the principle of the 
separation of powers and including, particularly, a bicameral representative system”121.  
On the basis of Article 38, an Ad hoc Assembly with the Belgian Prime Minister 
Paul-Henri Spaak as its president was created in order to draw up a plan for the future 
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federal political organisation of the EDC122. A Harvard study directed by Carl Friedrich 
was commissioned by the Committee for the European Constitution to prepare the work 
for the Ad Hoc Assembly123. In 1953, the Ad Hoc Assembly agreed and signed the Draft 
Treaty establishing the European Political Community (EPC) that echoing the 1787 
Constitution of the United States opens with “We, the Peoples”. Article 1 of the draft treaty 
of the EPC speaks unambiguously in the language of federalism:  
 
“The Community is founded upon a union of peoples and states, upon respect for 
their personality and upon equal rights and duties for all. It shall be indissoluble”124.  
 
The EPC was meant to unify the EDC and the ECSC into a single legal entity125, 
which was to be governed by a bicameral legislature (Senate and Peoples’ Chamber), and 
dual executive power composing a European Executive Council and the Council of 
Ministers, a single Court of Justice and an advisory Economic and Social Council126.  The 
EPC’s general aims were common security and defence, the coordination of foreign 
policy, contributions towards the endeavours of NATO, the Council of Europe and the 
European Convention for Co-operation, the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and finally economic and social unification of Europe through the 
establishment of a common market127. 
It was especially the Dutch politicians who insisted on the treaty including 
economic and social unification among its fundamental aims specified in the preamble128. 
The Dutch politicians were, however, not convinced that the proposals for the EPC went 
far enough and they therefore came up with a supplementary plan for economic 
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unification that became known as the Beyen Plan129 (named after the Dutch diplomat 
Johan Willem Beyen). Whereas Beyen recognised that the Soviet threat made military 
integration necessary, he also held that a political integration of Europe, which only had 
military integration as its object, would only to a very limited degree lead to a unity 
between the Member States: “Political integration which has no content other than 
making possible coordinated military action and organising the production and marketing 
of certain important raw materials can only bring about a very limited unity”130. Central 
to the Beyen Plan was the idea that the EDC and the EPC had to be supplemented by an 
economic union the heart of which would be a customs union131. Where the Pleven Plan 
is a proposal for a defence federation, the Beyen Plan calls for a welfare federation or 
economic union. 
The Beyen Plan commenced with the argument that together with common 
defence, the principal aim of European integration should be “the raising of the general 
standard of living of the European peoples”132. The Beyen Plan continues to assert that 
the general standard of living of the peoples of Europe cannot be achieved in a Europe 
“divided into a number of limited markets as a result of trade barriers and subject to 
monetary instability”133. The establishment of a united Europe ultimately of a “federal or 
confederal nature”, the plan continues, which is currently being proposed in EPC “should 
be bound up with the establishment of common bases of economic development and a 
merging of the essential interests referred to in the resolution”134. The Beyen Plan 
concludes with a list of concrete initiatives for economic and social integration of the EPC 
states in the form of a customs union that completely abolishes import duties within the 
union and that establishes common tariffs vis-à-vis the outside135. The Beyen Plan further 
concluded that the EPC ought to find a common solution to European agriculture136. 
Initially there was limited support for the Beyen Plan across the Six. France was 
directly opposed to the inclusion of economic integration, and notwithstanding that there 
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was some support for the plan in Italy and Germany, it was not of high importance to 
them137. Only Belgium fully supported the Beyen Plan138 but also they were not completely 
satisfied because they believed it was not comprehensive enough139. When it came to the 
ratification of the EDC, no definite consensus on how to proceed towards the 
establishment of a customs union had been reached140.  
On 30 August 1954, the grand project of a European military federation of the 
EPC and the EDC collapsed due to the rejection of the latter in the French Parliament141. 
But, interestingly, the previously relatively unpopular idea of a European economic union 
did not fall apart as a consequence of this failure. In May 1955, the BENELUX countries 
issued a collective memorandum proposing that a united Europe was to be reached in the 
‘economic domain’ by general economic integration, the establishment of common 
institutions—including a supranational authority—a progressive fusion of the national 
economies, the creation of a common market and the progressive harmonisation of the 
national social policies142. The Benelux memorandum was extensively discussed at the 
1955 Messina conference that led to the so-called ‘relaunch of Europe’143.  
The result of the Messina conference was the Spaak Report proposing two 
qualitatively distinct projects of European integration: the common market that led to the 
establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the proposal for 
sectoral integration of atomic energy that led to the establishment of EURATOM144. As 
argued with regard to the ECSC, sectoral integration, hereunder, EURATOM, is not 
federal in nature. The Spaak report’s proposal for the common market, however, speaks 
in the language of an economic federation145. The aim of a European common market, it 
is argued, ought to be the creation of “a large area with a common economic policy, so 
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that a powerful unit of production is formed and continuous expansion is made possible, 
as well as an increased stability, an accelerated increase of the standard of living, and the 
development of harmonious relations between the Member States”146. 
This zone of common economic policy, constituting one unity of production, 
can—in contrast to theories of global economic liberalisation, the Spaak Report 
continues—only be realised by a limited number of states147. Federations—defence unions and 
economic unions alike—are never global orders but concrete historical and territorially 
bounded unions of states with an outside and an inside. This was not lost on 
contemporaneous academics. As observed by one commentator in 1956, it was the 
customs union as the heart of the common market that distinguished it from ‘free trade 
agreements’: 
 
“There are already international institutions, world-wide such as the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or regional such as the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which pursue the abolition of trade barriers and have 
notable accomplishments to their credit; but none of them has attempted to bind its members 
through a customs union. Herein lies the innovation, the decisive and tangible step into an 
entirely new kind of relationship between a number of large continental countries (…) The 
customs union implies not only that the member countries ultimately abolish all duties 
on their mutual trade, but that they also ultimately apply a uniform tariff to trade with third 
countries”148. 
 
 The alternative approach of a free trade area was discussed at the Brussels’ 
Conference but rejected because “it was considered unsuited to the ultimate goal of 
economic unification”149. Instead, the common market was to be achieved by a customs 
union as the first step towards economic union.  
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III: THE SUCCESS OF ECONOMIC UNION AND FAILURE OF 
DEFENCE UNION 
 
Several proposals for the constitution of a European federal union of states were 
launched in the immediate post-WWII era, both in the form of ‘defence unions’ (the EDC 
and the EPC) and in the form of ‘economic unions’ (the Beyen Plan and the Spaak 
Report). The success rate of these two different strands of proposals for a federal union—
initially thought of as complementary—proved unequal. Where the project of an 
economic union became realised in the EEC, the project of a defence union first manifest 
in EDC and the EPC, and, as we shall see in due course, in the Fouchet Plan, all failed. 
Due to these failures, the project of European integration that emerged had welfare/the 
economy as its primary if not exclusive aim. The post-WWII union of European states 
emerged as an economic federation. 
 
A: The Constitution of a European Economic Federation 
In contrast to the abortive project of the EPC and the EDC, the Spaak Report 
led to the successful ratification of the Treaty of Rome, which came into force 1 January 
1958. Whereas the projects of a European defence union failed, the project of an 
economic federation was successfully constituted with the EEC. The EEC (now the EU) 
should, following Forsyth and Schönberger, be understood as a contemporary 
manifestation of a federal union of states whose primary aims is welfare150. That the 
EU/EEC has welfare, and not defence as its primary aim, in Schönberger’s interpretation, is 
one of the primary reasons that the federal nature of the EU/EEC has generally been 
overlooked151. Apart from Forsyth pioneering writings on the theory of the ‘economic 
union’ and Huber’s discussion of the constitutional nature of the Zollverein152, welfare as 
a relatively autonomous aim of federal unions of states is not widely acknowledged in the 
literature on federalism.  
Following Forsyth, it is clear both from the form and the content of the Treaty 
of Rome that the EEC is a federation153. The EEC is clearly federal in form: “The 
Community is based on a treaty which is more than a conventional interstate treaty. It is 
a constitutive treaty which, in the act of creating a new body politic, alters the constitutions 
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of the partners to it”154. The Treaty of Rome has all the characteristics of a federal 
constitutional treaty (Chapter 1): a treaty that leads to a political change in the constitutions 
of its Member States and constitutes a new political unity155. The EEC is thus, following 
Forsyth’s interpretation, characterised by the federal principles of birth and transformation 
(Chapter 1). The Treaty of Rome, Forsyth continues, also creates common federal 
institutions capable of legislating for the citizens of the new Union156: “The treaty 
established common institutions which are capable of passing laws that are directly 
binding through the territory of the community, and which are also endowed with 
considerable discretionary powers to fulfil the general objectives of the union”157. The 
Treaty of Rome creates a new system of public law that is binding throughout the Union. 
Finally, the Treaty is not limited in time: “The treaty is concluded for an ‘unlimited 
period’”158. As other federal union the EEC is imagined as a new and permanent 
community159 devoted to the ‘ever closer union’160 of its peoples.  
In its aims and general mission, the EEC is not a technical tool for the promotion 
of free trade but a political project of federation161. With regard to its content, Forsyth 
argues, the EEC is not a technique for the liberalisation of trade but “represents the 
transformation of the external economic relations between a numbers of states into an 
internal market”162. This transformation is a process of ‘enclosure’ towards the outside 
world by the creation of a common external tariff and common commercial policies 
towards non-EEC states163.  
 
“The decision made in 1957 to go beyond the sectoral approach and to create a common 
market, subsequently defined more precisely as an ‘internal market’ or an ‘area without 
internal frontiers’, is clearly keeping with the idea of union, and makes the European 
Community a political entity in the sense outlined above. It draws a boundary between 
insiders and outsiders, and establishes a far-reaching form of internal preference”164.  
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The relationship between the EEC/EU and GATT/WTO is a good illustration 
of the ‘enclosure’ of the EEC to the outside world. Though the EEC/EU was not a 
formal member of the GATT/WTO until 1995, it was recognised as the de facto unilateral 
representative of its Member States as early as two years after the Treaty of Rome came 
into effect:  
 
“The EC exercised practically all rights and fulfilled practically all obligations under 
GATT law in its own name like a GATT contracting party. Since 1960 all GATT 
contracting parties had accepted such exercise of rights and such fulfilment of obligations 
by the EC and had asserted their own GATT rights, even in dispute settlement 
proceeding relating to measures of individual EC Member States, almost always against 
the EC. Although this cannot be described as a case of State succession, the EC had 
effectively replaced, with the consent of the other GATT contracting parties, its Member 
States as bearers of rights and obligations under GATT”165. 
 
As other federal unions166, the EEC is characterised by a common external representation 
which is clearly manifest in its effective replacement of its Member States in the 
negotiations of international trade agreements. The radical difference between the 
EEC/EU and the GATT/WTO is thus clear in the simple fact that whereas the EEC/EU 
could become a de facto/de jure member of GATT/WTO, the opposite scenario would 
never be possible.  
Together with the construction of a common exterior representation of the 
Community to the outside world, the EEC creates a new common interior by removing 
barriers to the free movement of goods, services, workers and capital within the 
Community167. The new common interior constituted by the EEC is governed by its own 
system of public law. In contrast to other trade organisations like NAFTA and 
GATT/WTO, the EEC/EU has never relied on the public international law principles 
of state responsibility168 and state retaliation169 internally to enforce the treaty: “An essential 
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distinction between the EU and other international trade regimes is that the EU does not 
provide its member states with these legal mechanisms to unilaterally escape their 
previously assumed trade obligations to each other”170.   
That the EEC is radically different from international organisations of trade 
liberalisation is clear in the public law form it creates to sanction treaty infringements. By 
constituting between themselves the then EEC, the Six could no longer treat each other 
as aliens. On the contrary, they appeared in front of each other as equal Member States, 
with equal rights, of a new common Union through which their relations inter se from now 
on and for the most part would be governed. This is a manifestation of the interstate 
dimension of the state transformation (Chapter 1). A central part of the interstate 
dimension of the state transformation relates to the altered relationship between the 
Member States and the nationals of other Member States whom they are no longer 
allowed to treat as aliens (Chapter 1). This is the heart of federal citizenship, and as will 
be shown in what follows, it was introduced with the EEC.  
Following Schönberger’s work on citizenship, the federal character of the EEC is 
manifest in its introduction of the ‘true kernel of federal citizenship’, namely, the right to 
free movement and the right to non-discrimination on the basis of nationality171. These 
two rights constitute the core of the principle of Indigenat that characterises the interstate 
citizenship of federations172. When states come together in a federal union they all have 
their own citizenships. Once they conclude the federal treaty, however, they sow the seeds 
for a new citizenship—a new fundamental status—for their citizens, namely federal 
citizenship. That the EEC does not formalise these rights in a formal status of legal federal 
citizenship is typical of young or emerging federations173:   
 
“Once they conclude the founding treaty of a new Union, this is also the beginning of 
the new federal citizenship. Usually this new status is not yet formalized and it does not 
yet need formalization. This is due to a simple fact: The federal citizenship only denotes 
the legal status of state citizens at the federal level; it serves as an abbreviation for the 
federal rights those citizens enjoys in addition to the legal position they continue to have 
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at the state level. It is, as it were, the additional hat the State citizens wear as far as the 
Federation is concerned”174.  
 
The EEC, by conferring the core rights of federal citizenship on the citizens of its 
Member States without using formal citizenship as the ‘abbreviation’ of the status 
conferred, the EEC treaty is, following Schönberger, similar to other young federations. 
  As in other young federations, federal citizenship in the EEC/EU is derived from 
citizenship of one of the Member States, i.e., the status of federal citizenship is acquired 
and lost on the basis of citizenship in one of the Member States175. This derivative nature 
of federal citizenship can even continue to be the case in a federal state. This is the case 
in Switzerland where Swiss citizenship is a derivative status from cantonal citizenship176. 
In the United States, state citizenship became a derivative status to federal citizenship with 
the 14th Amendment after the Civil War. That the EEC did not—and that EU citizenship 
still does not—entail (full) political rights is in no way exceptional either. Following 
Schönberger, the main task of early federation is to eliminate the alien status of citizens 
of the different Member States: “In its beginnings, the main task of federal citizenship is 
to end the alien status of citizens of the sister states. (…) In founding times, the dimension 
of political participation remains secondary compared to such more fundamental 
problems”177. 
The obvious objection that because the EEC only granted these rights to 
economically active citizens, it cannot be understood as constituting federal citizenship, 
is dismissed by Schönberger. Federal citizenship—not merely for young federations—
tends to be conditional on the mobile citizens not being a social burden for the host 
Member States178. In the Articles of Confederation, the conditional status of free 
movement was expressed in Article IV: 
 
“The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people 
of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, 
vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities 
of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall free ingress and 
regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and 
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commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants 
thereof”. 
 
“Poor migrants”, Schönberger argues, did not enjoy the rights of the yet untitled interstate 
citizenship of the United States under the Articles of Confederation and they were to wait 
a long time to have equal rights with the well-off citizens of the United States179. In the 
United States, it was only in 1941 with Edwards v. California, that free movement of US 
citizens within the United States could no longer be restricted for indigent citizens180. In 
Switzerland, the equality of indigent Swiss citizens was only fully accomplished in 1975181. 
Not merely young federations but also federations that have evolved into federal states 
tends to exclude ‘poor migrants’ from the benefits of interstate citizenship for significant 
periods. The EU, Schönberger argues, should rather be understood as exceptional with 
regard to how fast it has broken down the conditions of self-sufficiency to free movement 
in its case law in comparison with other young federations182. 
 
B: The Failure of the Fouchet Plan 
With the Treaty of Rome, an economic federation was successfully established 
between the Six, but that did not silence the question of how to establish a political 
framework for common European defence. After the failure of the EDC and the EPC, a 
number of international treaties—none of them federal in nature—were concluded in 
order to solve the immediate problem of security in Europe, most importantly the 
Western European Union (WEU) and the inclusion of West Germany in NATO on 6 
May 1955183. The security of Western Europe was thereby guaranteed by NATO (and 
hereunder the WEU), meaning ultimately by the military might and nuclear guarantee of 
the United States. Nevertheless, the idea of a European defence federation—or a ‘political 
union’184 as it became known—was not abandoned. Interestingly, it was the French, led 
by de Gaulle, who in 1960 took the initiative for a European defence union with what 
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became known as the Fouchet Plan(s)185. De Gaulle made it clear shortly after taking 
office in January 1959 that he disapproved of the contemporaneous organisation of 
NATO because it did not reflect his plans for the reestablishment of France as a world 
power186. De Gaulle envisioned France, together with Britain, as a European world power 
independent from the United States, with access to nuclear weapons187. As part of his 
grand design was a plan for expanding the acquis communautaire into a political and military 
project188. The Fouchet Plan was de Gaulle’s vision for a European defence federation 
with France—the sole Member State with access to nuclear power—as the hegemon. 
In Forsyth’s interpretation, the first Fouchet Plan from November 1961 was “the 
strongest, clearest and most consistent call for a classic defensive confederation for 
western Europe” in the post-WWII era189. Whether this is a correct analysis or whether 
the EPC/EDC takes the price190 is a hypothetical question seeing that both projects failed. 
What is clear is that both the first Fouchet Plan and the Heads of States in their official 
communiques in the lead up to the plan spoke in the clear language and intent of a classic 
defensive federation. A few examples will suffice. After a meeting in Bonn on 18 July 
1961, the Heads of State of the Six, after taking note of the reports of the Study 
Committee, issued a statement declaring that they were  
 
“anxious to strengthen the political, economic, social and cultural ties that exist between 
their peoples, especially in the framework of the European Communities, and to advance 
towards the union of Europe; convinced that only a united Europe, allied to the United 
States of America and to other free peoples, is in a position to face the dangers that 
menace the existence of Europe and the whole free world (…) have decided (…) to give 
shape to the will for political union already implicit in the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities”191. 
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In the first Fouchet plan, the preamble speaks of the High Contracting Parties being 
resolved to lay the foundation for a common destiny “to be henceforth irrevocably 
shared; resolved to this end, to give statutory form to the union of their peoples, in 
accordance with the declaration in Bonn on 18 July 1961”192. In Title I, “Union of the 
European Peoples”, Article 1, it is declared that “By the present Treaty, a union of States, 
hereafter called ‘the Union’, is established. The Union is based on respect for the 
individuality of the peoples and of the Member States and for equality of rights and 
obligations. It is indissoluble”193. In contrast to the ‘supranational’ institutional structure 
of the EEC—embodied in the Commission and the ECJ—the Fouchet Plan’s imagined 
an ‘intergovernmental’ design for the Union closer to the classical federal diet (Chapter 3) 
with the Council as the strongest institution taking decisions by unanimity194.  
The response to the Fouchet Plan, however, was not univocally applauded by the 
other Five195. The strongest opposition came from the Dutch and the Belgian 
governments, both of whom where critical because they saw the Fouchet Plan as a threat 
both to the EEC and its governmental principles of ‘supranationalism’ and 
‘independence’ and the close relationship between Europe and the United States in 
NATO196. The Dutch and Belgians further believed that the United Kingdom, who had 
applied for membership of the EEC in August 1961, should be included in the discussions 
for ‘political union’ of Europe197. While the response from the delegations of Italy, 
Germany and Luxembourg was not a blank opposition, they shared the Dutch and 
Belgian concern regarding the weakening of NATO by the Fouchet Plan198. These 
differences of opinions were further radicalised by an intervention by the European 
Parliament in December 1961—authored by René Pleven—arguing for the use of 
qualified or simple majority voting by the Council and the granting of new significant 
powers to the European Parliament and the ECJ199. 
In response to the widening chasm, the French tabled a revised version of the 
Fouchet Plan in January 1962, the second Fouchet Plan, which, to the general astonishment 
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and anger of the Five, included no concessions but hardened the French position 
significantly200. In response to the second Fouchet Plan, the Five quickly agreed and 
signed a Counter-Treaty in February 1962 for a ‘European Union’ of a stronger and even 
more explicit federal design. Article 1 of the Counter-Treaty states that “By the present 
Treaty, a union of States and of European peoples, hereafter called ‘the European Union’, 
is established. The European Union is based on the principle of the equality of the rights 
of and obligations of its members”201. The European Union proposed by the Five was 
much closer to the Pleven Plan than any of the Fouchet Plans. The Union’s power should 
not prejudice the powers of the EEC, it would adopt a common defence policy within 
the framework of NATO, decisions in the Council would be taken by qualified majority 
voting, and the powers of the ECJ and the European Parliament were to be 
strengthened/included202. The proposal of the Five further entailed an automatic review 
of the Treaty when the EEC moved to the third and last stage of its transitional 
development in preparation of which the Council was to draft a constitution with highly 
integrationist goals: the extension of qualified majority voting, introduction of direct 
election to the European Parliament, and extending the powers of the ECJ203. The 
German delegations had further hoped to include European citizenship as a formal 
status204. 
The proposal of the Five was not acceptable to the French and despite the efforts 
of the Italians to reach a reconciliation, the negotiations collapsed at the last meeting in 
Paris on 17 April 1962. At this meeting, the Dutch and the Belgians made it clear that 
their price for any deal was UK membership in both the EEC and the proposed European 
Union205.  No agreement was reached at this meeting and the negotiations broke down 
never to be resumed. Less than a year later, De Gaulle vetoed the UK’s accession to the 
EEC. When the Germans and the Italians launched a project of a less formal political 
union in 1964, this was again blocked by the French206. When the 1966 deadline for the 
beginning of the third stage of the transitional development and for the wider 
introduction of qualified majority voting, the French boycotted the meetings, initiating 
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the ‘empty chair crisis’ and enforcing de facto Member State veto power with the 
Luxembourg Compromise.  
 
C: Federal Teleology and ‘Integration through Law’ 
With the failure of the Fouchet Plan, the idea of common European defence was 
abandoned for a number of years. As a result, the European federation that emerged came 
to have welfare, the economy, as its primary—and initially solitary—aim. In the Treaty of 
Rome, the aim of the Community, as defined by Article 2, belongs exclusively to the 
federal aim of welfare: 
 
“The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and 
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the 
standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it”. 
 
When Forsyth published Union of States in 1981, the EEC was a ‘pure’ economic 
union or welfare federation. Until the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the 
EEC had welfare—in its broad definition articulated in EEC Article 2—as its sole aim. 
Before the introduction of qualified majority voting with the Single European Act (SEA), 
the substantive aim of welfare, the raison d’être of the EEC was primarily advanced by the 
teleological interpretations of the Treaties by the ECJ—the so-called ‘integration through 
law’—starting with its two seminal judgements—Van Gend en Loos (1963) and Costa v 
ENEL (1964)—delivered in the two years following the breakdown of the Fouchet Plan.  
The authority of EU law claimed in these two judgements relies heavily on the 
federal ‘spirit’ of European integration207, first expressed in the Pleven Plan and the Beyen 
Plan, the EDC/EPC and the EEC, and which had been reaffirmed in negotiations over 
the Fouchet Plan by all the Member States, including the French, and even more strongly 
in comments by the European Parliament. An argument to this effect has been presented 
by the legal historian Morten Rasmussen: “federalist ideology spurred a particular legal 
thinking about the ECJ as having a constitutional nature and therefore constitutional 
tasks. The ideology provided a particular way of looking at the role of the ECJ and the 
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European treaties, which would pave the way for legal activism by the new ECJ”208. 
Rasmussen argues that the notion of the special nature of the community invoked in the 
two seminal judgements had historical roots in the European federalist ideas of the 1940s 
and 1950s209. The federalist ideology and the experience of the failure of the EDC/EPC, 
according to Rasmussen, led to the development of a constitutional understanding of the 
ECJ during the 1950s shared amongst a transnational network of European legal actors, 
many of them Christian democrats210. Notwithstanding that the ECJ definitely was an 
activist Court, Rasmussen argues, it is a mistake to argue that the interpretations of 
Community law in Van Gend en Loos and Costa is a pure ‘invention’ of the ECJ grabbed 
out of thin air211.  
In both Costa and Van Gend en Loos, the ECJ interprets the EEC Treaty as a federal 
constitutional treaty. A federal treaty is always concluded with the view to being a new 
political existence and thus of permanent character (“a community of unlimited 
duration”). It always creates federal institution(s) and tends to represent its Member States 
as a unitary political existence to the outside world (“having its own institutions, its own 
personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international 
plane”). It constitutes a new internal public law order (“the Community constitutes a new 
legal order”). A federation always limits the sovereign powers of its Member States 
(“[having] real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers 
from the states to the community, the member states have limited their sovereign rights” 
and “the states have limited their sovereign rights”). Finally, it establishes a public law 
relation with the citizens of its Member States via most often non-formalised federal 
citizenship (“created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves” and 
“the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals”)212. 
Notwithstanding that federalism is not mentioned by the ECJ, in both Costa and Van Gend 
en Loos the EEC is interpreted as a federal union of states. 
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D: The Introduction of Security as a Substantive Aim 
  As a consequence of the collapse of two grand post-WWII projects for more or 
less classical defence federations in Europe—the EDC/EPC and the Fouchet Plan—the 
EEC/EU has developed as a federation with welfare or the economy as its primary aim. 
That being said, the ideas of common European defence did never completely disappear. 
After the French Presidency went from De Gaulle to Georges Pompidou in 1969—
elected on a pro-European manifesto—the stalemate that had developed after the failure 
of the Fouchet Plan could be remedied. British membership of the EEC became possible 
and some of the ideas expressed in the Pleven Plan and the Fouchet Plan could be taken 
up again213 in the project of European Political Cooperation that since 1970 has been part 
of the informal relationship between the Member States of the EEC but separate from 
the legal order of the Community214. Before SEA, the European Political Cooperation had 
no formal legal standing215 and even under SEA, it was formally separate from the EEC. 
It created no or limited216 formal legal obligations and since it was excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ217, it was lacking a federal enforcement mechanism218. 
Furthermore, military security and defence were not included as substantive aims of 
SEA219.  
It was not before the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 that the European Political 
Cooperation was included as one of the three pillars of the European Union and security 
became a substantive aim of the EU: “The Union shall set itself the following objective 
(…) to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the 
implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing 
of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence (…) to 
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develop close cooperation on justice and home affairs”220. These two objectives 
correspond to the double political subject to which a federal aim of security always is 
directed: external security of the Union as a whole (‘common foreign and security policy’) 
and the internal security of its Member States (‘cooperation on justice and home affairs’). 
The double aims of security were constituted as respectively the second and third pillar 
of the EU by the Maastricht Treaty: Common Foreign and Security Policy and Police 
(CFSP) and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC).  
Notwithstanding that the three pillars introduced by the Maastricht Treaty were 
governed by one institutional structure, it only constituted a notional entity221. In contrast 
to the first pillar of the EU—the amended European Communities—the second and third 
pillars were only to a limited degree governed by the institutional structure set up with the 
EEC222. They were almost exclusively governed by the European Council and the legal 
effect of its decisions were only binding on the level of international law. It was therefore 
left up to the Member States to determine the legal effect of these decisions within 
national law. Nevertheless, since the second and third pillars relied on the first, most 
importantly with regard to their budgets, a clear-cut distinction between the three pillars 
was always dubious. With the Treaty of Amsterdam, several substantive areas of the third 
pillar were transferred to the first pillar. Finally, with the Treaty of Lisbon, the Union 
replaced and succeeded the Community and assumed a legal personality. It is not before 
the Lisbon Treaty that the EU truly had security as a substantive aim. That being said, the 
powers of the EU within common security are limited when compared with classical 
defence federations. Defence unions tends to have jus belli and guarantee the territorial 
integrity of its Member States. Neither of these fundamental aspects are present in the 
EU even after the Lisbon Treaty. In the context of the EU, national security remains a 
reserved competence of the Member States223. To this day, the EU remains an economic 
federation with defence and military security as a subsidiary aim.  
In 2016-2017, the project of a common European defence union, however, has 
once again gathered momentum224. The growing isolationism of the United States under 
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President Trump and the prospect of the UK (a long-time critic of stronger European 
defence) leaving the EU have been important motivational factors for a positive 
commitment of EU Member States to stronger cooperation on defence225. Whether these 
initiatives over time will lead to the establishment of a genuine European defence 
federation on a par with the ones imagined in the early days of European integration 
remains to be seen. 
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3 
 
State Transformation and Teleology 
The foundations and principles for the exercise of public power 
INTRODUCTION 
The federation is a discrete political form and for that reason the foundations and 
principles for its exercise of public power are different from that of the state. For the 
state, the core concept of public law is sovereignty. Power and authority is generated in 
the relationship between the people and its representatives and this relationship is the 
foundation for the public power of the state. The federation, like the state, is a political 
association. Sovereignty, however, is not at the heart of its public law. Public power is 
exercised in the federation but we need to deemphasise the question of sovereignty to 
understand the principles in accordance with which public power is wielded and regulated. 
The federation has its own principles for the institutionalisation of public powers and the 
activity of governing. This chapter is concerned with understanding the foundations and 
principles for the exercise of public power in the federation and in the EU. The aim of 
this chapter is to understand how the federation in general, and the EU in particular, 
governs itself as a political order without sovereignty. The argument presented is that the 
federation has a public law structure that is fundamentally different from that of a state. 
For that reason, it is a fruitless endeavour to study the EU based on the assumption that 
the same logic that applies to the state will be replicated ‘beyond the state’ in the EU. 
In contrast to the state, the federation is characterised by a dual and composite 
governmental structure: the Union institutional structure and the Member States. Both 
parts of this dual governmental structure differ from that laid out in the general theory of 
the state. The Union institutions do not amount to a new ‘super-state’ nor do its 
composite states govern themselves as independent sovereign states. Instead they govern 
themselves as ‘Member States’. ‘Member-statehood’ can in the case of the EU be 
characterised as ‘constrained statehood’ and should be understood as an integral part of 
the post-WWII constitutional project of ‘constrained democracy’. Another fundamental 
difference between the federation and the state as a political form is that the Union 
institutional structure is characterised by two governmental principles that differentiate it 
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from a state: teleology and specialisation. A federation is always constituted in order to obtain 
the fundamental aims common to its Member States. This means that the authority of the 
Union institutions is derived from and limited in relation to the realisation of that aim.    
This chapter is structured as follows. After a preliminary discussion of the public 
law structure of the federation (I), the chapter goes on to discuss the principles for the 
exercise of public power by the Member States (II) and by the Union institutions (III). 
I: THE PUBLIC LAW STRUCTURE OF A FEDERAL UNION 
 
A: Federal Duality 
The most important structural features of federal public law are the dual 
foundations of authority and its dual autonomous but interdependent ‘governments’. The 
federation as a political form is characterised by two qualitatively distinct and autonomous 
sources of public power: the political existence of the Union and the political existence of 
the Member States1. Whereas the state is a single political existence, the federation is a 
dual political existence. The federation is a ‘community of communities’ or, in 
Montesquieu’s famous definition a ‘society of societies’2. The implication for the exercise 
of public power is that whereas the state governs itself as a unity, the federation governs 
itself as a plurality. Consolidated federal states carry the mark of federalism in their 
exercise of public power. This is manifest in a significant division of public powers 
between the level of the composite states and the Union government. The principles of 
federal government in a federation and in federal states are therefore in many ways similar. 
A fundamental difference, however, relates to the foundation of authority. In a 
consolidated federal state, like present-day United States, the question of sovereignty has 
been irrevocably resolved and there is ultimately only one source of public power: the 
people or nation as one. The Member States are no longer an autonomous source of 
authority. In the case of the United States, ‘We, the People’ no longer carries an ambiguity 
between state peoples and one nation. With the end of the Civil War, the Constitution of 
the United States got a nationalist foundation. Importantly, this is manifest in the 
ratification of the 14th Amendment declaring for the first time the superiority of national 
citizenship over state citizenship and ignoring the old federalist ratification process for 
constitutional amendments. With the 14th Amendment, in the words of Bruce Ackerman, 
it was made clear “that the will of the nation was independent of, and superior to, the will 
                                                          
1 O Beaud, Théorie de la Fédération (Paris, PUF, 2007), 348. 
2 ibid 102-3. 
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of the states”3. Governmental authority in the United States was henceforth derived, not 
from the states, but from the United States as a nation. In contrast, the federation—being 
a dual political existence—has two sources of its public power (Chapter 1). 
The federation, as the federal state, has two distinct ‘governments’ that exercise 
public power over the same subjects and within the same territories4. The structure of the 
constitutional framework of a federation is therefore dual, namely, the institutional 
structure of the Union and the institutional structure of the Member States. The 
federation as a concept is ambivalent in that it at the same time refers to a union of states 
(the federation as political association) and to an institutional structure that is autonomous 
from the Member States (the federation as institution)5. What is important to understand 
is that in contrast to a state there is no identity between the federation as political 
association and the federation as institution. The federation as a political association, a 
union of states, is governed by a dual governmental structure composed of the Union 
institutions (the federation as institution) and the constitutional regimes of the Member 
States.  
This conceptual ambivalence also applies to the EU that simultaneously refers to 
the union of the Member States (the EU as political association) and to the institutional 
structure that is independent from the Member States (the EU as institution). The EU as 
a union of states is governed by the institutional structure of the Union (Council, 
Parliament, Commission, the ECJ, the ECB etc.) and the institutional structures of the 
Member States. As is the case for other federations, the government of the EU (as a 
political association) is characterised by the exercise of public power by a dual 
governmental structure: “[t]wo systems, the EU and the Member States, are established 
with each having a right to govern or rule”6. Together they make up the government of 
the EU as a union of states. The duality of public powers in the EU is manifest in the 
Treaties in the explicit division of competences between the Union and the Member 
States. Following the Treaties, some public powers are exclusively exercised by the Union7 
and some competences are shared between the Member States and the Union8. All 
                                                          
3 B Ackerman, We the People I: Foundations (Cambridge MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1991), 81. 
4 Beaud, Théorie, 348. 
5 ibid 103. 
6 D Chalmers, “European Restatements of Sovereignty” (2013) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 10, 6.  
7 Article 3 TFEU, Article 128 TFEU. 
8 Article 4 TFEU. 
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competences not conferred upon the Union remain the competences of the Member 
States9.  
 
B: Independence and Interdependence 
The dual public powers of a federation are characterised by a ‘mixed autonomy’ 
or by the principles of independence and interdependence10. The Member States come together 
in a federation to preserve themselves politically. As such, their statehood and autonomy 
are not dissolved. However, it is not merely the Member States vis-à-vis the Union but 
also the Union vis-à-vis the Member States that has an autonomous status. The federation 
is characterised by a double autonomy: the autonomy of the Member States and the 
autonomy of the Union as a whole11. By coming together in a federation, the Member 
States give birth to a new political association that is autonomous from them12. A federal 
union of states is different from the sum of its parts.  
The difference between a federation and the sum of its parts can be established 
not merely because many federations, including the EU, govern through majority decision 
or qualified majority decision within central areas of state power13. Even in cases where a 
decision is made on the basis of unanimity and all the Member States have a right to veto, 
there is a fundamental difference between a federation decision and a unanimous decision 
of international law because the decision of the federation needs no ratification through 
the individual Member States: “More precisely, every Member State is constitutionally 
(because the federal constitution is a component of its own constitution) bound directly 
and in public law terms by the federation decision”14. The federal constitutional contract 
gives birth to an autonomous legal order and a new source of law (Rechtsquelle)15 and 
institutionalises a public authority which is autonomous from the public authorities of the 
Member States and directly binding on them without further ratification.  
                                                          
9 Article 4(1) TEU. 
10 Beaud, Théorie, 183-4. 
11 ibid 185. 
12 ibid 156.  
13 Under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, the Council votes by qualified majority (55% of EU Member 
States representing 65% of the EU population). When the Council votes on a proposal that is made by 
neither the Commission nor the High Representative, there is a higher threshold (72 % of EU Member 
States vote in favour representing at least 65 % of the EU population). 
14 C Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2008), 401, amended 
translation (or. Verfassungslehre, 385). See also ER Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789, Band II: Der 
Kampf um Einheit und Freiheit, 1830 bis 1850 [hereinafter Huber, DV II] (Stuttgart, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 
1968), 294-5; C Hughes, Confederacies: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered in the University of Leicester 8 November 
1962 (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1963), 13. 
15 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 399. 
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An interpretation of the EEC along those lines was made by the German 
Constitutional Court in 1967 with regard to the status of Community law. After 
acknowledging that the Community is neither a state nor a federal state but rather a 
Community of a ‘special nature’ committed to the process of ever closer integration to 
which Germany together with the other Member States has ‘transferred’ sovereign rights, 
the German Constitutional Court argued that “A new public authority has thereby been 
created, which is autonomous and independent vis-à-vis the public authorities of each 
Member State” 16. As a consequence of that, the Court continues, “its acts do not require 
approval (‘ratification’) by the Member States, nor can they be annulled by those States. 
The EEC Treaty to a certain extent constitutes the Constitution of the Community” 17. 
The Community “forms its own legal order which is part of neither public international 
law nor the national law of the Member States. Community law and municipal law of 
Member States ‘are two internal legal orders which are distinct and different from each 
other’”18. By the act of federating, the Member States have given birth to a new legal order 
which, though autonomous, is not external to them: “The effect of the Treaty, following 
its ratification in the Federal Republic, was to create an autonomous legal order inserted 
into the municipal legal order and enforceable by municipal courts”19. The European legal 
order is a new legal order and yet it is internal to the Member States.  
The interdependence of the legal order of the Union and those of the Member 
States is manifest in that they, though autonomous, are not strangers to one another and 
accept parts of the others’ legal orders as their own. As is the case for all federations, the 
EU and its Member States are in an internal public law relation to one another20. This 
interdependence has a clear institutional expression. The classical example given in EU 
law is that of national courts that through the preliminary reference procedure also make 
up a component part of the European legal order. EU law is enforced by national courts 
acting as Union courts. Even more striking, perhaps, is the case of the central banks of 
the Eurozone Member States. After the creation of the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB), the central banks of the Member States are completely independent from 
the Member States. More akin to branches of the ESCB, they answer only to the 
European Central Bank (ECB). The government of money, in the vocabulary of Madison, 
                                                          
16 BVerfG 1 BvR 248/63 and 216/67 [1967]. The translation here cited is from Andrew Oppenheimer 
(ed), The Relationship between European Community Law and National Law: The Cases (Cambridge, CUP, 1994), 
413, emphasis added. 
17 ibid emphasis added. 
18 ibid emphasis added. 
19 BVerfG 2 BvR 225/69 [1971], 416. 
20 Beaud, Théorie, 192. 
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is a ‘national’ function of the ‘mixed regime’ of the EU. Another illustration, Union 
institutions are to a large extent made up by Member State officials. The Council of 
Ministers is made up of national ministers from each of the Member States (sitting in 10 
configurations with regard to specialization), the European Council comprises the Heads 
of the Member States/Member State governments and the European Court of Justice 
comprises one judge from each Member State and appointed by common accord of the 
Member State governments21. The official personnel of the Union is to a large extent also 
part of Member State governments or bureaucracies. On a very concrete level, Union 
institutions are not ‘alien invaders’—they are mostly made up by Member State officials. 
In this way, the Member States govern themselves collectively by their own 
representatives through the EU. 
Notwithstanding the institutional interdependence of the Union institutions and 
the Member States, they constitute two autonomous governmental entities characterised 
by different principles for the exercise of public powers. The exercise of public power by 
the Union and by the Member States is regulated in fundamentally different ways and as 
such there is an asymmetry between the two levels of ‘government’. What is shared 
between them, however, is that neither the Union nor the Member States exercise public 
power as sovereign states. In the rest of this chapter, the principles for the exercise of 
public power by the Union and by the Member States will be discussed.  
II: MEMBER STATE TRANSFORMATION 
 
A: Member-Statehood and State Transformation 
When previously independent states decide to come together in a federation or 
accede to one (Chapter 4), they undergo a process of state transformation manifest in a 
change of their constitutional orders. This constitutional change of the Member States is 
not necessarily manifest in a change of their constitutional laws22 (Chapter 1). Whether 
discernible by a purely legal analysis or not, the constitutional change is manifest in the 
transformation of the Member States’ constitutions in the positive sense23, namely the 
fundamental characteristics of how they govern themselves as political associations. By 
becoming Member States, the states of a federation are given a fundamentally new status. 
                                                          
21 Article 253 TFEU. 
22 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 384; ER Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789, Band I: Reform und 
Restauration 1789 bis 1830 (Stuttgart, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1957) [herinafter Huber, DV I], 661. 
23 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 384. 
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Notwithstanding the fundamental political change inherent in the process of state 
transformation, it does not eradicate the political autonomy of the Member States. In 
contrast to a decentralised state, the Member States are not mere administrative regions 
and neither does the process of state transformation deprive the Member States of their 
governmental, administrative or other institutional apparatuses. The Member States have 
a ‘political dignity’ that the federal constitutional treaty is meant to protect24. That being 
said, the “Member State of a federation is not a state in the classical sense”25.  
The process of state transformation has two aspects: interstate (the transformation 
of the relations between the contracting states that have become Member States) and 
intrastate (the transformation of the internal constitutional arrangements of the Member 
States) (Chapter 1). At a fundamental level, the interstate dimension of state transformation 
is manifest in that the Member States no longer relate to each other or each other’s citizens 
as aliens. Their relations are henceforth (primarily) governed by the internal public law of 
the Union instead of international law. For that reason, the dichotomies of 
internal/external and national/alien pertaining to the theory of the state no longer apply 
to the relationship between the states. The Member States are ‘sister states’—the 
federation is “like a big family within which all the states are brothers and sisters”26. Being 
a Member State entails that many if not most of its decisions must be taken, not as a fully 
autonomous ‘sovereign’ entity, but as a member of a common community. Amongst 
other things, this entails accepting the validity of judgements made in other Member 
States27. The intrastate dimension of state transformation originates in the necessity of 
incorporating and accommodating the Union constitution in the constitutional orders of 
the Member States. The federal constitution incorporates the Member States in their 
totality and makes up a part of the domestic constitutional orders (Chapter 1). A part of 
the federal constitution thus lives at the heart of the Member States’ constitutions. An 
important consequence of this state transformation is that the Member States no longer 
have full control over their own citizens and borders. Being Union citizens, the citizens 
of the Member States, subject to some conditions and limitations, will have rights of free 
movement and the right to be treated on equal terms with the citizens of host Member 
States (Chapters 1 and 2).  
                                                          
24 Beaud, Théorie, 102. 
25 ibid 204 my translation 
26 ibid 215, my translation. 
27 ibid 207ff. 
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 In the context of the EU, the process of state transformation that the Member 
States have undergone has been described in detail by Christopher Bickerton. European 
integration, in Bickerton’s words, entails a transformation of the European nation-states 
into another type of state, the Member State. “Central to this process of transformation”, 
Bickerton writes “is the way the state–society relationship has been relativized, becoming 
only one relationship amongst others constitutive of statehood. In contrast to traditional 
nation-states, national governments of member states understand their power and identity 
as dependent upon their belonging to a wider group or community”28. That is, the 
authority generating nexus between people and government that characterises state 
sovereignty as a relational concept is relativized due to EU membership. The Member 
State governments understand their authority and the activity of governing not merely in 
relation to their own peoples but also in relation to the EU and the other Member States.  
This process of state transformation determines the Member States’ decision-
making procedures and their institutional apparatuses29. A central aspect of Bickerton’s 
argument relates to the role played by Member State representatives in EU institutions30. 
Even in areas that traditionally are thought to remain exclusively under the control of the 
Member States, such as defence and policing, the Member States do not act as traditional 
state theory would suggest based on national sovereignty31. The EU does not work as a 
competition between different egotistical national actors. On the contrary, the national 
representatives tend to seek broad compromises and the EU institutions are therefore 
better understood as ‘consensus generating machines’32. The states are at the heart of the 
EU, Bickerton argues, but they do not behave as independent nations. 
 The concept of ‘Member State’, following Bickerton, is not merely a legal title but 
a distinctive form of status or statehood33. The most important characteristic of EU member-
statehood consists in the idea of the self-limitation of the state regarding its sovereign 
powers through external frameworks of rule34. ‘Member-statehood’, following Bickerton, 
consists in the voluntary consent of the Member States to constrain their sovereign 
powers through the EU35. It is a form of ‘constrained statehood’. Bickerton wishes to 
distinguish ‘member-statehood’ from other forms of constitutionally limited government 
                                                          
28 CJ Bickerton, European Integration: From Nation-States to Member States (Oxford, OUP, 2012), 12. 
29 ibid 12. 
30 ibid 46-47. 
31 ibid 28-33. 
32 ibid 31. 
33 ibid 51. 
34 ibid 61. 
35 ibid 64. 
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in that the former appears as being external to the state whereas the latter is an internal 
expression of sovereignty36. The important difference consists in whether the state binds 
the exercise of its sovereign power via a national constitution (‘internal constraint’) or 
whether the state binds the exercise of its sovereign power via EU membership (‘external 
constraint’).  
However, this distinction oversimplifies the constitutional transformation of the 
EU Member States by exclusively focusing on interstate state transformation. In a 
federation, the legal order of the federation (the ‘external constraint’) makes up a part of 
the Member States’ own constitutions (the ‘internal constraint). ‘Member-statehood’ 
therefore always entails constitutional internalisation on the part of the Member States of the 
constitutional order of the Union. In the context of the EU this means that state 
transformation cannot be understood as a purely ‘external’ constraint. To understand state 
transformation, it is important to understand not only how the Member States relate to 
each other in a new ‘non-sovereign’ way but also how the domestic constitutional 
settlements have undergone a transformation. Whereas Bickerton has made a brilliant 
analysis of the interstate dimension of member-statehood, an analysis of intrastate 
constitutional transformation of the Member States is missing. 
Because of the multiplicity of the types of constitutional orders of the EU 
Member States37 (Chapter 4), the internalisation of the EU constitutional order and the 
transformation of the domestic constitutional settlements differ significantly between the 
Member States. In what follows, three different paths of constitutional transformation 
and internalisation will be discussed: those of the ‘Original Six’ founding Member States 
of the EEC, the ‘continuous democracies’ of the UK and Scandinavia, and lastly the post-
Communist Member States of the ‘Eastern enlargements’.  
 
B: ‘Constrained Democracy’ 
The domestic constitutional internalisation of European integration has been 
relatively unproblematic38 for the ‘Original Six’: France, Germany, Italy and the 
BENELUX countries. For the post-WWII Western European countries who founded 
                                                          
36 ibid 65-8. 
37 B Ackerman, “Three Path to Constitutionalism—and the Crisis of the European Union” (2015) 
B.J.Pol.S. 45. 
38 France is to some extent an outlier in this group (see Chapter 2). The French relationship to European 
integration has been characterised by significant both political and legal contestation of EU authority, see, 
e.g., LF Goldstein, Constituting Federal Sovereignty: The European Union in Comparative Context (Baltimore, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
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the EEC there is an inherent relationship between the ‘internal constraints’ of the 
domestic constitutional orders and the ‘external constraints’ of European integration. The 
post-WWII constitutional regimes of these Member States and the project of European 
integration ‘grew up’ together and should be understood as parts of the same 
constitutional project. An argument to this effect has been presented by Jan-Werner 
Müller. 
European integration, following Müller, became central to the post-WWII 
constitutional settlement of ‘constrained democracy’ born out of a deep distrust in 
popular sovereignty, including parliamentary sovereignty39.  Unconstrained political 
power and mass politics were by the political elites of the time (whether an accurate 
diagnosis or not40) understood as having been the direct causes leading to the totalitarian 
breakdown of Europe and the rise of fascism, Nazism and communism41. The post-WWII 
response became the coinage of a completely new governmental form cloaked in familiar 
terms—‘liberal democracy’—differing from not only the interwar ‘democratic’ 
settlements but also from ‘liberalism’ in the 19th century meaning of the term42.  The new 
post-WWII ‘mixed regime’ was characterised by the reinstitutionalisation of liberal and 
moral natural law principles without redeploying liberalism as an overarching ideology 
because it generally was understood to have paved the way for totalitarianism43.  
The new settlement can neither be reduced to any pre-given ideology nor is it 
manifest in the work of any one thinker. Following Müller, its most important political 
and ideological expression is the Christian Democratic parties that won terrain in all post-
WWII Western European states that came to be the founders of the EEC44 (Chapter 2). 
Their success was brought about by the electoral alliance between the middle class, labour 
and the peasantry45. Distancing themselves from fascism, liberalism and communism, the 
Christian Democratic parties presented themselves as the protectors of traditionalism and 
                                                          
39 JW Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 2011), 5; JW Müller, “Beyond Militant Democracy?” (2012) New Left Review 73, 41.  
40 See MA Wilkinson, “The Reconstitution of Postwar Europe: Lineages of Authoritarian Liberalism” 
(2016) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 5; MA Wilkinson, “The Reconstitution of Post-war 
Europe: Liberal Excesses, Democratic Deficiencies” in MW Dowdle and MA Wilkinson (eds) 
Constitutionalism beyond Liberalism (Cambridge, CUP, 2017). 
41 The most important argument to that regard is perhaps manifest in Hannah Arendt’s, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (New York, A Harvest Book • Harcourt Inc, 1994); Müller, Contesting Democracy, 126.  
42 Müller, Contesting Democracy, 5; Müller, “Beyond Militant Democracy?”, 41. 
43 Müller, Contesting Democracy, 5, 129. 
44 ibid 129ff; W Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union (Cambridge, CUP, 2007), 9, 
164ff. 
45 Müller, Contesting Democracy, 138; AS Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London, Routledge, 
1992); Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union, 223. 
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the dignity of the human person46. Under this banner, the Christian Democratic parties 
brokered compromises between economic liberals and social-conservative Catholics that 
made them powerful ‘in-between figures’ and sowed the seeds for the parties’ later 
transformation into ‘catch-all parties’47.  
An important institutional innovation in the post-WWII constitutional settlement 
was the significant role given to constitutional courts. The Kelsenian guardian of the 
constitution became the central institution of post-WWII ‘militant democracy’48. The crux 
of the argument for militant democracy was laid out by Karl Loewenstein in 1937. If 
liberal democracy is to protect itself from the lures of fascist emotionalism, Loewenstein 
reasoned, it must not be afraid to use drastic means: “Democracy must become 
militant”49. Fascism, according to Loewenstein, was not an ideology but a most effective 
governmental technique50 and for that reason it should not be taken seriously as an 
alternative way of organizing social life but merely as a despicable means to accumulate 
power for power’s sake and it should be fought accordingly. “Fascism is not a 
philosophy—not even a realistic constructive program—but the most effective political 
technique in modern history”51. The only way of conquering it was to employ a 
governmental counter-technique, namely outlawing the enemies of democracy, e.g., 
through the ban of certain political parties. Fighting fire with fire.   
The principles of ‘militant democracy’ became influential in post-WWII Germany 
including ‘substantial democracy’ in the constitution and empowering the Constitutional 
Court52. The general hope was the ‘constitutional ethos’ that democracy could be checked 
but still preserved by way of a constitution and unelected institutions such as 
constitutional courts53. The fundamental idea of post-WWII ‘constitutionalism’ is to 
weaken national parliaments54 and insulate certain aspects of social and political life, e.g., 
fundamental rights, from democratic control by way of a constitution protected by a 
strong constitutional court55. The post-WWII settlement is concerned with constraining 
democracy by minimizing popular control of the state apparatus. 
                                                          
46 Müller, Contesting Democracy, 138. 
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The post-WWII ‘constitutional ethos’ was not merely institutionalized in 
constitutional courts but also through the transfer of power to other independent 
institutions and administrative agencies subject to judicial oversight56. A central way of 
constraining national democracy was by transferring sovereign powers to the newly 
founded project of European integration to secure perpetual peace amongst the European 
states. For the Christian Democratic Founders of the EEC—Alcide De Gasperi, Konrad 
Adenauer and Robert Schumann—national sovereignty was feared and had to be 
constrained:  
 
“European integration—this is crucial—was part and parcel of the new ‘constitutionalist 
ethos’, with its inbuilt distrust of popular sovereignty and the delegation of tasks to 
agencies that remained under the close supervision of national governments. Member 
countries consciously delegated powers to unelected domestic institutions and to 
supranational bodies, in order to ‘lock in’ liberal-democratic arrangements and prevent 
any backsliding towards authoritarianism”57.  
   
European integration was integral to the post-WWII ‘constitutional ethos’ in that 
it allowed the Member States to constrain their own sovereign powers through a common 
Union devoted to the common aim of European peace. The Member States could 
preserve their new constitutional identity—‘liberal democracy’—through their 
membership in a common Union58. The limitation of national sovereign rights to achieve 
European peace is thus written into several post-WWII constitutions59. In the Preamble 
to the French constitution of 1946 it is, e.g., declared that that ‘subject to reciprocity, 
France consents to limitations of sovereignty necessary for the realisation and the defence 
of peace’. The Italian constitution of 1948 contains a similar statement: ‘Italy may consent, 
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on equal terms with other States, to limitations of sovereignty necessary to establish an 
order ensuring peace and justice among nations’.  
The German Basic Law is perhaps the most interesting testament to that in that 
“the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power” constitutes Germany on the 
basis of their “determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united 
Europe”60. A united Europe is thus part of the post-WWII German constitutional 
identity, or as stated by the German Constitutional Court in the Lisbon Ruling “The Basic 
Law calls for European integration”61. From the very beginning, Germany decided to 
govern itself as a constrained democracy and as a member of a united Europe. In the case 
of Germany, EU membership is not something that can be decided on by any constituted 
power: “The constitutional mandate to realise a united Europe, which follows from Article 
23.1 of the Basic Law and its Preamble (…) means in particular for the German 
constitutional bodies that it is not left to their political discretion whether or not they 
participate in European integration”62. European integration is in this way protected from 
‘ordinary politics’, as fundamental rights are, by the German Constitutional Court. 
The project of European integration is a central aspect of the post-WWII 
constitutional model developed in Western Europe. For the founding members of the 
EEC, it has been largely possible to mediate between the domestic constitutional orders 
and the constraints of the European legal order. Nevertheless, even for these ‘core’ 
Member States, the mediation between national constitutions and the European legal and 
political order has required several constitutional amendments to constitutionally 
internalise the growing constraints that have come about with the development of 
European integration.  
 
C: Constitutional ‘Modernisation’ by Stealth 
In contrast to the Original Six for whom the constitutional internalisation of 
membership in the EU has been relatively unproblematic due to their shared origins in 
the constitutional imaginary of constrained democracy, the constitutional internalisation 
of EU membership has been more difficult for the ‘continuous democracies’ of the UK 
                                                          
60 The Preamble of the 1949 German Basic Law opens with the following statement: “Conscious of their 
responsibility before God and man, Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal 
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and the Scandinavian Member States (Denmark and Sweden63). None of these Member 
States, contrary to the Original Six, have the collapse of the interwar period and WWII as 
the defining watershed in their constitutional imaginaries64. In their constitutional 
imaginaries, these states are ‘continuous democracies’ predating the post-WWII world. 
Instead of being founded on the fear of popular and parliamentary sovereignty, these 
constitutional regimes are proud of their traditions of parliamentary sovereignty and are 
all characterised by a relative lack of judicial review or judicial self-restraint65. 
With its famous unwritten constitution characterised by the relatively unrestrained 
authority of Crown-in-Council-in-Parliament, the UK is perhaps the emblematic example. 
Famously, the UK constitution has developed historically in incremental steps allowing it 
to develop a modern constitutional order without a modern revolution. Despite its 
significance for British self-understanding, the incrementalism of British constitutional 
history means that WWII is not a particularly significant moment in the British 
constitutional imagination or if so it is only to illustrate and reinforce the power of 
parliamentary democracy. Notwithstanding significant differences such as the presence of 
written constitutions and modern though relatively non-violent revolutions, the two 
Scandinavian Member States share important constitutional features with the UK66. As is 
the case in the UK, the primacy of Parliament is the bedrock of the constitutional orders 
of Denmark and Sweden: “The Nordic democratic ideal is built on the motto: no one over 
or besides the parliament”67. For that reason, the idea of judicial review of acts of Parliament 
is viewed with suspicion as a political exercise of power by the judiciary. The judiciary in 
Denmark and Sweden have therefore been extremely cautious in exercising judicial 
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review. The Danish Supreme Court has, e.g., only ever declared one act of Parliament 
unconstitutional68 and the Danish Constitution is silent on the question on whether 
judicial review is allowed69. Sweden presents a similar case70.  
This kind of constitutional system is incompatible with the demands of EU law, 
which relies on the domestic courts to set aside national legislation that infringes EU law. 
The demands of member-statehood have therefore necessitated a relatively drastic 
constitutional transformation of these three states71 paving the way for a system of de facto 
judicial review of national law (to ensure conformance with EU law72) despite the effort 
of some domestic courts to avoid it, e.g., by not making use of the preliminary reference 
procedure73. The introduction of judicial review has led to significant critique from media 
and politicians as conflicting with democracy74 understood as the relatively unbound 
power and authority of Parliament. In the UK, The Daily Mail notoriously pronounced the 
judges of the Miller case ‘enemies of the people’75. Whereas the constraints of member-
statehood for these states might generally be understood as externally imposed, as 
Bickerton suggests, EU membership has in fact fundamentally transformed the domestic 
constitutional regimes of majoritarian democracy, parliamentary sovereignty and judicial 
self-restraint characterising these three states.  
Though largely unnoticed, the most drastic constitutional change has possibly 
taken place in the UK. For the British, the ‘external constraints’ of European law could 
never be easily ‘internalised’ as an act of self-binding of the people because the idea of 
popular sovereignty—let alone constrained democracy—is foreign to the British 
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constitutional imagination. That being said, after acceding to the EU, Britain was required, 
by virtue of EU law, to govern itself as a ‘constrained democracy’ and respect the 
supremacy and direct effect of European law. Via EU membership, the British 
Constitution, as argued by Martin Loughlin, has undergone a process of ‘modernization’ 
that has enabled judicial review to ensure the conformance of British law with EU law76, 
the adoption of fundamentals rights and a distinction between constitutional statutes and 
ordinary legislation previously foreign to the British Constitution77 and introduced the 
idea that popular sovereignty can express itself via referenda78.  
The radical transformation of the British Constitution, however, should not 
exclusively be understood as an incorporation of the demands of the European order. 
The British Constitution has at least since the end of WWII been understood as in need 
of a fundamental reform. Without the revolutionary conditions present to affect a 
fundamental constitutional change, the constitutional ‘modernization’ of Britain has taken 
place via EU membership79. EU membership has allowed the UK to undergo an 
incremental constitutional ‘modernisation’ that has broadly brought it in line with 
continental constitutional regimes. In a structurally similar manner to Milward’s argument 
of the European rescue of the nation-state (Chapter 2), Loughlin maintains that EU 
membership has provided the conditions that have allowed the UK constitutional regime 
to ‘modernize’ and thereby rescue it from its “institutional and conceptual sclerosis”80. 
Importantly, EU membership has provided the conditions for a peace settlement in 
Northern Ireland by providing the conditions for its unique cross-border arrangement 
and helped develop its constitutional system of devolution of powers to its constituent 
nations81. 
That Britain’s membership in the EU has led to a fundamental political change to 
its constitution, however, has at least to some extent gone unnoticed82. As argued by the 
UK Supreme Court in Miller, until the 1990s “it is fair to say that the legal consequences 
of the United Kingdom’s accession to the EEC were not fully appreciated by many 
lawyers”. The constitutional significance of EU membership, however, seems only now 
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to be truly dawning on Britain as a consequence of the tremendous difficulties associated 
with trying to leave the EU (e.g. the question of the future of Northern Ireland). An 
important reason for this late reckoning is probably that the constitutional transformation 
undergone by the ‘continuous democracies’ has largely not been achieved by popular 
deliberation or through formal constitutional amendments83. The constitutional 
transformation from nation-state to Member States has taken place mostly by ‘stealth’ in 
these three states. For that reason, the UK has been able to hold on to the fiction that the 
old pre-EEC accession constitution and “the shibboleth of parliamentary sovereignty”84 
are still alive and well (or at least, the fiction is that they will be, as soon as the UK leaves 
the EU). Having undergone a fundamental political change and become a Member State 
of the EU, the implication of Brexit is not merely that the UK leaves the Union, it will 
also have to give itself a fundamentally new constitution. 
 
D: Federal Destiny and the ‘Return to Europe’ 
Britain is perhaps the most extreme case, but it is in no way the only Member 
State for which the mediation of internal and external constitutional constraints has not 
been easily achieved. For the post-Communist countries of the ‘Eastern Enlargements’ 
that constituted themselves as ‘liberal democracies’ after the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
mediation between internal and external constraints was not easily achieved because the 
possibility of ceding sovereign powers to the EU or international organizations was not 
part of nine out of ten of the post-Communist constitutions85. In contrast to the 
reconstitution of Germany, France and Italy after WWII, the post-Communist countries 
did not constitute themselves as ‘open’ towards European law and European unification. 
All the post-Communist countries had to amend their constitutions when they decided to 
accede to the EU86. Furthermore, in contrast to the ‘continuous democracies’, the 
transformation of the post-Communist Member States affected all aspects of social and 
political life (Chapter 4). Perhaps for that reason, modernisation by ‘stealth’ was not an 
option. The internalisation of member-statehood was instead overwhelmingly achieved 
through employing the political myth of ‘the return to Europe’. A myth that had 
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previously influenced the ‘Mediterranean Enlargements’ of the 1980s (Spain, Greece, 
Portugal). The myth of ‘returning to Europe’ is that the transformation associated with 
becoming a Member State of the EU allows the country to fulfil its ‘true destiny’, to 
become what it was always meant to be, namely, a part of Europe. As such the idea of the 
‘return to Europe’ was granted the mythical or religious quality of an inherent kinship and 
a shared destiny between the Member States. 
The idea of a shared kinship and destiny of the Member States lies at the root of 
federalism as a concept and there is a direct link between the idea of fœdus (pacte, alliance) 
and fides (fidelity or faith)87. Following Beaud, these two aspects of federalism are united 
in the idea of the covenant used by the American Founding Fathers88. The original biblical 
sense of covenant is the pact between God and man. Interestingly, a similar political-
theological root can be found in the German term for a federation, Bund, which was 
originally used by Luther to describe the alliance between the people and God89. For the 
Anglican dissidents that were some of the first immigrants to the United States, the 
covenant was also used to describe the contractual founding of the protestant church. 
Here, the faithful individuals play a decisive role in creating the community to which they 
already belong90. When the Americans wanted to give themselves political institutions they 
turned to the community they knew best: the religious community91. The religious 
community can break the cycle of the constituent and constituted power92 by virtue of 
being destined to create that to which it already belongs. The religious community is in 
this way capable of mediating between the past and the future by introducing a cyclical 
element to the federal contract. Similarly, the federation is created by the states that are 
destined to belong to it. In this way, they conserve themselves politically by becoming 
what they were always meant to be, by fulfilling their true destiny.  
In the EU, the idea of the ‘ever-closer union of the peoples of Europe’ is an 
important myth binding together its Member States. As we saw in Chapter 2, for the 
Founding Fathers of European integration, ‘Europe’ was the Sorellian myth for the post-
WWII era that was meant to fill the void left behind by totalitarianism. Linguistically, the 
idea of the ‘ever-closer union of the peoples of Europe’ mimics that of the founding of 
the protestant church by the faithful individuals who already belong to the community. 
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In this way, the European peoples (the faithful) can play an active role in forming the EU 
(the church) to which they already belong as peoples of Europe (the religious community). The 
transformation (‘ever-closer’) allows the peoples to become ever-closer to what they were 
destined to become (the ‘union of the peoples of Europe’).  For that reason, any 
prospective EU Member State also has to be a ‘European state’ (Chapter 4). The 
significance of this accession criteria lies in the mythical quality of ‘Europe’: ‘European 
states’ can accede to the European Union because they already belong to ‘Europe’. This double use of 
the idea of Europe is, e.g., manifest in the statement of the Greek Prime Minister, 
Constantinos Karamalis made in relation to Greece’s application for membership in the 
EEC: “Greece belongs to Europe and desires to belong to Europe (…) Greece does not 
desire full membership solely on economic grounds, the reasons are mainly political and 
refer to the consolidation of democracy and the future of the nation” 93. The ideas of a 
‘reunification of Europe’94 or a ‘return to Europe’95 were even more prevalent in the case 
of the Eastern Enlargements: 
 
“1989 was not only a revolution for freedom. 1989 was also a revolt to ‘return to Europe’. 
After World War II, the countries of Central and South Eastern Europe had fallen under 
the geopolitical and systemic control of the Soviet Union. For them, Cold War, Iron 
Curtain and totalitarian dictatorship also meant a separation from ‘Europe’, from its 
Western part and its common heritage. ‘Returning to Europe’ was the unfulfilled dream 
and obvious aspiration. 1989 opened the doors that had been slammed by the forces of 
a tragic history. 1989 meant the end of the order of Yalta. It meant a homecoming, the 
return to a common civilization of freedom, law and democracy”96. 
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These kinds of statements are meaningless if thought of in historical terms. Nevertheless, 
the ideas of European reunification or a ‘return to Europe’ provides a strong historical 
myth that was capable of making a bond between the future and the past, transformation 
and internalisation, by constituting the present in the image of ‘homecoming’ to, albeit a 
fictitious, past97. The prominent Polish political activist and intellectual Adam Michnik 
thus wrote: “For now two roads lie open before my country and our newly freed 
neighbours… one road leads to nationalism and isolationism, the other to a return to our 
‘native Europe’”98. Similarly, in a speech at the European Parliament in 2009, Václav 
Havel stated: “I tend to say somewhat poetically that Europe is the ‘homeland of our 
homelands’”99.  
The revolutions in Eastern Europe have, furthermore, been conceptualised as 
‘rectifying revolutions’100 by bringing the states back on the track they would have been 
on had they not been under Soviet rule: 
 
“In Poland and Hungary, in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria—in other words, in 
those countries which did not achieve the social and political structures of state socialism 
through an independent revolution, but rather ended up with them as a result of the war 
and the arrival of the Red Army—the abolition of the people’s republic has occurred 
under the sign of a return to old, national symbols, and, where this was possible, has 
understood itself to be the continuation of the political traditions and party organizations 
of the interwar years. Here—as revolutionary changes gather force and become 
revolutionary events—is also where one finds the clearest articulation of the desire to 
connect up constitutionally with the inheritance of the bourgeois revolutions, and socially 
and politically with the styles of commerce and life associated with developed capitalism, 
particularly that of the European Community”101. 
 
‘Revolution’ is, as pointed out by Hannah Arendt, another concept which is capable of 
mediating between the past and the future by bringing something back to its original place 
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by an act of ‘restoration’102. The political myth of ‘the reunification of Europe’ allowed 
the states to imagine a return to the pre-communist era and take the path they would 
otherwise have taken: the path of the West103. “For many Czechs, Hungarians and Poles, 
this development was merely a restoration of the region’s historical and cultural unity with 
the West”104, as one scholar remarks.  
From a liberal-democratic perspective, most of the post-Communist countries 
had little to ‘return to’ (only Czechoslovakia had been a democracy in the interwar 
period105) and the post-Communist countries did, in fact, not return to their pre-WWII 
constitutions. Instead, they gave themselves fundamentally new constitutional orders. 
And so as the post-WWII order created an entirely new constitutional settlement in the 
guise of returning to the past, the Eastern European countries fashioned new 
constitutions in the guise of ‘returning to Europe’. As manifest in the 1990 
Czechoslovakian Civic Forum election poster below, returning to Europe was imagined 
as crawling out of the abyss ‘back to Europe’. The Eastern European peoples had literally 
fallen off the map. 
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Picture 1: A concrete example of political change in the guise of a return to the past is the 1990 election campaign 
for the Czechoslovakian Civic Forum with the slogan: “Back to Europe”106 
 
III: TELEOLOGY AND SPECIALISATION 
 
A: The Foundations of the Governmental Authority of the Union 
The federation is a union of states. The states, however, as we have just seen, are 
not states in the classical sense of the term. Instead they are Member States that in the 
context of the EU can be characterized as a form of ‘constrained statehood’. But what is 
the ‘union’ in the union of states and what are the foundations for its exercise of public 
power? Until now, the union has overwhelmingly been dealt with as a political association 
created by the Member States (the federation as political association). However, as argued 
earlier in this chapter the union is also an institutional apparatus created by the Member 
States (the federation as institution) with its own foundations for governmental authority 
different from that of the state. The foundations for the governmental authority of the 
Union institutions are qualitatively distinct from those of the state because union authority 
is always limited and directed towards a certain pre-given aim. For that reason, the 
federation as institution is distinct from the ‘omni-competence’ of the state107. The 
principles of Union authority are specialisation and teleology.  
The public powers of the Union are born out of the Member States coming 
together in a common Union to obtain the common ends or goals of the federation. 
Union authority is therefore ‘functionally’ derived from the collective purposes of the 
Union108. To understand the foundations of Union authority we have to think in terms of 
the purposes for which it was created109. Union government is therefore always teleological. 
However, in contrast to the state, the union is not free to set its own aims or purposes110. 
In his analysis of the German Federation of 1815, Ernst Rudolf Huber writes: The 
German Federation “in contrast to a genuine state did not possess a universality of state-
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ends [Staateszwecks] (…) The Federation was limited to certain individual ends 
[Einzelszweck] that the federal treaty enumerated, whereby it at the same time limited the 
federal competences (‘enumeratio, ergo limitatio’)”111. The public powers of the EU are 
born out of the constraint but not annihilation of the Member States. For that reason, 
EU institutions only have competences to act within limited fields and it is only within 
those fields that EU law enjoys supremacy over Member State law112. The supremacy or 
primacy of EU law is therefore neither absolute nor unconditional113. The Member States 
have limited their powers in order to preserve themselves politically in a common union 
and government by Union institutions is therefore always directed towards this 
constitutional aim. In contrast to the governmental apparatus of a state, Union institutions 
cannot be conceptualised independently from their end, the federal telos.  
But is this teleological orientation fundamentally different from that of the state? 
In political theory, it is a long debate whether the state should be understood in relation 
to the ends or means specific to it. The two extreme positions in this debate can be 
illustrated by the works of Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber. For Hobbes, the state is 
born out of a social contract between individuals to ensure their mutual security and 
stability. In the early history of the theory of state, therefore, the state cannot be 
understood as independent from its telos. Notwithstanding the continuing relevance of 
Hobbes for the theory of the state his teleological conception of the state is no longer the 
dominant one. At least since Max Weber, the state has for the most part been 
conceptualised in relation to the means specific to it, namely the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force114. Whatever the relevance of the conceptualisation of the state in 
terms of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, it is unhelpful to analyse the 
federation in these terms. The federation is characterised by a duality of public powers 
over the same territory and the same population115. The federation can, in other words, 
be defined by the lack of a monopoly of the use of public power (which is another way of 
saying that the federation is not a state). A state-centric analysis in terms of means will be 
incapable of understanding the constitutional significance of the federal telos.  
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The constitutional significance of the teleological orientation of the federation 
consists in the political intent of the federal founding and it is part of the institutional and 
juridical architecture of the federation as a constitutional order116. The states unite to 
obtain certain aims and they provide the institutional structure presiding over the Union 
with the powers to obtain those aims117. For that reason, the foundation of union authority 
is the constitutional aims for which the states united. There is a direct constitutional link 
between the competences and the aims of a federation118. In the EU, the link between 
competences and the aims or objectives of the Union is made in Article 1 TEU: “By this 
Treaty, the HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES establish among themselves a 
EUROPEAN UNION, hereinafter called ‘the Union’ on which the Member States confer 
competences to attain objectives they have in common”. In contrast to a state, it is impossible 
to understand the public powers of the EU independently of the Treaty aims that at the 
same time are their foundation and limitation: “The Union shall pursue its objectives by 
appropriate means commensurate with the competences which are conferred upon it in 
the Treaties”119.  
The aims of a federation are what limits and justifies its exercise of public powers. 
The public powers of the federation are directed towards, and limited in relation to, the 
aim specific to the federation, that is, the federal telos. What is important to understand is 
that the teleological basis for the exercise of public powers by the federation cannot be 
reduced to a sociological criterion through which obedience is established, that is, it is 
irreducible to so-called ‘out-put legitimacy’120. Whatever the sociological relevance of the 
concept of ‘output legitimacy’ to understand the grounds for relative obedience, it is 
unhelpful to determine the regime type or the foundations for governmental authority of 
any political entity. All regimes, in order to stay in power, need some degree of ‘output 
legitimacy’ (Machiavellian statesmanship holds true for monarchies and democracies alike: 
“a prince can never make himself safe against a hostile people: there are too many of 
them”121).  
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B: The Institutional Structure of the Union  
Despite their transformation from (independent) states to Member States, the 
Member States, as we have seen, retain their institutional structures and governmental 
apparatuses. The Member States’ institutional and governmental structures, however, are 
not necessarily mirrored by a sophisticated institutional structure of the Union or any 
union ‘government’ in the traditional sense of the term122. The constitution of a federation 
always entails the creation of a permanent institutional apparatus (the federation as 
institution), but it can consist, as a minimum, of a single institution: the federal diet 
(assembly or council) composed of representatives of all the Member States123. The federal 
diet can be the sole federal institution exercising a wide array of legislative, executive and 
judiciary powers. In contrast to most modern states, federations are not necessarily based 
on the idea of the separation of powers124. That being said, the federal diet has to be 
collegial and as such the federal institution always entail a political balance between its 
Member States. In contrast to an empire, the federation is based on political equality and 
for that reason it cannot govern via monarchical institutions.  
The federal diet is a genuine expression of the federal principles because its 
operational logic is neither purely interstate nor purely intrastate125 and as such it differs 
both from a diplomatic conference and a state parliament126. On the one hand, the federal 
diet is distinct from an interstate diplomatic conference because its decisions will be 
immediately binding on the Member States without further ratification127. On the other 
hand, the federal diet differs from a national government, in that the Member States’ 
representatives are ‘derived’ from another government. They are not elected for the office 
but appointed by the Member State governments, parliaments or other designated 
institutions of the Member States128. The federal diet is in that sense an 
‘intergovernmental’ assembly. The Member States are generally equally represented 
irrespectively of the size of their populations reflecting the political equality of the 
Member States. The federal diet is therefore not based on the modern conception of 
political equality of citizens expressed in the idea of ‘one person, one vote’. The federation 
is (primarily) a union of states; not an association of individuals. 
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Nevertheless, federations of democratic or republican states tend to represent not 
merely the states but also their peoples129. This double representation is ideal-typically 
expressed in the bicameralism of Congress in the United States, with the House of 
Representatives as the ‘popular chamber’ and the Senate as the ‘state chamber’. In such a 
second ‘popular chamber’, the size of the population of the individual states will, as a rule, 
be considered. Bicameralism, however, is not a necessary character trait of a federation130. 
The EU has incorporated double representation to some degree with the European 
Parliament as the ‘popular chamber’ representing the European citizens and the Council 
of the EU as the ‘state chamber’ representing the Member States’ governments131. The 
Member States are furthermore represented by their Heads of States/governments in the 
European Council and the Eurozone Member States are (informally) represented by their 
finance ministers in the Eurogroup.  
Nevertheless, the EU cannot be characterised as a genuine bicameral federation. 
The reason for that is not only the relative weakness of the European Parliament132 but 
also, more importantly, the central role of the Commission in the legislative procedure133. 
In the words of Antoine Vauchez: “the problem is not that the citizens turn away from 
the European parliamentary elections but that politics in itself turn away from the 
European Parliament”134. In the EU, the legislative initiative is held by an unelected, 
relatively unaccountable and politically independent institution. If we are to understand 
the defining principles of Union government in the EU, we cannot focus exclusively on 
the EU’s representative institutions of the EU Member States and the EU citizens. What 
makes the governmental structure of the EU somewhat unusual from the perspective of 
the theory of the federation are the central legislative, executive and judicial institutions 
that fit the theory of neither a monocameral nor a bicameral federal diet, namely, the so-
called ‘independents’135: The European Commission, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
and the European Central Bank (ECB). As pointed out by Vauchez, it is a mistake to try 
                                                          
129 Beaud, Théorie, 357; Forsyth, “Towards a New Concept of Confederation” in The Modern Concept of 
Confederation (Santorini, Venice Commission, 22-25 September 1994). 
130 Beaud, Théorie, 359. 
131 Both the European Parliament and the Council, however, are based on a compromise between the 
‘federal’ principle of Member State equality and the ‘democratic’ principle of ‘one person, one vote’. The 
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to understand the governmental structure of the EU (exclusively, if at all) in terms of the 
principles of representative democracy because these institutions, the independents, 
clearly do not base their authority on this principle136. From a comparative historical 
perspective, the ECJ is the least ‘extraordinary’ because of its strong similarities with the 
Supreme Court in the United States. 
The independents are neither representatives of the Member States nor the 
European citizens. These institutions are not elected by popular vote and their 
accountability is limited. Their authority relies, not on an electoral chain but on its 
exteriority to the ‘democratic passions’ and ‘national egoism’137. They are what would 
generally be termed ‘non-majoritarian’ or ‘counter-majoritarian’ institutions138. In short, 
their authority is very different from not only state governments but also from the federal 
diet. What makes the independents especially interesting is that their authority relies 
directly on the European federal constitution, that is, their authority is not derived from 
the Council and/or the Parliament. The independents owe their existence directly to the EU 
constitution and not to an Act of the EU’s representative institutions.  
In terms of its institutional apparatus, the independents are perhaps the most 
singular aspect of the EU as a federation. That being said, the constitutional creation of a 
‘non-partisan’ executive office of a federation is not a unique feature of the EU as a 
federation. The Constitution of the United States of 1787 also constituted a ‘non-partisan’ 
executive office which was not to be elected directly by the people: the Presidency. From 
a contemporary perspective, the comparison of the Commission with the office of the 
President of the United States might seem absurd. But that is only because the Presidency 
has undergone a series of constitutional transformations since the founding of the early 
Republic. In the early Republic, the Presidency was not, as we tend to think of it today, a 
plebiscitary office that carried with it a ‘mandate’ from the people139. On the contrary, the 
Electoral College that elects the President (which is still in place today) was designed by 
the Founding Fathers in order to avoid a plebiscitary President. The electoral college 
“aimed to encourage the selection of the man with the most distinguished past service to 
the Republic. Republican virtue, not populist demagogy, was to be the principal qualification”140. 
The Presidential veto that today makes the Presidency into something akin to a third 
legislative chamber, was in its original intent thought of as a ‘defensive’ mechanism to 
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protect the Constitution as well as the Presidency 141. Whereas the US Presidency was 
meant to be appointed by the Electoral College for his ‘republican virtue’, the officials of 
the independents are appointed, not merely on the basis of federal principles and their 
general qualifications but also on the grounds of their unquestionable ‘independence’ and 
their ‘European commitment’142.  
 
C: ‘Political Messianism’ and the ‘European Form of Government’ 
The foundations of the independents’ authority can be understood based on the 
principles of federal government, namely, teleology and specialisation. The independents 
are constitutionally limited teleological institutions. From the very beginning of European 
integration, we can understand the authority of the Commission in that way. In the ESCS 
treaty the mandate of the Commission (then the ‘High Authority’) was defined as follows: 
“The High Authority shall be responsible for assuring the fulfilment of the purposes 
stated in the present Treaty under the terms thereof”143. Its independence is granted not 
as a set of arbitrary prerogative powers but as a constitutional mandate to seek a certain 
pre-given end independently. The source of the independents’ authority is not representation 
but commission: they are entrusted with the authority to do a certain task by the constitution. 
Their authority relies on a constitutional mandate to ensure the federal telos.   
The constitutional mandate of the independents has two distinct meanings. First, 
the constitutional mandate of the independents is conservative: the independents are there 
to uphold the constitutional contract between the Member States. Together with the 
ECJ144 that ensures “that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
observed”145, the Commission is generally understood as the ‘guardian of the Treaties’146. 
If the EU as an integral part of post-WWII constitutionalism is born out of a fear of 
democracy and parliamentarism as suggested by Müller, it is understandable why the 
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European ‘guardian’, like the national constitutional courts, was not to be a ‘political’ 
institution with arbitrary prerogative powers but an ‘independent’ institution bound by a 
pre-given constitutional telos. The ‘European form of government’, manifest in the 
independents, following Vauchez, was created as a ‘counter-model’ to national 
parliamentary democracies147. 
Being a guardian of the constitution, however, is not merely a conservative task 
that looks towards the past. It is also a transformative or creative task. In the act of uniting, 
the Member States express their foundational intention of being “RESOLVED to 
continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. The 
institutional framework of the EU, following the Treaties “shall aim to promote its values, 
advance its objectives, serve its interests, those of its citizens and those of the Member 
States, and ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its policies and 
actions”148. The independents are therefore also commissioned to look toward the future. 
The Member States have united for aspirational reasons in order to create a not-yet-there. 
The overall aims of the Union are of that nature: “to promote peace, its values and the 
well-being of its peoples”149. In addition to their conservative mandate, the independents 
have a constitutional mandate to promote the objectives of the Union for the benefit of 
which the Member States decided to unite in the first place.  
 In a similar fashion to the Member States of the ‘Eastern Enlargements’, an 
important way of balancing the creative and conservative forces of the independents’ 
constitutional mandate is by squaring the circle through the ‘idea of Europe’ as a political 
myth. The task of the independents is to create the ‘promised land’ of Europe and to 
make sure that the European states fulfil their destiny.  The authority of the independents 
can therefore be understood based on what Weiler has termed ‘political messianism’150. It 
is the authority of the saviour of the chosen people. Following Weiler, the political 
messianism of Europe is first expressed in “Europe’s ‘Declaration of Independence’”, 
namely, the Schumann Declaration of 1950. The substance of this declaration, Weiler 
argues, is in itself “messianic”: “a compelling vision which has animated now at least three 
generations of European idealists where the ‘ever closer union among the people[s] of 
Europe’, with peace and prosperity icing on the cake, constituting the beckoning 
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‘Promised Land’”151. A united Europe became understood as the ‘Promised Land’ that 
would allow for the Member States to preserve themselves as free and equal states bound 
together in a common union.  
The authority of the independents relies on this political messianism. Their 
‘imperative mandate’, following Vauchez, is that of the ‘European project’: “The 
‘mandate’ on which the Court and the Commission—and ultimately the ECB—prevail 
finds neither its source nor its imperative in the general will of the peoples. Rather it 
ensues from the existence of ‘Europe’ as an ‘idea’, ‘spirit’, ‘consciousness’ or specific 
‘project’”152. Following Vauchez, this European form of government manifest in the 
independents and based on the imperative mandate of the European project has led to 
the development of two traditions of government specific to Europe: a ‘judicial tradition’ 
and a ‘bureaucratic tradition’153.  
The judicial tradition of ‘integration through law’ manifest in the early 
transformative constitutionalism of the ECJ is one of the clearest manifestations of the 
‘political messianism’ of the independents. The ECJ is, as we have seen, not a 
representative institution but a commissioner with the imperative mandate of a 
constitutional guardian. As such, the ECJ does not have any legislative power; it cannot 
make new laws. What it can do, however, is to interpret the European constitutional 
contract, the Treaties, in a teleological manner, that is, on the basis of the intent of the 
contracting parties; the aim or spirit of the law154. In this way, the case law can be 
construed not as new or original law because the ECJ’s interpretation is merely a 
clarification of the original intent of the contracting parties. The teleological process is 
further authorised by the judicial formalism of the ‘rule of law’. The idea that the ECJ is 
constrained by a judicial logic and the ‘rule of law’ makes it possible to fundamentally 
depoliticise an otherwise deeply political process155. According to Weiler, this is a typical 
trait of political messianism as such: “‘political messianic’ projects, by their very nature, 
go hand in hand with a formalist, self-referential concept of ‘rule of law’”156. Whether this 
holds true or not, it is the case for the EU. The political messianism of Europe has 
depoliticised its own revolutionary development through judicialization. The 
constitutional revolution of the early case law of the ECJ, most notably Van Gend en Loos 
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and Costa should be read in this light as the Court giving effect to “the project the High 
Contracting Parties encapsulated in their respective Treaties”157. 
The ‘bureaucratic tradition’ invented, following Vauchez, is that of the ‘Monnet 
method’ of integration through ‘de facto solidarity’, that is, integration through the 
interdependence of the Member States which will lead to ‘spill-overs’ in other fields of 
integration158. The teleological meaning of the ‘bureaucratic tradition’ is best captured in 
the principle of implied powers159 (Chapter 4). The principle of implied powers is an 
expression of the teleological logic of the exercise of public power in that the competences 
of a federation and the federal telos are intrinsically linked to one another. The public 
powers of the Union are always limited in relation to the aims of the federation, and 
therefore, the Member States must arguably have provided the federation with the means 
necessary to achieve the aims of the federation. As the other independents, the Commission 
does not have any ‘political authority’. What is deemed ‘necessary’ to obtain a certain aim 
can therefore not be justified on political grounds. Whereas the ECJ could ground the 
authority of its transformative constitutionalism on the basis of judicial procedure and the 
‘rule of law’, the Commission and the ECB can ground their authority in ‘expertise’ and 
‘technical’ solutions. The idea that the executive branch of government is intrinsically 
linked to the notions of rationalism and technicality is not unique to the ‘European form 
of government’. This connection lies at the origins of the modern state and the birth of 
government based on socio-practical experience160. As such, the Commission and the 
ECB introduce an element of raison d’état into the Union that will always threaten its 
internal balance in that general aims will justify unlimited means: “He who wills the end must 
also will the means”161.  
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4 
 
United in Diversity 
The problem of the federal balance and constitutional 
heterogeneity in the European Union 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Having identified the federation as a discrete political form (Chapter 1) and 
discussed both its origins (Chapter 2) and how it governs itself as a political association 
without sovereignty (Chapter 3), this chapter is concerned with understanding the main 
problem that characterises the federation as a political form: the problem of the federal 
balance. This problem consist in how the federation can strike an internal balance between 
its dual political existence and its dual governmental structure? This chapter maintains 
that the federation as a political form is characterised by a fundamental internal 
contradiction expressed in the dual nature of the federal constitutional aim: the creation 
of an ever-closer union between the peoples of the Member States and the protection of 
the autonomy and diversity of the Member States.  
A federation is a political union constituted by its Member States because for one 
reason or another they have found it difficult to maintain their own political autonomy 
(Chapter 2). The raison d’être of all federations is therefore to perpetuate the political 
existence and autonomy of its Member States1. The perpetuation of the political 
autonomy and existence of its Member States, however, is not the sole aim of the 
federation. By coming together in a federation, the Member States aim to constitute a new 
political existence, the Union (Chapters 1 and 3). A federal constitution is therefore 
committed to create and protect the political existence and autonomy of the Union as a 
whole. Whereas a state, if understood in terms of ends and not means, has a unified (if 
not unitary) telos—the security and wellbeing of its people—the federation has a double 
telos which is planted in it with the founding: the will to preserve the states as autonomous 
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and the will of living together in a common union2. The double federal aim means that 
the Union at the same time is committed to unity and diversity, transformation and 
conservation, the past and the future.  
In order to persist as a political form, the federation needs to strike a balance 
between these contradictory forces. This chapter is concerned with the precariousness of 
this balance that in the EU recently has manifested itself in the rise of authoritarian 
constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary seemingly breaching the foundational values of 
the Union. This chapter is concerned with understanding whether, how and to what 
extent a federal union of states can maintain the federal balance if one of its Member 
States adopts a constitution that is hostile to the Union constitution. Does the EU have 
the authority to intervene in the constitutional developments of its Member States in 
order to ‘save’ a Member State, and the Union at large, from the ‘dangers of democratic 
choice’? How can the EU live up to its motto of being ‘United in Diversity’?  
 
I: THE PROBLEM OF THE FEDERAL BALANCE 
 
A: The Double Telos of the Federation 
The double telos of the federation originates in the curious sentiment from which 
all federal constitutions are born: on the one hand, the wish to live together, however, 
without being one, and, on the other hand, the wish of remaining autonomous, however, 
without being fully separate from one another. The precondition for the establishment of 
a federation is in the words of Albert Dicey:  
 
“[T]he existence of a very peculiar sentiment among the inhabitants of the countries 
which it is proposed to unite. They must desire union, and must not desire unity. If there 
be no desire to unite, there is clearly no basis for federalism (…) If, on the other hand 
there be a desire for unity, the wish will naturally find its satisfaction, not under a federal, 
but under a unitary constitution (…) [T]he sense of common interest, or common 
national feeling, may be too strong to allow of that combination of union and separation 
which is the foundation of federalism”3.  
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3 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Indiapolis, Liberty Fund, 1982), 75-6.  
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 In the context of the EU, this ‘peculiar sentiment’ is perfectly captured in the 
constitutional aim of the Union: ‘the ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’. 
The EU is born out of an aspiration for an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe—
a clear expression of a desire for union. At the same time, this union can never become a 
unity. The constitutional aim insists that it is a union among the peoples of Europe. The 
constitutional aim of the EU is in other words a desire for union but not unity, 
paraphrasing Dicey. A similar interpretation of the political aim of the EU has been 
advanced by Joseph Weiler: 
 
“No matter how close the Union, it is to remain a union among distinct peoples, distinct 
political identities, distinct political communities. (…) The rejection by Europe of that 
One Nation ideal or destiny is, as indicated above, usually understood as intended to 
preserve the rich diversity, cultural and other, of the distinct European peoples as well as 
to respect their political self‐determination”4. 
    
In Weiler’s interpretation, the idea of ‘the ever-closer union of the peoples of Europe’ 
comes to symbolise what he understands to be the ‘unique brand of European 
constitutional federalism’ whose normative hallmark is that of ‘constitutional tolerance’5. 
That is, the prevalence of Member State obedience to European law despite the lack of a 
sovereign act of the people of Europe as its source of authority6. However, contrary to 
what Weiler argues, the double telos of the EU expressed in its constitutional aim is a 
clear manifestation of the ‘peculiar sentiment’ that is at the origins of all federations—not 
just the EU. For that reason, neither the aim of ‘an ever-closer union of the peoples of 
Europe’ nor the lack of a sovereign people as the source of constitutional authority is 
unique7 (Chapters 1 and 3).  
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the men of Berne or of Zurich. The sentiment therefore which creates a federal state is the prevalence 
throughout the citizens of more or less allied countries of two feelings which are to a certain extent 
inconsistent—the desire for national unity and the determination to maintain the independence of each 
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In contrast to what is often argued, the United States at the time of the 
Constitutional Convention “were not a nation by any modern standard”8. “Most citizens 
of the United States in 1790”, Samuel Morrison writes “if asked their country or nation, 
would not have answered American but Carolinian, Virginian, Pennsylvanian, New 
Yorker or New Englander”9. Following Eric Hobsbawm: “Early political discourse in the 
USA preferred to speak of ‘the people’, ‘the union’, ‘the confederation’, ‘our common 
land’, ‘the public’, ‘public welfare’ or ‘the community’ in order to avoid the centralizing 
and unitary implications of the term ‘nation’ against the rights of the federated states”10. 
The characteristics of the EU that following Weiler makes it unique are therefore a clear 
manifestation of the federation as a political form. This is not recognised by Weiler 
because, in his treatment of federalism and the EU, he relies on the statist imaginary of 
the ‘federal/confederal’ (Bundesstaat/Staatenbund) dichotomy 11. 
Notwithstanding that it has been more pronounced in the case of the EU than 
other young federations12, the phenomenon of ‘constitutional tolerance’ is not unique to 
the EU either. Constitutional tolerance, as will be argued in this chapter, is a manifestation 
of how the federation governs itself when the internal tensions and contradictions 
pertaining to the federation as a political form can be managed. As we shall see, it is only 
under certain circumstances that the federation can manage internal constitutional 
conflicts and maintain ‘constitutional tolerance’. ‘Constitutional tolerance’ is not an 
unconditional gift of federalism. The reason for that has to do with the internal 
contradiction or tension pertaining to the federal aim:  
 
“Federalism is always an arrangement pointed in two contradictory directions or aimed 
at securing two contradictory ends. One end is always found in the reason why the member 
units do not simply consolidate themselves into one large unitary country; the other end 
is always found in the reason why the member units do not choose to remain simply small 
wholly autonomous countries (…) [A]ny given federal structure is always the institutional 
expression of the contradiction or tension between the particular reasons the member units 
                                                          
man’s separate State. The aim of federalism is to give effect as far as possible to both these sentiments” 
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11 Weiler, “Federalism without Constitutionalism”, 58. 
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have for remaining small and autonomous but not wholly, and large and consolidated but 
not quite”13. 
 
Following Martin Diamond, the ‘peculiar federal sentiment’ discussed above 
means that the double telos of the federation is inherently contradictory. On the one hand, 
the states come together in a new common Union because they want to preserve their 
own political identity and autonomy; they come together in order to ‘remain who they 
are’14: “In other words, in spite of the federation or rather still because of it, they want to 
stay themselves, that is, remain autonomous political entities” 15. The federation is for that 
reason always conservative in nature16, directed towards the past and committed to preserving 
the diversity of its Member States17. This is, borrowing the terminology of Beaud, the 
‘particularistic aim’ of the federation18 because it is particular to the individual Member 
States of the Union and it introduces a centrifugal force into the federation.  
On the other hand, the federation is constituted because the Member States have 
rejected the status quo and desire to come together into an ‘ever-closer union’ with their 
future fellow Member States19. The federation is for that reason always creative in nature, 
directed towards the future and committed to creating and perpetuating the unity of its 
Member States. This is, again using Beaud’s vocabulary, the ‘common aim’, because all 
the founding states converge around it, and it introduces a centripetal force into the 
federation20. The federation as a political form is therefore characterised by two political 
forces that haul it in opposite directions: the creation and protection of the common 
political Union and the conservation of the political existence and autonomy of its 
Member States. These contradictory political forces pertaining to the double telos is at 
the heart of all federations exactly because the federation is a new political unity (‘common 
aim’) constituted in order to perpetuate the political existence and autonomy of its Member States 
(‘particularistic aim’). 
The double telos of the federation will therefore always threaten to pull the 
federation apart. The federation as a political form carries within itself a fundamental 
contradiction that it constantly needs to balance if it is to preserve its own political form. 
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This is what Schmitt refers to when he writes: “The federation exists only in this existential 
connection and in this balance”21. If this balance is not struck, the federation as a political form 
will tend to dissolve either into its composite states—a full realisation of the ‘particularistic 
aim’—or a fusion of the Member States into a fully-fledged federal state—a full realisation 
of the ‘common aim’. The logic of sovereignty will prevail either in the form of one 
sovereign state or many. 
The federation is therefore always conditioned on an incomplete realisation of the 
two core aims of the federation22. On the one hand, the aspiration of the Member States 
of remaining fully autonomous must be curbed in the federation because membership in 
a federal union imposes limits on the sovereignty of the Member States—membership of 
a federation always entails the transformation from independent ‘monadic state’ to 
‘Member State’ (Chapters 1 and 3). On the other hand, the aspiration of an ‘ever-closer 
union’ must be curbed because the powers of the Union are inherently limited. The 
federation does not enjoy the ‘omni-competence’ of a state; its powers are always 
governed by the principles of specialisation and teleology (Chapter 3).  
If a constitutional conflict erupts between the Union and one or more of its 
Member States, there is ultimately no legal answer to the question of what constitution(s) 
should prevail and who settles that question. Or rather: there are two strong, viable claims 
based in respectively the public law of the Union and the constitutions of the Member 
States as ultimate sources of authority (Chapters 1 and 5). This chapter is concerned with 
understanding the conditions—both legal and extra-legal—for the persistence of a federal 
balance. 
 
B: Why the Federal Balance cannot be Maintained by a ‘Division of 
Competences’ 
 Is it possible merely to legally stipulate the federal balance by way of a formal 
division of competences? Following this argument, the danger of upsetting the balance 
between the constitutional orders of the Union and those of its Member States is 
overstated because the powers of the Union always are enumerated and hence limited 
(Chapter 3). In the EU, this is spelled out by the principle of conferral (Art 5 TEU)23. In 
this understanding, the federal balance is protected by the clear-cut division of labour 
                                                          
21 C Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2008), 388, emphasis 
added. 
22 Beaud, Théorie, 280. 
23 The principle of conferral together with the principle of subsidiarity were introduced into EU law with 
the Maastricht Treaty, see L Azoulai, “Introduction: The Question of Competence” in L Azoulai (ed) The 
Question of Competence in the European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2014), 6. 
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between the Union and its Member States: the EU only has the power granted to it by its 
Member States.   
The theory of the federation rebuts the idea that a legal limitation alone can 
preserve the federal balance between the Union and the Member States. Notwithstanding 
that the Union is not endowed with the ‘omni-competence’ of the state, the theory of the 
federation maintains that the powers of Union government are limited in relation to a certain 
aim (Chapter 3). In the context of the EEC/EU, the powers of the Community/Union 
have, following Loïc Azoulai, from the very beginning been limited on a ‘functional basis’ 
in relation to the aims it was meant to realise: 
 
“From the outset, the European Community was said to operate on the basis of broad 
objectives provided by the Treaties. Community competences were derived from the list 
of objectives associated to each policy area. As a result, the way in which the objectives 
of the Treaty were construed dictated the reality of the allocation of powers between the 
Community and its Member States”24.  
 
The governmental structure of the Union, thus conceived, will have the 
governmental authority necessary to obtain the aim for which it was constituted: the 
objectives of the treaty ‘dictate’ the allocation of powers. In the Treaties, this is expressed 
in Article 6(4) TEU: “The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its 
objectives and carry through its policies”25. This is the doctrine of implied powers26 that is 
adequately summarised in a statement by ECJ Judge Pescatore: “the vision of objectives 
must be accompanied by a corresponding reality of powers”27. This form of teleological 
government or ‘competence creep’ is not unique to the EU. The growth of the 
governmental powers of the Union is an inherent feature of the structure of federal government28. 
The limitation of Union powers in relation to the ‘common aim’ means that the limited 
character of Union government (the principle of conferral) is undermined by its 
teleological orientation. A general governmental principle of necessity (the principle of 
teleology/‘functionality’) is thereby introduced into the heart of federal government 
(Chapter 3).  
                                                          
24 Azoulai, “The Question of Competence”, 6.  
25 Article 6(4) TEU, emphasis added 
26 In the context of the EU, the paradigmatic case is the ERTA case, see Azoulai, “The Question of 
Competence” 4ff; P Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (Oxford, OUP, 2011), Ch 3.  
27 P Pescatore, The Law of Integration: Emergence of a New Phenomenon in International Relations, Based on the 
Experience of the European Communities (Leiden, Sijthoof, 1974), 41-2. 
28 See e.g. Webster’s interpretation of the ‘necessary and proper’ clause (Forsyth, Union of States, 119-20). 
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The teleological orientation of Union government therefore presents a threat to 
the idea of a constitutional balance of the federation if imagined to be checked only by 
the idea of ‘limited competences’. The federation as a political form can only persist if it 
is capable of balancing its internally contradictory double aim that its governmental structure 
is predisposed to undermine because the powers of the Union government are limited in 
relation to transitory forces. This cannot be done by way of a legal demarcation of federal 
competences because the teleological orientation of the federal government can always 
authorise a transgression of this demarcation.  
 
C: The Problem of the Political Balance 
If a real political conflict emerges between the Union and its Member States, legal 
limitations of power are of little value. As remarked by Azoulai, “Confronted with real 
value conflicts and substantial solidarity issues, legal rules of conflict resolution like the 
pre-emption rule, the primacy rule, or the rules of competence laid down by the Treaties 
are of little use”29. But how then can the federal balance be maintained? The only way for 
the federal balance between unity and diversity to persist is to ensure a political balance 
between the Union and its Member States30.  No one was more acutely aware of this than 
Hannah Arendt: “only power arrests power”, she famously stated in On Revolution with 
reference to Montesquieu, that is, she added, “without destroying it by putting impotence 
in its place (…) Laws, on the other hand”, she continued, are “always in danger of being 
abolished by the power of the many, and in a conflict between law and power it is seldom 
the law which will emerge as victor”31. The problem of the federal balance is for that 
reason ultimately political and not legal in nature.  
That this is the case can be gathered from the debates around the constitution of 
the United States. The main problem for the Founding Fathers was, following Arendt, 
“how to establish a union out of thirteen ‘sovereign’, duly constituted republics; their task 
was the foundation of a ‘confederate republic’”32. The task of the Constitution, she 
                                                          
29 Azoulai, “The Question of Competence”, 15. 
30 C Schönberger, “Die Europäische Union als Bund” (2004) AöR 129(1), 104-5. 
31 H Arendt, On Revolution (New York, Penguin, 2006 [1977]), 142. In a similar spirit, John Fischer writes: 
“the question which dominated the first seventy-five years of American political life was, quite simply: 
How can such a federal system be held together against the splintering pressures of divergent interests? 
From the very beginning, therefore, American politicians were preoccupied with the problems of 
balancing these pressures against one another. They recognized that no constitutional or legalistic device 
could save the republic, unless the underlying real forces could be kept in equilibrium: As John Randolf 
put it: ‘You may cover whole skins of parchment with limitations, but power alone can limit power’” (J 
Fischer, “Prerequisites of Balance” in AW MacMahon (ed) Federalism: Mature and Emergent (New York, 
Doubleday & Company, 1955), 63). 
32 Arendt, On Revolution, 143. 
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continued, was not constitutionalism in the sense of securing a negative sphere of freedom 
from government but the “erection of a system of powers that would check and balance 
in such a way that the power neither of the union nor its parts, the duly constituted states, 
would decrease or destroy one another”33. The core of the problem of the founders—as 
it is for all federations—was how to balance the political existence of the Union with the 
political existence of the Member States: “Both kinds of legal-political existences must 
continue to survive side by side, otherwise the federation can no longer exist. The mark 
of the federation is therefore a precarious condition of equilibrium, a state of uncertainty”34.  
That a mere legal division of competences is insufficient to stabilise federal 
government was acknowledged by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America. The 
federal system, de Tocqueville writes, “necessarily brings two sovereignties into 
confrontation. The legislator manages to make the operation of these two sovereignties 
as simple and equal as possible and is to enclose both of them into their own carefully 
defined spheres of action. But he cannot meld them together into one single entity or 
prevent their bumping into each other at some point”35. Since the legislators, he continues 
“are unable to avoid dangerous collisions between the two sovereignties which the federal 
system brings face to face, their efforts to divert confederated peoples from war must be 
supplemented with special arrangements for promoting peace”36. For that reason, de 
Tocqueville concludes “the federal agreement cannot last long unless, in the peoples to 
which it applies, certain conditions of union guarantee a measure of comfort in their 
common life as well as smoothing out the task of government. Thus the federal system not 
only needs sounds laws to achieve success but also favourable circumstances”37.  
In all federal systems, de Tocqueville argues, law is incapable of preventing a clash 
between the powers of the Union and those of the states and ultimately incapable of 
diverting the confederate peoples from war. Countries that therefore only adhere to the 
federal ‘letter of the law’ of divided competences like the contemporaneous Mexico, de 
Tocqueville remarks, will fail because they will be incapable of transferring the necessary 
“spirit which gave it life”38. The federal balance necessitates, following de Tocqueville, not 
only sounds laws but also a federal ‘spirit’ and some circumstances favourable to it. But 
what are they? 
                                                          
33 ibid. 
34 Schönberger, “Die Europäische Union als Bund”, 105, my translation. 
35 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (London, Penguin, 2003), 192-3. 
36 ibid 196. 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid 194. 
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II: THE CONDITIONS FOR THE FEDERAL BALANCE 
 
A: The Principle of Homogeneity 
 The political balance between the Union and its Member States can be maintained 
as long as there is a general convergence of the wills of all the Member States. As long as the 
will of one, on a fundamental level, is the same as the will of all, an existential conflict 
between the Union and its Member States can be repressed and the federal balance can 
be maintained. In this case, there is no fundamental conflict between the ‘common aim’ 
and the ‘particularistic aim’ of the federation. If there is a convergence of the wills of the 
Member States, there is little ground for an existential conflict between them and hence 
the question of sovereignty can be ignored. As long as there is a convergence of wills, it 
can remain an idle theoretical question who ultimately decides. But under what conditions 
will there be a general convergence of the wills of the Member States? 
Following the theory of the federation, the primary requirement for the 
convergence of the wills of the Member States is the persistence of a substantial homogeneity 
across the Member States. Every federation, Schmitt writes, rests on “an essential 
presupposition, namely the homogeneity of all the Member States, that is, on a substantial 
similarity that lays the foundation for the conformity of the concrete mode of being 
[seinsmäßige Übereinstimmung] of the Member States and ensures that the extreme case 
of conflict does not occur within the federation”39. In other words, the conditions for the 
coexistence of unity and diversity in the federation is that its Member States do not differ 
too much from one another on a fundamental level, that they converge with regard to 
their ‘mode of being’. The federal constitution, Montesquieu wrote, “should be composed 
of states of the same nature”40. Whereas the ‘common interest’ or ‘common national 
feeling’, as we saw earlier can be too strong for a proper foundation for federalism41, so 
is it the case that, on a fundamental level, the Member States need to be substantially 
similar for the federal balance to be maintained. There is, in other words, a stark limitation 
to the degree of plurality that can exist in a federation. In the context of the EU, this has been 
most clearly expressed by Jan-Werner Müller: “the EU has always been about pluralism 
within common political parameters”42. 
                                                          
39 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 376, my translation. 
40 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge, CUP, 1989), 132 (IX:2). 
41 Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 75-6.  
42 JW Müller, “Protecting the Rule of Law (and Democracy!) in the EU: The Idea of a Copenhagen 
Commission” in C Closa and D Kochenow (eds) Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2016), 221. 
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Following Beaud’s comparative work on the political forms of the state, the 
empire and the federation, the latter lies in between the two other forms of political 
modernity with regard to its tolerance of plurality43. When compared with the political 
form of the state, both the empire and the federation are characterised by a high tolerance 
of diversity44. Whereas the empire, ruling through domination, does not need homogeneity to 
govern—and in many cases does not aspire to establish it45—the federation, founded on 
free contract and characterised by legal and political heterarchy (Chapter 1), needs a 
certain degree of unity to preserve the order and stability of the Union as a whole. Whereas 
a general consensus exists within the theory of the federation regarding the necessity of a 
relative substantial homogeneity across the Member States, it is contested what this 
homogeneity must consist in. What is it that needs to be shared by the Member States in 
order for the federal balance to be preserved?  
Returning to Democracy in America, the answer given by de Tocqueville is, first, 
shared material interests46. States tend to federate on the basis of necessity because they are 
incapable of providing for the defence or welfare of the peoples and hence incapable of 
maintaining themselves politically (Chapter 2). But in itself, this is not enough to preserve 
the federal balance. “To ensure the long life of a confederation”, de Tocqueville writes, 
“a uniformity of civilization is no less necessary than a uniformity of needs in the diverse 
peoples forming it”47. On that basis, de Tocqueville maintained that the government of 
Switzerland was not ‘truly federal’ because of what he perceived as being a strong 
civilizational heterogeneity between the cantons:  “The difference between the canton of 
Vaud and that of Uri resembles the difference between the nineteenth and fifteenth 
centuries”48. De Tocqueville was for a similar reason very critical of the prospects of 
Canada which he understood to be “divided into two hostile nations”49. The good fortune 
of the United States in contrast to Switzerland and Canada, in de Tocqueville’s eyes, was 
therefore that  
 
“From the state of Maine to that of Georgia is a distance of some one thousand miles. 
However, there is less difference between the civilization of Maine and that of Georgia 
                                                          
43 O Beaud, “Federation and Empire: About a Conceptual distinction of Political Forms” in A Lev (ed) 
The Federal Idea Public Law Between Governance and Political Life (London, Hart Publishing, 2017), 72. 
44 ibid 69. 
45 ibid.  
46 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 196. See also RR Bowie, “The Process of Federating Europe” in 
AW MacMahon (ed) Federalism: Mature and Emergent (New York, Doubleday & Company, 1955), 493. 
47 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 196-7. 
48 ibid 197. 
49 ibid 199. 
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than between that of Normandy and that of Brittany. Consequently, Maine and Georgia, 
at the distant ends of a vast empire, have by nature more real opportunities to forge a 
confederation than Normandy and Brittany, separated only by a stream”50. 
 
A similar answer had been given by John Jay in Federalist No. 2: “Providence has 
been pleased to give this one connected country, to one united people; a people descended 
from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, 
attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and 
customs”. Under Jay’s (and de Tocqueville’s) idea of a community granted by 
‘providence’, however, hides a very different historical reality. Leaving aside Jay’s 
obviously faulty assertion of common ‘ancestors’ in an immigrant country, as the other 
Founding Fathers, Jay ignored the other populations inhabiting the United States: the 
Native Americans and the enslaved black population. These populations were, by the 
founders, not considered to belong to ‘We, the People’.  
With the infamous three-fifths compromise51, the 1787 Constitution of the United 
States explicitly constructed the slave population as inferior human beings to the 
‘American people’. In concrete terms, for the representation and taxation purposes of the 
States, each slave counted for three-fifths of a white person. This was reinforced in the 
1856 Dred Scott case where the Supreme Court answered in the negative the question of 
whether  
 
“a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves, become 
a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the 
Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and 
privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen”52 
 
The inferior legal and political status accorded to the Native Americans is clearly 
expressed in the 1831 case of the Supreme Court of the United States, Cherokee Nation v 
Georgia53. Native Americans were in this case excluded from federal jurisdiction by the 
Supreme Court on the grounds that they were a ‘domestic dependent nation’ standing in 
                                                          
50 ibid 197. 
51 “Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included 
within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the 
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding 
Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons”, The Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 2, 
emphasis added. 
52 U.S. Supreme Court, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 19 How. 393 393 [1856]. 
53 U.S. Supreme Court, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 5 Pet. 1 1 [1831], Section 2. 
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a relationship to the United States resembling that of a ‘ward to his guardian’54. Due to 
their ‘inferior status’, the Cherokees, the Supreme Court ruled, were neither citizens of 
the United States nor were they entitled to be treated as a true foreign nation or state.  
That the United States was constituted by white settlers only was, in other words, 
not down to the ‘providence’ of a pre-given existence of a homogenous population—in 
terms of neither culture, civilisation, language nor ethnicity—on the territory of the 
United States but the construction of political identity along racist lines. This is a deeply political 
project of inclusion and exclusion, it is a political decision on who belongs to ‘the people’. 
The homogeneity that following Jay and De Tocqueville constitutes the ‘good fortune’ of 
the United States is, in other words, down to a political decision on who ‘the people’ is. The 
emergent American nationalism of the late 18th and (early) 19th century was, in this way, 
relying on racism as an ideology.  
The case of the United States is a neat illustration of the fact that rather than 
relying on a homogenous common nationality granted by ‘providence’, the constitution 
of a federation entails the political construction of a new people, a federal nation. That is, 
the federation is not constituted by the federal nation, it is the other way around. This is 
the strongest possible expression of the ‘common aim’ of the federation: “The deepest 
meaning of the federal mission is to transform the entirety of the different regions into a political 
community (…), all the while safeguarding the initial allegiance of the individual members 
with respect to the member-state[s]”55. All federations are characterised by a double 
construction of political identity56. These are the ‘common aim’ and the ‘particular aim’ 
of the federation. The double construction of political identity is clearly visible in federal 
citizenship law that always consists of dual citizenship (Chapters 1-3): the citizenship of 
the original Member States and the construction of a new common federal citizenship 
that, at least in young and emergent federations, is derived from Member State citizenship. 
Federal citizenship establishes a common ‘indigenat’: a common status that forbids the 
Member States to treat citizens of other Member States as ‘aliens’, i.e., the right to be 
treated equally with the ‘natives’ in the other Member States. As a minimum, the common 
status of the ‘indigenat’ is the content of the embryonic ‘federal nationality’ that is 
                                                          
54 ibid. 
55 O Beaud, “The Question of Nationality within a Federation: a Neglected Issue in Nationality Law” in R 
Hansen and P Weil (eds) Dual Nationality, Social Rights and Federal Citizenship on the U.S. and Europe: The 
Reinvention of Citizenship (New York and Oxford, Berghanh Books, 2002), 319, emphasis added. 
56 M Forsyth, “The Relevance of Classical Approaches” in JJ Hesse and V Wright (eds) Federalizing Europe? 
The Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems (Oxford, OUP, 1996), 35. 
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constructed by the constitution of a federation. Because of the structure of federal 
citizenship law, a federation is always characterised by ‘dual nationality’57. 
The question is what influence cultural heterogeneity has on this double 
construction of political identity? In Forsyth’s view in “a heterogeneous federal system 
there will be an additional, natural, built-in limit on the nation-building capacity of the centre”58. 
Notwithstanding the probable influence of a cultural, ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity 
between the Member States for the construction of a common federal political identity, 
its significance can easily be overstated. After all, few if any states could rely on a ‘pre-
given’ homogeneity for their nation-building: “in ethnic, linguistic, or any other terms,” 
Hobsbawm writes “most states of any size were not homogenous and, could not simply 
be equated with nations”59. A ‘nation’ is not a product of nature and it is less dependent 
on ‘pre-given similarity’ than its ideological and political capacity to construct and enforce 
one: “Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men (…) as an inherent political 
destiny is a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them 
into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures; that is a 
reality”60. The political homogeneity on which a federation relies is, as is the case with all 
political identity, not something natural but an ideological product of history. It is not 
something that springs into life spontaneously. On the contrary, it is essentially 
constructed ‘from above’61.  Nations are a product of nationalism, not the other way 
around62.  
Whereas it is definitely the case that federalism—both the federation and the 
federal state63—is only capable of dealing with a certain degree of sub-Union nationalism, 
this is not down to the existence of multiple heterogeneous populations but to the 
existence of strong political ideologies of Member State nationalisms. A multi-national 
federation is preconditioned on the mutual recognition of the legitimate claim of a share 
                                                          
57 “[A] federation features only one true form of nationality: dual nationality. By dual nationality we mean 
not the classic state-based notion, according to which an individual would be at the same time a national 
of two different countries (…) but the coexistence of two nationalities that do not necessarily depend on 
the existence of two separate countries” (Beaud, “The Question of Nationality within a Federation”, 317).  
58 Forsyth, “The Relevance of Classical Approaches”, 33, emphasis added. 
59 Hobsbawm, Nations and nationalism since 1780, 17. Later in the book, Hobsbawm adds: “In any case, 
nobody ever denied the actual multinationalty or multilingualty or multiethnicity of the olders and most 
unquestionable nation-states, e.g. Britain, France and Spain”. For Hobsbawm’s critique of linguistic or 
ethnic homogeneity as a necessary pregiven condition for the construction of nationhood, see ibid 51-67. 
60 E Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, OUP, 1983), 48-9.  
61 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, 10. 
62 “Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around” (Hobsbawm, Nations and 
Nationalism Since 1780, 10). 
63 The secession of Pakistan from India is a good example (Wheare, “Federalism and the Making of 
Nations”, 30-1). 
139 
 
of public power of all the sub-Union nationalities. Federalism and extreme nationalism—
be it manifest in “nation-building at the centre and province-building at the 
periphery”64—are incompatible with one another: 
 
“People of differing nationality cannot form a federal union unless they are prepared to 
accept a government in which those who differ from them in nationality have some share. 
In many cases, too, some nationalities must expect that, though they may have their own 
way in their own state or province of the federation, they will be in a minority in the 
government of the whole federation. A federal union usually implies, too, that those who 
join will expect or be expected to develop some common nationality in addition to their 
distinct nationalities. When people of different nationalities are unwilling to accept these 
consequences, federal union cannot be made to fit their case”65. 
 
During the nineteenth century, a number of ethnically and linguistically 
heterogeneous federations and federal polities emerged, most importantly the Restored 
Swiss Confederation of 181566 constituted, for the first time, on the basis of the political 
equality of the Germanophone and Francophone Cantons67. The Swiss example provides 
proof that the ‘civilisation thesis’ put forward by de Tocqueville is overstated. Another 
example is the Canadian Confederation that, however, from the perspective of this thesis 
will have to be treated with some care because it was united under the British Crown by 
the Constitution Act of 1867 and not as an autonomous federation on the basis of a 
federal constitutional treaty68. In the 20th century, federalism via devolution—and hence 
not the political form of the federation described in this thesis—has been used as a way 
of managing strong manifestations of diversity in previously unitary states69. With its 
current 24 official languages, the EU surpasses all previous federal unions with regard to 
linguistic and cultural heterogeneity and the content of its substantive homogeneity is 
clearly not that of a common pre-given linguistic, ethnic or cultural homogeneity. The 
homogeneity of the EU is not constructed along the lines of ‘ethno-nationalism’. 
In his writings on the constitutional theory of the federation, Schmitt argued in 
line with his political existentialism that the content of the substantive homogeneity was 
                                                          
64 Forsyth, “The Relevance of Classical Approaches”, 33. See also Wheare, “Federalism and the Making 
of Nations”, 35. 
65 Wheare, “Federalism and the Making of Nations”, 30. 
66 Beaud, “Federation and Empire”, 71.  
67 Forsyth, Federalism and Nationalism (Leister and London, Leicester University Press, 1989), 3. 
68 See, however, Beaud, Théorie, 126. 
69 Forsyth, Federalism and Nationalism, 4-5. 
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unimportant: “There can be a national, religious, cultural, social, class, or another type of 
homogeneity”70. What mattered, in Schmitt’s view, was that the intensity of the connection was 
sufficiently strong to maintain a concrete existential agreement between the Member 
States ensuring that that no extreme case of conflict emerged within the federation71. The 
political, in Schmitt’s view, ultimately boils down to the friend-enemy distinction: a 
discrimination between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Following Forsyth, in a federation a firm line is 
always drawn between insiders and outsiders to the community: 
 
“At the minimum—in a union whose content is economic [an ‘economic federation’]—
it means a body in which systematic preference is given by insiders to insiders within an 
enclosed economic space. The maximum, it means a body capable of conducting war—
the most intense form of the friend-enemy relation”72. 
 
The substantive homogeneity existing between the Member States is manifest in 
the justification of the new common status of ‘member-statehood’ that, e.g., disallows the 
Member States to treat the citizens of other Member States as ‘aliens’. The content of the 
substantive homogeneity of a concrete federation will be what is perceived to be most 
politically salient for the Member States, something close to their political or 
constitutional identity, and will therefore differ from federation to federation. Schmitt 
considered ‘national similarity’ to be the dominant content around which the friend-
enemy distinction was drawn contemporaneously. An important exception in his eyes, 
however, was the Soviet Union; a polity that clearly drew the friend-enemy distinction on 
something other than nationalism. The opening statement from the preamble of the 1924 
Soviet Constitution—the Constitution of the Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics—
attests to this: 
 
“Since the foundation of the Soviet Republics, the states of the world have been divided 
into two camps: the camp of capitalism and the camp of socialism. There, in the camp of 
capitalism: national hate and inequality, colonial slavery and chauvinism, national 
oppression and massacres, brutalities and imperialistic wars. Here, in the camp of 
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socialism: reciprocal confidence and peace, national liberty and equality, the pacific co-
existence and fraternal collaboration of peoples”73. 
 
The substantial homogeneity set out by the 1924 Constitution between the 
different peoples of the Soviet Union is that they all belong to the proletariat. Nationalism 
is on the basis of the 1924 constitution understood as being incapable of solving the 
problem of peaceful ‘collaboration of peoples’: it belongs to the world of capitalism and 
imperialism. The Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic of 1918 
is even more explicit in that citizenship is determined neither on the basis of blood nor 
soil but exclusively on class: any foreigner living in the Soviet Republic and who belongs to 
the ‘toiling class’ is granted political rights and can obtain citizenship ‘without complicated 
formality’ (Article 20) and the Soviet Republic recognizes ‘the equal right of all citizens, 
irrespective of their racial or national connection’ and further forbids any discrimination 
on the basis hereof (Article 22). Capitalism is the enemy in relation to whom the political 
identity of the Soviet Union is constructed.  
This discrimination between friend and enemy is often very present in emergent 
federations because they mostly are defensive in origin (Chapter 2). States tend to come 
together in a federal union in response to a concrete enemy that they are incapable of 
defending themselves from individually but against whom they might stand a chance if 
united74. With regard to the United States, Jay writes that ‘providence’ has been pleased 
to unite a people “who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side 
throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established their general liberty and 
independence”75.  
In order to maintain the political autonomy of the Member States, a federation is 
never exclusively concerned with defence in a material sense. With the modern 
revolutions, the constitution of federations is part of the creation and solidification of a 
political order and constitutional imaginary. As constitutional projects, federations are 
also concerned with the protection of a certain ‘way of life’ and their common political 
identity—their political homogeneity—tends to be constructed around that constitutional 
project. A common constitutional project manifest in a common form of government can 
therefore be one of the most important ways of securing a political homogeneity between 
                                                          
73 The 1924 Constitution of the Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics can be accessed via: 
http://mailstar.net/ussr1924.html [last accessed 11 April 2018], emphasis added. 
74 Beaud, Théorie, 286; Forsyth, Union of States, 160; Friedrich, “Federal Constitutional Theory and 
Emergent Proposals”, 519-20. 
75 Federalist No. 2 (Jay) (see The Federalist Papers, 14-8).  
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the Member States of a federation: “A Federation has better chances of surviving when 
the Member States have the same form of government”76.  
This observation was already made by Montesquieu who argued that “a 
confederate government ought to be composed of states of the same nature, especially of 
the republican kind”77. Montesquieu favoured republicanism over monarchy because he 
considered the spirit of the latter to be warlike and prone to enlargement by domination 
whereas the spirit of republicanism was that of peace and moderation78. For that reason, 
Montesquieu considered the Holy Roman Empire—a political union of monarchies and 
free cities—to be inferior to that of the United Provinces of the Netherlands and 
Switzerland79. But history supports neither Montesquieu’s thesis of the incompatibility of 
the federation as a political form with the monarchical form of government of its Member 
States nor his thesis of the inherently peaceful nature of republican federations. The 
monarchical German Federation as well as the republican federations of Switzerland and 
United States had violent civil wars in the 19th century. It is, however, generally agreed 
that he was right regarding the importance of a homogeneity with regard to the 
governmental form of the Member States of a federation: “opposing types of state 
principles and political outlook cannot exist together in a federalist construct”80. At least 
from the modern revolutions onwards, homogeneity with regard to the constitutional 
identity of the Member States provides one of the most important substantial contents 
for the political homogeneity of federal unions.  
 
B: Homogeneity in the European Union 
The early period of European integration is also characterised by the protection 
of a certain political ‘way of life’, not merely from the concrete territorial threat of the 
USSR but also from the political ideologies of fascism and communism81 (Chapters 2-3). 
These ideologies are understood as Western Europe’s ‘other’: an internal and external 
threat that European integration was perceived as being key in checking. The 
constitutional imaginary of the EU as an ‘elite construction’82 belongs to the post-WWII 
                                                          
76 Beaud, “Federation and Empire”, 70. 
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78 ibid. 
79 ibid. 
80 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 392 
81 K Adenauer, World Indivisible—With Liberty and Justice for All (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 
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82 B Ackerman, “Three Path to Constitutionalism—and the Crisis of the European Union” (2015) 
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‘constitutional ethos’ of ‘constrained democracy’83 (Chapter 3). An important tenet of the 
construction of a common political homogeneity in the EU, as was the case for the 
modern revolutionary federations, is around this shared constitutional project.  
Formally, the EU is a ‘mixed federation’ of republics and constitutional 
monarchies. This does not mean that the EU is without a constitutional identity but rather 
that it does not belong to the modern revolutionary type84. The EU is neither born out of 
a modern republican revolution against monarchy nor as a monarchical counter-
revolution to republicanism. It guarantees neither the republican nor the monarchical 
form of government of its Member States. The question of ‘constitutional monarchy’ or 
‘republic’ is not politically significant for the Union and in no way divides the Member 
States politically. It is therefore a mistake to think about constitutional identity in the EU 
on the basis of the classical forms of government (democracy, aristocracy, monarchy) or 
those of the modern revolutions (constitutional monarchy and republicanism). 
From a formal perspective, the constitutional identity of the Union is expressed 
in Article 2 TEU that has its origins in the constitutional imaginary of a substantive value 
order that emerged as part of the post-WWII political imaginary of ‘constrained 
democracy’. Article 2 TEU states: 
 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women 
and men prevail”85. 
 
That democracy, following Article 2 TEU, is understood as one substantive ‘value’ that 
has to be respected as part of a broader value order—and not as a form of government 
comparable to, e.g., monarchy—highlights that the constitutional imaginary of the EU 
would be incomprehensible from the perspective of the modern republican revolutionary 
                                                          
83 JW Müller, “Beyond Militant Democracy?” (2012) New Left Review 73, 43; JW Müller, “Safeguarding 
Democracy Inside the EU: Brussels and the Future of Liberal Order” (2013) Transatlantic Academy 3, 11; 
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85 Article 2 TEU, emphasis added 
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tradition. The constitution of the EU is a manifestation of ‘value-order’ 
constitutionalism86. 
The presupposition of Article 2 TEU is that there is a relatively homogenous 
constitutional identity across the Union (“these values are common to the Member States”). At the 
most fundamental level, Article 2 surmises that the Member States share a similar 
understanding of the constitution as a value order and that this value order is identical to 
or at least compatible with that of the EU.  If the constitutional identities of the Member 
States are not compatible with Article 2 TEU, there is an open constitutional conflict at 
the heart of the EU. This would spell the end of, or at least constitute a fundamental 
threat to, ‘constitutional tolerance’ and ‘constitutional pluralism’. As we shall see in this 
chapter, this may very well be the case because of the constitutional heterogeneity of the 
Member States, beyond the ‘Original Six’, that later have acceded to the Union. 
 
C: The Introduction of Political Heterogeneity with the Enlargements to 
the EU 
 The most significant reason for the introduction of political heterogeneity in the 
case of the EU is its enlargements. The political elites of the ‘Original Six’—France, 
Germany, Italy and the BENELUX—were relatively united around the same anti-fascist 
and anti-communist political project of ‘constrained democracy’ with European 
integration as focal point for the new post-WWII constitutional imaginary87 (Chapters 2 
and 3). This constitutional imaginary that lies at the heart of the constitutional identity of 
the EU, however, is not shared to the same degree by all the Member States that later 
have acceded to the EU (Chapter 3). The enlargement of the EU has therefore introduced 
a strong element of political heterogeneity. Notwithstanding that the EU prescribes a 
certain constitutional identity, it is not a given that all its Member States belong to this 
constitutional type, or at least experience the same intensity of relationship to it. 
An argument in favour of the compatibility of the value order of the Union and 
the constitutional identities of the Member States can be advanced with regard to the 
states of the ‘Mediterranean Enlargements’ (Spain, Portugal and Greece). These states 
adopted constitutional settlements that fit the notion of constitutionalism as a ‘value 
order’ because of their direct experience of fascism, dictatorship or authoritarianism. They 
                                                          
86 For a discussion of the idea of the constitution as an order of values, see M Loughlin, “The Silences of 
Constitutions” (2018) I•CON 16 (forthcoming). 
87 Gaullism proved, however, to be the very significant exception to this general pattern and led, as we 
saw in Chapter 2, to the collapse of the project of a European military federation in the 1950s. 
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belong to the world of ‘constrained democracy’ or what Alexander Somek calls 
‘Constitutionalism 2.0’ because of their experience of the breakdown of the liberal 
constitutional order88. For these states, membership in the EU has been understood as an 
important protection against the return of political extremism, specifically of fascism or 
authoritarianism. This sentiment was aptly expressed by the European Commission in a 
report in the “General considerations on the problems of enlargement” in 1978: 
 
“When Greece, Portugal and Spain, newly emerging as democratic States after a long 
period of dictatorship, asked to be admitted to the Community, they were making a 
commitment which is primarily a political one. Their choice is double significant, both 
reflecting the concerns of these three new democracies for their own consolidation and 
protection against the return of dictatorship and constituting an act of faith in a united Europe, 
which demonstrates that the ideas inspiring the creation of the Community have lost 
none of their vigour or relevance. The three countries have entrusted the Community with a political 
responsibility which it cannot refuse, except at the price of denying the principles in which it is itself 
grounded”89. 
 
For these states, member-statehood of the EU has been an important way of realising 
their own understanding of constitutional autonomy by protecting themselves, via 
membership in the EU, from the return of the main enemy of the liberal constitution: 
fascist dictatorship. For both the ‘Original Six’ and the countries of the ‘Mediterranean 
enlargements’, the project of European unification was understood as a possibility for the 
realisation of a new domestic constitutionalism by constraining the possibilities of 
democratic choice. In a very concrete sense, it is a part of their own domestic 
constitutional settlements90. There is accordingly a strong affinity between the identity of 
the European project and the constitutional project of those Member States. It is for that 
reason that the Commission writes that it cannot deny these states membership ‘except at 
the price of denying the principles in which it is itself grounded’. 
                                                          
88 A Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution (Oxford, OUP, 2014), Chapter 2. 
89 The European Commission, “General Considerations on the Problems of Enlargement” 
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emphasis added. 
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This shared understanding of constitutionalism, however, is much less prevalent 
in both the ‘continuous democracies’ of Scandinavia and the UK and the ‘new 
democracies’ in the Central and Eastern European states of the ‘Eastern Enlargements’ 
(Chapter 3). All these Member States have a much stronger ‘sovereigntist’ understanding 
of their constitutions. In the constitutional self-understanding of the ‘continuous 
democracies’, the constitution is a ‘framework for regulating political conflicts’91 and not 
a substantive order of values. The constitutional imaginaries of these states belong in 
many ways to the pre-WWII world. The constitutional orders of these states are not based 
in a fear of the internal collapse into fascism and for that reason the idea of granting a 
substantive value order the status of ‘super-legality’ has not become part of their 
constitutional imagination.  
The idea of ‘constrained democracy’, however, did not have a strong resonance 
for the acceding Central and Eastern European states either. In some ways this is 
surprising taking into account their own experience of authoritarian rule and the central 
role of EU membership to their constitutional reform process92. A process that—as had 
been the case of the Mediterranean states93—was understood as an important part of 
national renewal and the achievement of the countries ‘true destiny’, allowing their ‘return 
to Europe’94 (Chapter 3). Nevertheless, there is an important difference between the 
constitutional imaginary of the ‘post-fascist’ and the ‘post-Communist’ states. In contrast 
to the post-fascist constitutions, the constitutional imaginary of the post-Communist 
constitutions was not born out of the internal collapse of the nation-state (Chapter 2) but 
out of the collapse of a foreign empire. The ‘enemy of the constitution’ for the Central 
and Eastern European states was represented by an external imperial foe (the Soviet Union 
and Communism as an ideology); not as an ‘enemy within’.  
The Central and Eastern European countries gave themselves constitutions with 
a strong accentuation of national sovereignty after the fall of the Soviet Union95. For these 
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countries, in contrast to the post-fascist countries, sovereignty and nationalism were not 
perceived as being threats to democracy96 but on the contrary a vehicle for it. The 
necessary limitation of sovereignty entailed in EU membership, therefore, was not always 
met with great enthusiasm97. At times it was even understood as a new form of foreign 
dominance (‘We have just got rid of Moscow’s domination and are about to subject 
ourselves to domination by Brussels’ was the slogan of some anti-EU political 
movements98). This may be part of an explanation as to why the constitutions of these 
countries, despite the use of Europe as a myth (Chapter 3), are less ‘open to European 
law’ (in one famous case, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s accession ruling, flatly 
rejecting the notion of supranationality entirely99). As a Polish commentator put it in 
regard to this ruling, ‘the Tribunal’s reasoning was based on fears of losing sovereignty, 
or not retaining enough of it’100. The accession to the EU was therefore for the Central 
and Eastern European states characterised by the paradox that, on the one hand, 
accession was understood as a key factor in the consolidation of their newly won 
democratic freedoms, but, on the other hand, their constitutional imaginary relied on a 
strong emphasis on nationalism and sovereignty incompatible with the constitutional 
imaginary and reality of the Union they were acceding to: “the EU is thus perceived both 
as a source of the promotion of democracy and as a threat to democracy”101. 
 
D: The Government of Constitutional Homogeneity and Heterogeneity in 
the EU 
Enlargement of a federation is a clear (but not the only) example of why the initial 
shared material interest and sense of a common enemy is insufficient for the long-term 
stability and survival of a federation. A political homogeneity consisting in a common 
threat and common material interests changes with the political winds and fortunes of its 
Member States and is therefore highly volatile.  In contrast to districts or provinces of a 
state, the Member States of a federation retain their political autonomy and hence their 
right to decide on their own fate. This means that they constantly have the potential to 
develop in opposite directions and give themselves constitutions that contradict the 
political homogeneity of the federation. If the federation is to maintain its internal balance, 
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it will need to find a more stable and permanent solution to deal with political, social and 
constitutional changes of its Member States beyond the fortuitous existence of a common 
enemy and shared interests to provide a political homogeneity. The federation therefore 
needs to foster and protect the content of the substantial homogeneity of its Member 
States if the federation is to survive.  
Whereas the content of the political homogeneity of the Member States of any 
given federation ultimately is an extra-legal question, the government of the homogeneity of 
the Member States is a question of federal public law. The government employs a variety 
of laws and measures in order to protect what it understands to be the politically salient 
substantial homogeneity of its Member States. In the rest of this chapter, two of the most 
important tools for the government of political homogeneity and heterogeneity in the 
federation will be examined: the government of the states acceding to a federation and 
provisions relating to the government of the constitutional identity or form of 
government of the Member States. These governmental tools are an important way for 
the federation to manage its internal constitutional contradictions by securing the unity 
of its Member States with regard to their fundamental substantial homogeneity. That 
being said, this exercise of public powers presents a new conundrum for the federation: 
how does the federation ensure a continuous political homogeneity of its Member States 
without destroying their political autonomy? The government of federal homogeneity and 
heterogeneity, in other words, risks reproducing the problem it was indirectly meant to 
solve—the problem of the federal balance—by eroding the political autonomy of its 
Member States. 
III: ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBER STATES 
 
A: The Government of Accession 
An important way for a federation to protect the federal balance is to make sure 
that no state with a ‘different nature’ from the existing Member States (in the eyes of the 
Union) is allowed to accede to the federation. One way of securing that is simply not to 
allow for any new Member States. Switzerland is often portrayed as an example of such a 
‘closed’ or ‘restricted’ federation. After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with 
WWI, Vorarlberg attempted to leave Austria for Switzerland. Despite the people of 
Voralberg voting 80.75% in favour of acceding to Switzerland in the 1919 referendum, 
and despite public support in Switzerland for their membership, the government of 
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Switzerland let the Allies decide the question in the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye 
(which they did in favour of Austria). Due to its commitment to neutrality and its internal 
balance102 between the Germanophone and Francophone communities, the Swiss 
government withheld any opinion in order not to jeopardize either their internal balance 
or their relationship with Austria, which potentially would have endangered their 
continued neutrality: “The Swiss federation, a small state surrounded by powerful 
neighbours, found it therefore wiser to refuse to admit any new State to safeguard its 
external security and its internal cultural balance”103.  
As is the case for federal states, federations are not necessarily expansive in nature. 
In contrast to the United States, both Switzerland (pre-1848) and the German Federation 
have been relatively restricted federations however, all three of them have had to deal 
with the problem of admitting new Member States104. Switzerland has not admitted any 
new Member States since the full and equal inclusion of the francophone cantons 
(Neuchâtel, Geneva and Valais) in 1815, however, from its foundation in 1291 it has 
grown from its original three Member States (Uri, Schwytz and Unterwalden) to 22 
cantons105. The German Federation was also a relatively closed federation. This is manifest 
in one of its founding treaties stating that the federation is “restricted to the states 
currently participating” and only allows for the admission of new Member States “when 
the entirety of the Confederal membership finds such to be compatible with existing 
circumstances and appropriate to the advantage of the whole”106. Nevertheless, in 1820 it 
allowed for the inclusion five new Member States.  
The EEC/EU was from the very beginning conceived of as an expansive federation 
that was meant to ‘unite Europe’; not merely the Original Six107. This is, e.g., visible in the 
Preamble to the Treaty of Rome “calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share 
their ideal to join in their efforts”. That the expansion of the EU continues to be a central 
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political aim of the Union was reaffirmed in a 2002 speech by the President of the 
European Commission, Romano Prodi:  
 
“we have restored the historical unity of the peoples of Europe. Our common destiny is 
once again to build a common future. A future built on shared fundamental values: those 
of peace, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities (…) 
[the] enlargement is not just about economics. It is important primarily for political and 
ethical reasons. Enlargement is the fulfilment of the European project. This project has given us 
half a century of peace and prosperity, and it should be extended to the whole 
continent”108.  
 
True to its original aim, the EU has more than quadrupled over the years. Even 
so, the admission of new Member States has presented the EU with much greater 
problems than it did for the federations of the 18th and 19th century. The main reason for 
that is that in contrast to the new Member States of the EU, the states that acceded to the 
aforementioned federations were generally not fully independent states109 and definitely 
not fully formed nation-states: “New members of existing federations were usually small 
units incorporated into a larger body; territories, colonies or provinces”110.  
The United States provides an interesting example. Together with the EU, the 
United States is the most expansive federation. However, only two of the states that 
acceded to the Union—Vermont (1791) and Texas (1845)—were fully independent 
states111. The majority of the states admitted gained their statehood through the United 
States’ expansion into the Western territories. The Westward expansion of the United 
States was governed by a number of laws—importantly the Land Ordinances of 1784 and 
1785 and the Northwest Ordinances of 1787 and 1789112—stipulating the conditions 
under which the Western territories would be included into the United States ‘on equal 
footing’113 with the original 13 states. These territories—ceded to the United States from 
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some of its Member States, occupied by American settlers or bought from other colonial 
empires or Indian Tribes—were not yet states.  
An important part of the aforementioned laws is therefore concerned with ‘state 
building’ measures such as procedures for the basic spatial organisation of the territories 
that would make them governable114. This entailed the geographical division of land into 
states115 and townships, a standardized system for the acquisition of settler land, 
documentation of natural resources, and the share of Congress in these resources, e.g., 
precious metals116. The question of governability was crucial on a political level because 
the Westward expansion was controversial at the time (“many easterners feared that it 
would lead to the depopulation and impoverishment of their states and to the weakening 
of the union”117). Moreover, on entering into the Union, the new Member States were to 
be liable for parts of the debt of the United States118: “Not only did the United States 
stand to forfeit tremendous economic resources and a vast area for growth by failing to 
maintain federal authority in the West, but it would also become increasingly vulnerable 
to disunion and counterrevolution”119.  
Beyond the possibility of government, the Land Ordinances and the Northwest 
Ordinances are concerned with the form of government of the new states. Importantly, the 
new states needed to give themselves constitutional forms of governments, specifically, a 
republican form of government120. The westward expansion of the United States was in this way 
done through state-building and despite the enormous scope of such a task, it presented 
the United States with relatively few serious problems. The reasons for this, following 
Carl Friedrich, is primarily that the westward expansion did not introduce any substantial 
heterogeneity into the Union: “Most of the leaders and settlers of all territories admitted 
to statehood have been Americans. All of the territories admitted to the United States, 
with the exception of California, have been contiguous to the rest of the nation”121.  
The EU, being situated in the middle of the ‘old world’ is presented with a 
qualitatively different problem than that of the United States. Whereas the problem for 
the United States was that the territories were not yet states, the problem for the EU is 
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how to make sure that the state apparatuses, constitutional regimes and societal models 
already present in the acceding states—whether fragile or consolidated, new or old—does 
not become a threat to the constitutional homogeneity of the Union as a whole. Being 
situated in the ‘old world’, the potential Member States of the EU have all had long 
histories and political, cultural and societal norms of their own; none of them were ‘blank 
slates’122. This is clearly manifest in that six of the Member States that have acceded to the 
EU—the UK, Ireland, Austria, Finland and the Scandinavian states—were fully formed 
nation-states with consolidated constitutional regimes of their own at the time of 
accession.  
Notwithstanding the long histories and very diverse societies of the rest of the 
states who have joined the EU, they have an interesting commonality with the expansion 
of the United States into the Western territories. For all these states, accession to the EU 
has been tied to a political, societal and constitutional ‘rebirth of the state’ after the 
collapse of either an authoritarian/fascist regime (Greece, Spain and Portugal) or the 
collapse of Communism that led to independence for some states (Poland, Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Romania) and statehood for others (the Baltic states, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Slovenia). In all these cases, the states had to be radically rebuilt politically, 
culturally, socially and economically. Because of the long histories of these states and 
regions, the EU has nonetheless been confronted with the need to govern an 
unprecedented amount of plurality. As has been noted by Bruce Ackerman, a distinctive 
feature of the EU that differentiates it from “other great federations—most notably the 
United States” is that the Member States of the EU have approached the EU along 
different constitutional paths123. The constitutional diversity of the EU is much more 
pronounced than in any previous federation.  
The EU has attempted to protect its constitutional homogeneity when admitting 
new Member States through the establishment of a set of provisions that the acceding 
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states should adhere to if they are to be admitted: accession criteria124. The accession 
criteria, as we saw in the case of the westward expansion of the United States, allow for 
an extensive government of the acceding states. They allow the Union to pre-emptively 
‘engineer’ new Member States that are substantially homogeneous with its existing 
Member States with regard to what it perceives to be most politically salient.  
In contrast to what Jan Zielonka has argued in the context of the ‘Eastern 
Enlargements’125, accession processes are not imperial (at least not from a public law 
perspective) because the new Member States accede on the basis of their own initiative, 
on free contract and the acceding states are promised to become politically equal partners 
(Chapter 1). To be sure, this does not mean that accession conditionality is not a means 
for the federation to extend its powers and gain influence over the acceding states126. On 
the contrary, the accession process is a very effective ‘foreign-policy instrument’ of the 
Union that allows it to influence the domestic and foreign policy of the applicant state127. 
As the accession of the post-Communist states to the EU bears witness to, accession 
conditionality can be equally intrusive for the political and constitutional structures of the 
acceding states as for states under imperial dominance128. For the period of the accession, 
the acceding state is de facto if not de jure a kind of dependency of the Union, albeit on a 
voluntary basis and with the promise of political equality post-accession. 
Notwithstanding that Zielonka’s analysis of the EU as empire129 from a public law 
perspective is incorrect, he is nonetheless right with regard to the dominance of the Union 
over the acceding states. The ‘Eastern Enlargements’ were without a doubt a means for 
the Union to “assert political and economic control over the unstable and impoverished 
eastern part of the continent (…) It was about conquering, reforming, and regulating new 
emerging markets. In essence it was about securing peace and prosperity in the future 
Europe through the skilful use of EU membership conditionality”130. That being said, in 
                                                          
124 For an account of the historical development of the EU’s accession criteria, see KE Smith, “The 
Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality” in M Cremona (ed) The Enlargement of the 
European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2003). 
125 Zielonka, Europe as Empire, 44-59. 
126 Smith, “The Evolution and Application of EU Membership Conditionality”, 121. 
127 ibid 108; Vachudova, Europe Undivided. 
128 “The ‘There Is No Alternative’ to the liberal democracy and market economy narrative presented the 
people in post-communist Europe with something that was disturbingly familiar to them. When they lived 
in ‘really existing socialism,’ they were left with no choice but to submit to the laws of historical necessity 
steering them to a better (socialist) future. Throughout the 1990s, they were again simple ‘marionettes in a 
historical process that takes place independently of their will and drags them with it to a better future’—
this time liberal democracy and market economy, which awaited them at the end of history” (J Komárek, 
“Waiting for the Existential Revolution in Europe” (2014) I•CON (12)1, 195). See also, Zielonka, Europe 
as Empire, 56-7. 
129 Zielonka, Europe as Empire. 
130 ibid 44-5. 
154 
 
contrast to imperialism, federalism allows for the creation of a concrete economic order 
established not on land-grabbing but on mutual promises and pledges (Chapter 2). 
Notwithstanding the intrusiveness of accession conditionality, an accession process to a 
federation is a peaceful and voluntary expansion of the federal union and market.  
 
B: The Copenhagen Criteria and the Requirement of Political and 
Economic Homogeneity 
The EU accession criteria are of great interest because they are a manifestation of 
what the EU perceives to be the most important substantial character-traits pertaining to 
its Member States. They are in this way an important source for understanding the EU’s 
‘constitutional identity’. In concrete terms, there will of course always be discrepancies 
between the criteria for the acceding states and the ‘reality’ of the old Member States131. 
The accession criteria are therefore, in precise terms, a source for understanding the 
‘ideology’ of a federation (in the context of the United States, it was thus an important 
debate whether the newly admitted states were to allow for slavery or not132). It is not only 
about what the Union is but what it understands itself destined to become. 
Accession to the EU is governed by Article 49 TEU, which tells us that “Any 
European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to 
promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union”. The criterion of being a 
‘European state’ is not legally specified and since there are no clear geographical, historical 
or cultural borders to Europe, it is a political question for the Union and its Member States 
to define, at their discretion, what they perceive as the borders of Europe and what 
constitutes a ‘European State’133. Such criteria are therefore subject to geopolitical shifts 
and power relations between the Member States. After the fall of the Soviet Union, several 
countries belonging to the former Soviet Union or the Eastern bloc were thus permitted 
to ‘return to Europe’ (Chapter 3), whereas Turkey has been unable to join despite 
submitting its formal application for membership three decades ago.  
In order to be considered for membership in the Union, the ‘European’ state in 
question has to respect, and be committed to promote, the foundational values of the 
Union (as defined by Article 2 TEU). In the lead up to the ‘Eastern enlargement’, the 
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accession requirements were further developed and specified in the Copenhagen criteria, 
laid down by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993: 
 
“Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes 
the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to 
the aims of political, economic and monetary union”134. 
 
The Copenhagen criteria can be broken down into three separate requirements. First, a 
‘functional’ requirement regarding the candidate country’s ability to take on the obligations 
of Union membership. Another ‘functional’ requirement was added in Madrid in 
December 1995, regarding the candidate country’s administrative and legislative capability 
to transpose and implement EU directives in a secure and sufficient manner. These 
requirements, stating that the Member State has to be capable of being a functional and 
law-observing member of the Union, are of interest in that, like the Northwest and Land 
Ordinances of the United States, they intend to make the new Member States governable. Their 
intention is to make the new states conform to a governmental pattern comprehensible 
from the perspective of the Union. This allows the EU institutions to evaluate and 
measure the exercise of governmental power by the new Member States; it makes them 
apprehensible in the eyes of an outsider. A federation is always based on a mutualisation 
of risk and it can therefore not admit an ungovernable state into the Union. 
The two other requirements are ‘substantial requirements’ regarding the 
implementation of a concrete political and economic order. First, the candidate country is 
required to maintain (and create) stable institutions capable of protecting the liberal-
democratic political order: democracy, rule of law, human rights, and the protection of 
minorities. Second, the candidate country is required to implement and sustain a 
functioning market economy capable of coping with the competitive pressure and the 
market forces of the Union. One of the strongest criteria for a substantial homogeneity 
demanded and monitored by the Union for any state acceding to the Union is a 
requirement related to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). All states acceding to 
the EU obligate themselves to adopt the euro as their legal tender. In order to do that 
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they will need to align their economies in accordance with the convergence criteria,135 
which further insure a substantial homogeneity between the Member States of the 
Eurozone Area. The convergence criteria require the Member States ‘with a derogation’136 
to achieve a high degree of price stability, sustainable government finances, exchange-rate 
stability and stability of long term interest rates. The purpose of the convergence criteria 
is that the acceding Member States to the euro do not endanger its primary objective: 
price stability.137  
The Copenhagen criteria thus highlight the centrality of the protection by the 
Union of a constitutional homogeneity with regard to the ‘economic constitutions’ of its Member 
States. The economic order protected by the Union as part of the constitutional 
homogeneity of its Member States, however, is not identical over time. Whereas the 
immediate post-WWII period of the ‘trentes glorieuses’ was characterised by different 
forms of ‘embedded liberalism’ aimed at market correction, protecting domestic welfare 
states and allowing for the development of different ‘varieties of capitalism’,138 the 
collapse of the Soviet Union arguably signals a watershed in the development of Europe’s 
economic constitutionalism. With the end of the Cold War, which signalled the global 
victory of American capitalism, it is widely held that European political economy and 
Europe itself began to acquire a new identity with the constitutionalisation of the EMU 
based on a ‘substantive value order’ influenced by ordoliberalism and neoliberalism139. 
However, if the constitutional identity protected by the EU is understood as including a 
specific economic order and set of economic prescriptions, another problem of 
constitutional heterogeneity has to be raised, namely, that in the constitutional settlements 
of various Member States of the EU very different relationships between state and society 
and different economic models persist140. The most profound example is the difference 
between the economic and societal models for the countries of the Eastern enlargements 
before and after the post-Communist transition. The transformation of the former 
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communist countries from centrally planned economies to market economies is one of 
the most radical state transformations imaginable141. As remarked by one scholar: 
 
“The closest parallel to the disruption that the countries of formerly communist Europe 
are bringing on themselves is with natural or man-made disasters: floods, earthquakes, 
famines, or wars. But even those parallels understate the enormity of social dislocation 
that economic transition is bound to cause. It is an easier matter to repair physical 
damage, even if it is extensive, than to change the beliefs, the habits, and the skills of an 
entire population”142. 
 
The post-Communist transition called for nothing less than an ‘existential 
revolution’; the introduction of a complete and comprehensive new societal ‘way of life’ 
and a complete ‘liberation’ from the totalitarian past143. Notwithstanding that post-
Communist transition was not entirely tied to the process of accession to the Union, it 
was without a doubt one of the key events—if not the key event—that shaped the new 
constitutional regimes that emerged post-1989144.  The countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe provide the example where the conformance with the Maastricht ‘economic 
order’—as laid out in the Copenhagen criteria—has entailed the most radical state 
transformation. In the words of Zielonka: “before 1989 crossing the East-West divide 
was like entering a totally alien, if not hostile empire, with different laws, economy, 
education, ideology and culture”.145  That example aside, important differences persist 
even in the relatively ‘old’ Member States between the social market economies and the 
liberal market economies146. 
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The government of the accession to the EU has been a way for the EU to stay 
true to its founding mission of ‘uniting Europe’ without allowing states ‘of different 
nature’ into the Union. By way of the accession criteria, especially the Copenhagen criteria 
used in the case of the ‘Eastern Enlargements’, the EU has ‘engineered’ the new Member 
States in what it perceives to be its own image. From a formal perspective, the radical 
state transformation associated with accession is not a danger to the autonomy and 
diversity of the acceding states because they undergo this transformation before they 
become Member States. The radical state transformation this has necessitated has been 
done ‘pre-emptively’ to ensure that the federal balance of the EU was not endangered by 
the admission of the new Member States. The problem, however, is that this radical state 
transformation that the Central and Eastern European states had to undergo to become 
Member States of the EU has not necessarily been genuinely internalised: “Many analysts 
today agree that while post-Communist countries were successful in building democratic 
institutions, they were much less so as regards democratic culture—one Czech commentator 
describes this as ‘democracy without democrats’”147. If it is not properly internalised, the 
demands of EU member-statehood are likely to be experienced as a ‘foreign’ or even 
‘imperial’ force.  In that case, there is no guarantee that the Member States will continue 
to adhere to the homogeneity imposed by the accession process. Accession criteria are 
meant to ensure that the states who enter into a federation are substantially similar to the 
existing Member States. It can, however, not ensure that they stay the same (“there is no 
such thing as ‘post-accession conditionality’”148).   
This leads us to a more general problem of the introduction of political 
heterogeneity into a federation: the problem of political and constitutional change. This problem, 
of course, applies to all the Member States of a federation; not merely to the danger of 
the ‘new’ Member States ‘backsliding’ into their ‘old ways’. In a federation, the Member 
States remain politically and constitutionally autonomous and they are therefore politically 
free to decide on their own destiny and give themselves new constitutions. The question 
is: what happens if a Member State gives itself a new constitution that is politically in 
conflict with the identity of the federation and therefore presents a threat to the federal 
balance? In what ways can the federation exercise constitutional defence? 
                                                          
147 Komárek, “Waiting for the Existential Revolution in Europe”, 195. For data collection on the citizens 
of the acceding states’ support for different types of democratic communities, see Zielonka, Europe as 
Empire, 41. See also Sájo, “Becoming ‘Europeans’: The Impact of EU ’Constitutionalism’ on Post-
Communist Pre-Modernity”, 175-8. 
148 Sadurski, Constitutionalism and the Enlargement of Europe, 156. 
159 
 
IV: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEFENCE 
  
A: The Government of Constitutional Change through a Federal 
Guarantee Clause  
Radical political and constitutional change in the constitutions of the Member 
States presents the federation with a paradox. On the one hand, the federation cannot 
allow the Member States to develop politically and constitutionally in a way that is 
incompatible with the constitutional identity of the Union as a whole. This would 
endanger the substantial homogeneity between the Member States on which the federal 
balance and the very existence of the federation relies. On the other hand, the federation 
is created exactly in order to protect the political existence and autonomy of its Member 
States. The political right of a community to decide on its own fate and give itself a new 
constitution is one of the most important expressions of the political existence and 
autonomy of a state. It is therefore highly controversial for the federation to interfere with 
the constitutional autonomy of its Member States.  Constitutional change in the Member 
States therefore presents the federation with a conundrum: it needs to limit the 
constitutional autonomy of its Member States but this limitation cannot be understood as 
an intrusion into their constitutional autonomy. The problem of constitutional change is 
one of the most difficult manifestation of the contradictory nature of the federal telos: 
how to balance unity and diversity when what is at stake is the very identity of the Member 
States?  
One of the most important tools for the federation to manage constitutional 
change in its Member States is a federal guarantee clause, i.e., a guarantee by federal law of 
the shared form of government/constitutional identity of its Member States. A federal 
guarantee clause has a double purpose: on the one hand, it is meant to create a new unitary 
order and extend the scope of federal power over the constitutional structure of the 
Member States. On the other hand, it is meant to conserve the Member States 
constitutional identities and diversity and distinct ‘ways of life’149. The ante-bellum United 
States and the German Federation are both good examples of the double role played by 
the federal guarantee of constitutional identity.  
The federation of the United States, born out of the American Revolution, 
emerged in opposition to the absolute monarchy of the Old World. Desiring to protect 
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their newly found republican freedom, the former colonies guaranteed a republican form of 
government, not merely via their own state constitutions, but also in the new federal 
Constitution of the United States150: “The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; 
and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot 
be convened) against domestic Violence”151. In addition to their own republican 
constitutions, the newly-won republican spirit of the former colonies now enjoyed 
protection from the constitution of the United States and the federal government. By 
guaranteeing the republican form of government of the Member States, the Constitution 
of the United States is a clear expression of the preservation of the constitutional identities 
of its Member States.  At the same time, this guarantee enabled the creation of a new 
federal constitutional unity and allowed for the possibility of the federal government to 
intervene against ‘unrepublican’ constitutional amendments and uprisings in the Member 
States152. While preserving the constitutional identity of the states, the guarantee clause 
also extended the powers of the federal government over the constitutional developments 
of its Member States. 
Whereas the United States was meant to protect the spirit of the republican 
revolution from the monarchical order of the Old World,153 the German Federation was 
created as an anti-revolutionary union of monarchies in order suppress the liberal and 
nationalist revolutionary potential of the German states154. The German Federation thus 
guaranteed the monarchical form of government in its Member States155 and on requests by 
individual princes, the federation performed numerous military federal interventions to 
quell liberal and nationalist uprisings in the individual Member States156. In this way, the 
relatively wide powers of the German Federation to which the German princes submitted 
themselves were in a very concrete sense a means for constitutional self-preservation of 
the monarchical order for the individual Member States. At the same time, however, the 
federal guarantee of the monarchical form of government created the possibility for the 
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federal level to intervene extensively in the internal affairs of the Member States in order 
to preserve the unity of the federation157 (Chapter 5). 
The federal guarantee of the constitutional identity of the Member States is meant 
to protect the constitutional orders of both the Union and its Member States. It allows the 
federation to bridge the gap between the contradictory forces of the federation: on the 
one hand, the transformative forces directed towards the future and demanding unity and, 
on the other hand, the conservative forces directed towards the past and requiring 
diversity. A federal guarantee of the constitutional identity of the Member States is a 
‘Janus-faced gateway’ that allows for the articulation of transformation as a means of 
conservation, the creation of unity as the preservation of diversity, and the future as a 
return to or continuation of the past. The federal guarantee of constitutional identity can 
in this way allow for the articulation of the birth of a new unitary order and the 
transformation of the federating states as an expression of constitutional conservation 
and self-determination.  It is in many ways an ingenious constitutional mechanism in that 
it allows for the possibility of balancing the contradictory forces of the federation. It is a 
means to square the circle. That being said, in order for it to work, at least two 
preconditions need to be met. 
A federal guarantee clause of the Member States’ shared form of government self-
evidently requires, first, that the Member States share the same form of government; they 
need to be relatively constitutionally homogeneous. The federal guarantee clause will grant 
the Union the authority to intervene in the internal constitutional affairs of the Member 
States. These interventions need to be authorised and preferably perceived as a ‘help’ on 
the part of the Member States for them to further their own constitutional projects and 
not as a threat to their autonomy. This only works if there is a relative homogeneity of 
the Member States’ constitutional identities. This entails not merely a ‘formal’ 
constitutional homogeneity, e.g., ‘a republican form of government’, but also a relatively 
homogeneous interpretation of the meaning of ‘republicanism’. The need for constitutional 
homogeneity is not surprising—the guarantee clause is, after all, meant to deal with the 
problem of constitutional change and it thus presupposes an already existing 
homogeneity. The second precondition is therefore more controversial: the possibility of 
constitutional change in the Member States needs to be limited de jure or only exercised 
to a limited degree de facto for the federal guarantee clause to work. The consequence of 
the guarantee of the constitutional identity of the Member States is a guarantee of the 
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status quo of the constitutions of the Member States158. In other words, it gives the Member 
States rigid constitutions.  
Constitutions, however, are always in flux. They are a process of becoming, and 
that is the case whether they are of an ‘evolutionary’ (UK), ‘revolutionary’ (USA) or ‘elitist’ 
(Germany) type159. Nevertheless, the constitutions of the Member States cannot be 
allowed to evolve so as to present a threat to the unity of the federal order. For example, 
the ‘people’ of an individual state of the United States could not be allowed to give itself 
an ‘unrepublican’ constitution; neither could the German Federation allow for the rise of 
republican/liberal constitutionalism in the individual Länder. What this means is that the 
federation is characterised by an inherent paradox, namely that in order to preserve the 
political existence and autonomy of its Member States, it must impose restrictions on one 
of the most important expressions of the political existence of the state: its political right 
to decide on “the type and form of its own political existence”160. The Member States, 
therefore, should preferably give themselves internally rigid constitutions that mirror that 
of the federation and thereby establish a constitutional ‘double bind’. 
The federal guarantee clause does not solve the problem of constitutional change 
in the Member States. Its primary purpose is the creation of a shared framework—a 
constitutional imaginary and, as we shall see in the next chapter, a governmental 
apparatus—through which the problem of constitutional change can be dealt with. In the 
context of the United States, it allowed constitutional changes and conflicts—in the 
Member States and the Union as a whole—to be mediated through a political contestation 
over the meaning of ‘republicanism’. A concept that changed radically over time from 
being primarily the antithesis to monarchy/nobility and direct democracy at the time of 
the Founding to the idea of political equality and anti-slavery at the time of the 
Reconstruction161. As the United States bears witness to, this framework can only deal 
peacefully with a certain degree of political and constitutional conflict. Ultimately, the 
debates over the compatibility of slavery with republicanism could not be settled through 
constitutional and political debates. In the end, the question was politically settled with 
the Civil War.  
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B: Constitutional Change and Constitutional Defence in the EU 
 How does the EU manage the problem of constitutional change in its Member 
States? This question is not merely of academic interest. There are currently two Member 
States where ‘liberal democracy’ and the foundational values of the Union set out in 
Article 2 TEU are under serious threat due to fundamental changes to their constitutional 
orders: Hungary and Poland.  
Hungary’s slide towards authoritarianism started with the election of the ultra-
right-wing party Fidezs led by Viktor Orbán to government in 2010. The political 
programme of Fidezs is often illustrated with reference to a speech Orbán gave in 2014 
where he explained that “the new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal 
state, a non-liberal state”162. Having the necessary two thirds majority in Parliament, 
Fidezs has pushed through a number of constitutional and other fundamental reforms 
meant to consolidate their own power163. These fundamental reforms include an overhaul 
of the constitutional court ensuring that Fidezs appointed judges are in the majority and 
narrowing the jurisdiction of the court, a new election law with legislative districts 
favourable to Fidezs, extension of voting rights to ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring 
countries who are deemed likely to vote for Fidezs, the creation of a new media authority 
run by Fidezs loyalists and finally an amendment to the National Higher Education Act 
(nicknamed ‘Lex CEU’164) that in practical terms might entail the closure of the Central 
European University (CEU)165 .  
With the combined parliamentary and presidential victory of the Law and Justice 
Party (PiS) in 2015, a form of political authoritarianism has emerged in Poland that in 
many ways mirrors Hungarian developments. Like Fidezs, the PiS has taken over the 
control of the Constitutional Tribunal, engaged in blatant court packing and 
fundamentally overhauled the general judiciary in a way where it is widely agreed that rule 
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of law has come under fundamental threat if it has not been entirely eliminated in 
Poland166. Whereas the reform of the judiciary is the most discussed manifestation of 
Polish authoritarianism, another important example is the amended counterterrorism laws 
allowing the security services expansive powers over telecommunications and personal 
information167. Like Hungary under Orbán, Poland ruled by the PiS has clearly undergone 
constitutional changes, both formal and informal168, that are incompatible with the 
constitutional identity of the EU as expressed in Article 2. 
In contrast to the United States, the EU does not have one designated guarantee 
clause of a shared constitutional identity of its Member States. The problem of 
constitutional change in the Member States is dealt with in three separate Articles: Articles 
2, 4(2) and 7 TEU. Article 2 TEU sets out the value order common to the Member 
States—“respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”—on 
which the Union understand itself to be founded. It sets out the constitutional identity 
which, following Union law, is meant to be shared by the Member States. It is an 
expression of the ‘common aim’ of the federal telos. Nevertheless, Article 2 TEU does not 
guarantee this shared constitutional identity. It merely spells out the value order on which the 
Union is founded. The question of a guarantee of the constitutional identity of the 
Member States is dealt with in Article 4(2) and Article 7. Article 4(2) reads: 
 
“The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as 
their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their 
essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, 
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national 
security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State”. 
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Whereas Article 2 is a manifestation of the ‘common aim’ of the Union, Article 4(2) is a 
manifestation of the ‘particularistic aim’ of the Union. It is an expression of the Union’s 
respect for the political and constitutional diversity and autonomy of its Member States.  
In contrast to a federal guarantee clause, Article 2 and Article 4(2) provide a poor 
constitutional mechanism for dealing with the problem of constitutional change in the 
Member States because the link between the ‘particularistic aim’ and the ‘common aim’ is 
not legally established. There is no direct legal identification of the value order on which 
the Union ‘is founded’ (Article 2) and the constitutional identities of the Member States 
that the Union is bound to ‘respect’ (Article 4(2)). This identity is merely surmised (‘these 
values are common to the Member States’). There is no common overall denominator—
however unspecific, e.g. ‘liberal democracy’—that formally unifies Article 2 and Article 
4(2). It is therefore possible to justify a discrepancy between the constitutional identity 
prescribed by the Union (Article 2) and the constitutional identities of its Member States 
(Article 4(2)) on the basis of the framework of the Treaties.  
Even in cases where such an overall denominator is present (e.g. ‘a republican 
form of government’ in the Constitution of the United States), there will always be a 
discrepancy between the identity clause in the federal constitution and the concrete 
manifestation of it in the constitutions of the Member States (tellingly it is not the 
republican form of government but a republican form of government). That being said, 
a common denominator allows for the contestation and negotiation of constitutional 
conflicts within the same constitutional imaginary and constitutional structures. The lack 
of a common denominator in the case of the EU—however vague—therefore limits the 
possibilities for managing constitutional conflicts within the Union as a matter of EU law. 
This lack of a common denominator is not the only problem. In contrast to the 
earlier discussed cases of the United States and the German Federation, the EU does not 
guarantee the constitutional identity of its Member States. As argued, the guarantee clause 
is ingenious because it allows for the identification of the contradictory forces of the 
federation. It allows for the possibility of both the Member States and the Union 
internalising each other’s constitutional orders. Instead of guaranteeing the constitutional 
identity of its Member States, the Union, following Article 4(2) TEU is bound to respect 
the constitutional identities of its Member States. The accentuation of the Union’s need 
to ‘respect’ its Member States suggests that the Union is more of a constitutional threat than a 
constitutional guardian. Article 4(2) is a means for the Member States to protect themselves 
from the power of the Union.  
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In a similar manner, Article 7 is a means for the Union to protect itself from a 
threat from the Member States. It sets out the Union’s primary powers of constitutional 
defence of the Union against its Member States. In contrast to a federal guarantee clause, 
it does not simultaneously protect the Union and its Member States. The scope of Article 
7 is not limited to Union law, meaning that the EU may act in the event of any breach 
within all areas where the Member States act autonomously, because a breach of the 
fundamental values of the Union are likely to undermine the very foundations of the 
Union169. Article 7 TEU allows the Council to determine the existence of a persistent and 
serious breach, or clear risk of a serious breach, by a Member State of the foundational 
values of the Union expressed in Article 2 TEU. These are respectively known as the 
‘sanctioning arm’ (Article 7(2)-(3)) and the ‘preventive arm’ (Article 7(1)). The two ‘arms’ 
of Article 7 can be triggered independently of one another, that is, the use of the 
‘sanctioning arm’ does not require a previous use of the ‘preventive arm’. 
The ‘preventive arm’ has a lower threshold than the ‘sanctioning arm’. Following 
Article 7(1), on a reasoned proposal by either one third of the Member States, the EP or 
the Commission, the Council acting on a 4/5 majority after obtaining the consent of the 
EP, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the 
foundational values of the Union. The Council may further address recommendations to 
the Member State in question. In itself, this is an almost insurmountable threshold. The 
‘sanctioning arm’, however, has an even higher threshold. As established by Article 7(2)-
(3), the Council acting by unanimity (minus the Member State in question) on a proposal 
by either one third of the Member States or the Commission and after obtaining the 
consent of the EP, may determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach of the 
values of Article 2 TEU. If a persistent and serious breach by a Member State of the 
foundational values of the Union is established, the Council can authorise the suspension 
of certain Treaty rights including the political representation of the Member State in the 
Council170. These sanctions do not free the Member State in question from being bound 
by EU law171. The deprivation of political rights is quite radical in that it, for the duration 
of the sanctions, effectively reduces the Member State in question to a dependency. The 
Member State in question would be fully bound by Union laws but deprived of political 
equality and influence. It is effectively reverted to the legal and political status of an 
applicant state during the accession process.  
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Though radical, the suspension of the political equality of the Member States is 
not necessarily effective. Even if applied, the Union could end up by having a de facto 
authoritarian dependency instead of an authoritarian Member State. For that reason, there 
is an argument to be made that the Union needs to have stronger sanctions or the 
possibility of intervening directly in the internal affairs of the Member States in order to 
combat the rise of authoritarianism in a Member State. Article 7 does not provide this 
possibility: “the core of Article 7 consists of a mechanism to insulate the rest of the Union 
from the government of a particular Member State deemed to be in breach of 
fundamental values; it enables a kind of moral quarantine, not an actual intervention”172.  
Until recently, Article 7 had never been triggered and it was generally considered 
a ‘nuclear option’ deemed too controversial to be used. This perception is at least partly 
based on the EU’s incapability of relying on Article 7 against Austria in the so-called 
‘Haider affair’173 involving the inclusion of the extreme right-wing party FPÖ in the 
Austrian government in January 2000174. However, in December 2017, the Commission, 
relying for the first time on Article 7(1) TEU and backed by the European Parliament, 
called upon the Council to determine whether there is a clear risk of Poland breaching the 
foundational values of the Union175. This is in response to the complete overhaul the 
Polish judiciary has undergone in the past year that has undermined judicial 
independence176.  
Even if the clear risk is established, the probability that Poland will be sanctioned 
through the Article 7 procedure is low. The threshold for the ‘sanctioning arm’ of Article 
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7 is so high that it in practice is very difficult if not impossible to rely on177. The 
requirement of unanimity in the Council for the establishment of a persistent and serious 
breach means that as long as the authoritarian state in question has just one ally, Article 7 
cannot be used. Victor Orbán has pledged on several occasions to veto any EU attempts 
to sanction Poland178. In response to this situation, a few scholars have suggested an effet 
utile interpretation of Article 7 that would allow the Council to bring a case against Poland 
and Hungary simultaneously and thereby deprive both of them of a vote179. Such an 
interpretation, however, has not yet been seriously considered by the EU. 
How can the EU deal with the problem that as long as there is more than one 
‘bad egg’, Article 7 cannot be triggered? Some scholars have suggested that the EU could 
attempt to prevent the authoritarian ‘backsliding’ by social pressures and shaming180, 
fundamental rights protection by national courts acting in the capacity of European 
courts181, systematic infringement procedures182 and by recommendation via the 
Commission’s ‘rule of law framework’183. Apart from the ‘Reverse Solange proposal’184, 
these measures are mostly of technical nature and are therefore largely incapable of 
dealing with the general political challenge of the rise of authoritarianism. This is neatly 
illustrated by the fact that the Commission only could deal with Orbán’s court-packing as 
a matter of age discrimination185. Besides, the possibilities of sanctions through these 
alternative routes are even weaker than Article 7 because there is no way of forcing the 
Member State to comply. As remarked by Jan-Werner Müller: “as of now, the EU has no 
convincing toolkit to deal with the situation”186 in Poland and Hungary187.  
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To make up for this lack, Müller has suggested two new forms of sanctions: first, 
the establishment of a ‘Copenhagen Commission’ that should act as a political guardian 
of the Copenhagen criteria and be able to investigate Member States and, via the 
Commission, to apply sanctions in the form of cutting funding or imposing fines188.  More 
radically, he also suggests that the Union ultimately should have the right to expel a Member 
State from the Union in order to save the constitutional integrity of the Union as a 
whole189. This would, however, be highly controversial because it threatens the perpetual 
nature of the Union—it is an anti-federal measure that the EU cannot undertake without 
endangering its own constitutional foundations190. 
 
C: A Political Right of Intervention? 
In contrast to the federal guarantee clause, the constitutional defence of the EU 
as set out in Articles 2, 4(2) and 7, arguably does not give the Union a legal mandate to 
intervene in the internal constitutional developments of its Member States to prevent a 
constitutional capture. On the contrary, the Treaties have set up two legal and political 
bases for constitutional defence: the defence of the Union against the Member States and 
the defence of the Member States against the Union. As we have seen, these two clauses 
are only poorly connected by Article 2 because of the lack of a common denominator 
through which political conflict could be mediated. There is, in other words, only a poor 
and limited connection between the ‘common aim’ and the ‘particular aim’ of the Union. 
That being said, the question is whether the EU has a political right to protect the Union 
and its Member States from a Member State committing ‘democratic suicide’? 
Notwithstanding the legal limitations, “does the EU have the authority to act as a guardian 
of liberal democracy”191?  
Despite the comparatively limited possibilities provided by Articles 2, 4(2) and 7 
TEU for the EU to intervene in the internal constitutional developments of its Member 
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States to ‘save it from democratic suicide’, there are strong political—though highly 
controversial—arguments in favour of the existence of the Union’s right to do so. The 
strongest political arguments for the EU’s right of intervention have been presented by 
Müller.  
  The EU, Müller argues, has for most of its Member States been part of the 
formation and consolidation of the constitutional project of liberal democracy, albeit in 
different ways. For that reason, the EU is an extra layer of constitutional guarantee of 
liberal-democratic constitutionalism. Membership in the EU is a way for the Member 
States to ‘lock in’ liberal democracy; it is part and parcel of ‘constrained democracy’192. 
The rigid constitutionalism that member-statehood entails is a way for the Member States 
to guarantee an anti-authoritarian form of constitutionalism. “Governments in turn 
sought to lock themselves into Europe to prevent ‘backsliding’”, Müller writes, “it was 
like Ulysses binding himself to the mast in order to resist the siren songs of illiberal 
antidemocratic demagogues in the future”193. Membership in the EU was a way of 
‘anchoring democracy from above’194. Müller’s argument is that a central reason for the 
constitution of the EEC/EU—like the United States and the German Federation (though 
Müller does not make the connection)—was the protection of a specific constitutional 
identity or ‘way of life’.  Following this argument, the protection of liberal democracy is a 
central telos of the Union. The Member States wanted to join the EU to protect 
themselves from the return of fascism. The EU, therefore, has not only a right but also a duty 
to intervene in the constitutional developments of its Member States in order to save them 
from ‘democratic suicide’.  
There is, however, a problem with this argument, namely that not all Member 
States of the EU belong to the constitutional type of ‘constrained democracy’195. Whereas 
the ‘Original Six’ and the ‘Mediterranean Enlargements’ Member States clearly are 
‘constrained democracies’, this is, as we have seen, less so the case for the rest of the 
Member States. Seeing that EU membership was perceived as key to the consolidation of 
democracy for the Central and Eastern European countries, the only full exception to 
‘constrained democracy’ constitutionalism is the ‘continuous parliamentary democracies’ 
of the UK and Scandinavia. For these countries, the distrust of unrestrained popular 
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sovereignty, including parliamentary sovereignty, is not part of their post-WWII DNA196. 
As argued earlier, despite the importance of the idea of ‘the return to Europe’, the 
countries of the ‘Eastern Enlargements’ differ from the post-fascist countries because the 
constitutions are defined against an external imperial enemy and not internal democratic 
collapse. They are therefore to a lesser degree defined by a ‘distrust’ in sovereignty. For 
the Member States of the EU, it seems, there is no consensus on the question of whether 
‘democracy’ means ‘constrained democracy’ and to what extent the EU is a legitimate 
guardian of European democracy. The EU is not the first federation where the meaning 
of the constitutional identity of the Union as a whole has been highly politically contested. 
A good historical example is the debate over whether slavery was compatible with a 
republican form of government in the United States that began in the 1820s and which 
only was settled by the Civil War197. When the constitutional identity is highly politically 
contested, an intervention to save the Member States ‘from themselves’ is difficult to 
authorise and can lead to violent conflict. 
 That being said, there is another political argument in favour of a Union right of 
intervention in order to prevent a Member State from committing ‘democratic suicide’ 
based on the principle of the political interdependence of the Member States. As other 
federations, the EU is characterised by a high degree of mutualisation of risk. This means 
that there are no ‘internal affairs’ of a Member State that are not also potentially a common 
concern for the Union at large198. “Strictly speaking, there are no purely internal affairs in 
EU member states”, Müller writes “all EU citizens are affected by developments in a 
particular member state”199. In concrete terms, this means that the rise of authoritarian 
constitutionalism in one or more Member States potentially affects all the other Member 
States. An example given by Müller is that an authoritarian Member State, when acting 
through its representatives in the EU, will influence laws that are made for all the citizens 
of the Union200. The citizens of the authoritarian Member States are also citizens of the 
Union and the Union therefore has a political right to protect its citizens from any ‘anti-
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constitutional behaviour’ of its Member States201. Following this line of argument, in order 
to save the citizens of the Union from authoritarian influence, the Union will therefore 
have to repress any form of authoritarian constitutionalism in the name of the safety of the 
citizens of the European Union.  This political right, however, is highly controversial because 
both the Member States and the Union have a political right to act as the ‘guardian of the 
constitution’ (Chapter 5).  Moreover, as will become clear in the next chapter, by relying 
on constitutional guardianship a strong element of raison d’état is introduced into the 
federation that risks the destruction of the federal balance and the federation as a political 
form. 
 The EU has as of yet not been capable of intervening in any significant manner 
in the internal affairs of Poland or Hungary to combat the rise of authoritarian 
constitutionalism. The lack of an explicit guarantee clause, the poor interconnection 
between TEU Articles 2, 4(2) and 7, and the relatively limited possibility of sanctioning 
the ‘backsliding’ Member States are without a doubt important reasons for that. 
Notwithstanding these reasons, the lack of action by the EU cannot fully be explained by 
these factors. As we shall see in the next chapter, the EU has in response to the Eurozone 
crisis developed a strong executive apparatus that allows it to take over more or less full 
control of the government of ‘deficit’ Member States. These interventions, as we shall 
see, have been authorised in a structurally similar manner to the arguments in favour of 
an EU intervention in authoritarian Member States presented by Müller. This form of 
‘emergency government’ conforms to the theory of executive constitutional defence in 
the federation. As will become clear, it is a highly controversial and contradictory form of 
emergency government that threatens not only the autonomy of the Member States but 
ultimately also the very existence of the federation as a political form.  
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5 
 
Emergency Rule without a Sovereign 
The emergency government of the Eurozone and the 
contestation of constitutional guardianship in the federation 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, the question of whether the EU has the authority to intervene 
in the internal constitutional affairs of its Member States has not merely been raised in 
the context of the rise of ‘illiberal democracy’ (Chapter 4) but arguably to a greater extent 
in the context of the Eurozone crisis. A good example is the so-called ‘golden rule’ that 
requires the Member States to introduce domestic constitutional guarantees for fiscal 
consolidation1. The intrusion by the EU into the constitutional affairs of its Member 
States during the Eurozone crisis, however, has not been limited to this. The government 
of the Eurozone crisis has been characterised by a radical extension in the governmental 
powers of the Union and ‘micro-management’ of deficit Member States to the degree that 
their political autonomy—de facto if not de jure—has been eroded. It is therefore generally 
maintained within academic debates that the government of the Eurozone has led to a 
change in the constitutional architecture, a constitutional transformation, a constitutional 
mutation or a distortion of the constitutional balance of the EU2. Extensive arguments 
regarding the implications for the constitutions of the Member States have been put 
forward regarding the erosion of the powers of Member State parliaments vis-à-vis the 
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Member State executives and the infringement of constitutionally protected social rights3. 
The extraordinary measures used to govern the Eurozone crisis have been justified with 
reference to ‘necessity’ and an impending ‘emergency’. It is therefore widely agreed that 
the government of the Eurozone crisis conforms to the idea of ‘emergency politics’, albeit 
not the classical statist model of the ‘state of exception’4.  
Notwithstanding the magnitude of the constitutional implications of the 
emergency government of the Eurozone, this chapter argues that—in one limited sense—
the constitutional mutation thesis is overstated. The chapter maintains that the emergency 
government of the Eurozone can be understood as a manifestation of federal 
constitutional defence. What this means is that ‘emergency Europe’ and the Europe of 
‘constitutional tolerance’ are both manifestations of how the federation as a form of 
political association governs itself—in peaceful times and in times of profound crisis. In 
other words, whereas the constitutional balance or identity of the Union might have 
changed, its constitutional character has not, at least not yet. This also provides an 
explanation for why the government of the Eurozone crisis can be a form of ‘emergency 
rule without a sovereign’5. As has been argued throughout this thesis, the federation is a 
discrete political form on a par with, though distinct from, the state and the empire. One 
of the main characteristics of the federation as a political form is the internal absence or 
repression of sovereignty. As will become clear, the federation also governs itself in a 
qualitatively different way than the state in times of crisis. This chapter argues that 
‘emergency Europe’ does not conform to the theory of the ‘state of exception’ because 
the EU is not a state but a federation.  
Emergency government or executive constitutional defence—despite its 
controversial nature—is crucial for the survival of all constitutional governments6, 
including that of a federation. That being said, emergency government is particularly 
dangerous for the federation because it introduces a strong unitary element of raison d’état 
that threatens the dual political nature of the federation. As will become clear, the 
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government of an internal crisis can be what finally destroys the federal balance and takes 
the federation beyond its double political existence into the realm of statehood, either 
through the collapse of the Union or in the form of its transformation into a more unitary 
federal state. Notwithstanding that the government of the Eurozone crisis has arguably 
brought the Union closer to both the brink of collapse and statehood, neither of these 
scenarios has yet come to pass.  
The chapter is structured in three sections. First, a theory of constitutional defence 
and emergency politics in the federation as a political form is developed (I). Special 
attention is given to the employment of different modes of constitutional defence and 
emergency politics in two historical federations: the pre-civil war United States and the 
19th century German Federation (Deutscher Bund). Based on the theory developed, the 
chapter goes on to discuss respectively the emergency government of the Eurozone crisis 
(II) and its contestation by the Member States (III). 
  
I: CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENCE AND EMERGENCY 
GOVERNMENT IN THE FEDERATION 
 
A: Emergency Rule in the Federation 
Being founded on a federal constitutional treaty, federations have constitutional 
forms of government. This means that the exercise of governmental authority is subject 
to such limitations as institutional checks and in some cases protection of fundamental 
rights. The most important constitutional limitation in a federation is the constitutional 
balance between the Union and its Member States (Chapter 4). Nonetheless, situations 
may arise—war, secession, subversion, insurrection, natural or socio-economic 
catastrophes or crises—where the survival of the federation necessitates measures 
incompatible with these constitutional limitations. In the words of Clinton Rossiter: 
 
“Wars are not won by debating societies, rebellions are not suppressed by judicial 
injunctions, the reemployment of twelve million jobless citizens will not be effected 
through a scrupulous regard for the tenets of free enterprise, and hardships caused by the 
eruptions of nature cannot be mitigated by letting nature take its course”7. 
 
In such situations, the federal constitution must, in the same manner as the 
constitution of a state, either explicitly provide for the possibility for the exercise of 
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emergency powers or the governmental structure of the Union must be provided with 
enough flexibility so that it can deal with the state of crisis through the exercise of similar 
extraordinary measures8. In either case, the difficulty consists in how the temporary 
relaxation of constitutional constraints can be ensured without incurring permanent harm 
to the constitutional norms and the constitutional balance of the federation9. The purpose 
of all constitutional emergency government is neither more nor less than the 
reestablishment of the status quo ante crisis. This is the general aporia of emergency politics 
that applies to the state and the federation alike. 
Nevertheless, there are fundamental and qualitative differences between the mode 
of emergency government of the state10 and of the federation. In contrast to the state, the 
federation has a double political existence. This means that emergency politics can be 
exercised by a variety of different constitutional actors (Union institutional actors and Member 
State institutional actors) and wielded on behalf of different existential units (the Union and the 
Member States). The debate on ‘who is the guardian of the constitution’ is therefore not 
reducible to the Schmitt/Kelsen debate on President vs. constitutional court11. The 
federation allows for a contest not merely between different institutions but also between 
different political entities—claims to governmental authority that can lead to highly toxic 
conflicts. There is of course the possibility of a ‘perfect storm’ that hits all the Member 
States in the same manner and where the Member States can collectively declare a Union-
wide state of exception through federal institutions on behalf of both the Member States 
and the Union as a whole. This would be a kind of ‘symmetrical’ state of exception in 
many ways similar to that within a state. That being said, the political form of the 
federation means that the exercise of emergency powers will most often be more intricate 
than that. 
                                                          
8 CJ Friedrich and AE Sutherland, “Defence of Constitutional Order” in RR Bowie and CJ Friedrich (eds) 
Studies in Federalism (Boston and Toronto, Little, Brown and Company, 1954), 676.  
9 ibid. 
10 There is a vast—and controversial—literature on emergency government in the state including C 
Schmitt, Dictatorship: From the Origin of the Modern Concept of Sovereignty to the Proletarian Class Struggle 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 2014); C Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006); G Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life 
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998); G Agamben, The State of Exception (Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 2005); E Frankel, The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (New York, OUP, 
1941); B Honig, Emergency Politics Paradox, Law, Democracy (Princeton, PUP, 2011); WE Scheuerman, “The 
Economic State of Exception” (2000) Cardozo L.Rev. 21; Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship. A general 
review of this literature is outside the scope of this thesis. For a general introduction to the history and 
theory of emergency politics, see Ferejohn and Pasquino, “The Law of the Exception”.  
11 See L Vinx, The Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional Law 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2015). It should be noted that emergency politics in a state more often than not is 
more complex than this question. 
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Emergency politics in the federation is complex because the multiple 
constitutional orders of the federation stand in a relationship to one another of both 
independence and interdependence (Chapter 3). On the one hand, since the constitutional orders 
of the Union and the Member States are independent from one another, the federation 
allows for two sets of emergency actors (Union and Member State actors) on behalf of 
two constitutional orders (Union and Member State constitutions). On the other hand, 
because the constitutional orders of the Union and the Member States are interdependent, 
there is no necessary correspondence between a crisis in a constitutional order and the 
actor that claims emergency authority to govern that particular crisis.  
The interdependence has its roots in the fundamental mutualisation of risk amongst 
the Member States12 (Chapter 2). By coming together in a common Union, some of the 
most important concerns of the Member States—defence and/or welfare—become 
common concerns. A disequilibrium in one part of the Union can have repercussions in 
all the other parts of the Union13. In a federation, there are therefore no ‘internal affairs’ 
of the Member States that cannot potentially be understood as Union matters14 (Chapters 
3 and 4). Besides, by coming together in a common Union, the Member States renounce 
their right to self-help and their relationship inter se is governed by the internal public law 
of the Union (Chapters 1-3). This means that in case one of the Member States breaches 
the fundamental law of the Union, the Member States no longer possess the rights of 
international law such as state retaliation or ultimately war. It is therefore necessary that 
the Union, by way of its own public law, can enforce and defend the constitution against 
constitutional threats or breaches by its Member States. All conflicts between the Member 
States and crises within the Member States are potential matters of common security and 
stability for the Union as a whole and they have to be governed by Union law15.   
For that reason, emergency politics in the federation cannot be understood on the 
basis of the matrices: Member State crisis = Member State emergency rule and Union 
crisis = Union emergency rule. That is, when a Union institution exercises emergency 
politics it is not necessarily with reference to a Union-wide state of exception and seldom 
exclusively so. As we shall see, Union institutions will often justify the exercise of 
emergency powers with reference to both a crisis of one or more of the Member States 
and a crisis of the Union as a whole. Similarly, when a Member State exercises emergency 
                                                          
12 O Beaud, Théorie de la Fédération (Paris, PUF, 2007), 296. 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid 301.  
15 ibid 296. 
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politics, it is not necessarily purely with reference to a threat to its own constitutional 
order. The Member State may also claim to act as the guardian of the Union constitution. 
In other words, the fundamental interdependence of the constitutional orders of the 
federation means that the claims to emergency powers in the federation are not parallel 
but overlapping. Besides, the exercise of emergency politics in the federation will tend to 
involve both Union institutions and Member State institutions because of the 
interdependence of the governmental orders of the Union and the Member States 
(Chapter 3). Federal emergency politics is a form of ‘mixed emergency rule’ more often than not involving 
multiple actors and multiple claims to emergency authority. 
In this mixed form of emergency rule, the different actors can relate to each other 
in multiple ways. This is especially clear in that Union institutions tend to employ two 
different modes of emergency politics in relation to its Member States. The Union 
institutions can exercise emergency power both against a Member State and on behalf of a 
Member State. First, they can act against a Member States that breaches or threatens the 
federal constitution. Second, they can act on behalf of a Member State that is incapable of 
dealing with an internal crisis or conflict. This latter form of intervention tends to be 
justified both with reference to the stability of the crisis-ridden Member State and the 
Union as a whole. The most coherent theory of these two qualitatively different forms of 
emergency politics has been developed on the basis of the praxis of the German 
Federation to which we will now turn. 
 
B: Federal Execution and Federal Intervention in the German 
Federation 
In the German Federation (Deutscher Bund)—established in 1815 after the collapse 
of the Holy Roman Empire and dissolved in 1866 after the Austro-Prussian War—two 
qualitatively distinct forms of executive constitutional defence were available to the 
federal diet (Bundesversammlung/Bundestag): the ‘federal execution’ (‘Bundesexekution’) and 
the ‘federal intervention’ (‘Bundesintervention’)16.  The ‘federal execution’ authorised the use 
of executive measures against a non-complying Member State. The ‘federal intervention’ 
authorised the use of executive measures on behalf of a Member State incapable of dealing 
with an internal crisis. The main legal basis for both the federal execution and the federal 
intervention was the second constitutional treaty (Verfassungsvertrag) on which the German 
Federation relied: the Wiener Schlussakte of 1820. The federal execution was governed by 
                                                          
16 ER Huber, “Bundesexekution und Bundesintervention: Ein Beitrag zur Frage des Verfassungschutzes 
im Deutschen Bund” (1953) AöR 79, 1-2.  
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Article 19 and Article 31-34 and the federal intervention by Article 25-28 of this treaty17. 
These two forms of executive constitutional defence were frequently used during the 
lifespan of the German Federation, notably to defend the ‘monarchical form of 
government’ of the Member States guaranteed by the German Federation against the 
national-liberal political uprisings of the mid-19th century18. In this way, executive 
constitutional defence was in the German Federation intimately linked to the federal 
‘guarantee clause’ (Chapter 4). Federal emergency politics was, e.g., used against the 
revolutionaries of the Frankfurter Wachensturm of 1833 to authorise the federal occupation 
of Holstein during the Second Schleswig War of 1864, and in the attempt to stop Prussia 
seceding in 186619. The most important theoretical study of federal constitutional defence 
in the German Federation has been done by the German constitutional historian and 
constitutional theorist, Ernst Rudolf Huber20. In the following, I will sketch out the main 
lines of his theory of the two forms of federal executive constitutional defence. 
According to Huber, federal execution and federal intervention have often been 
conflated21—and for good reasons. The conflation happens because the concrete measures 
used in federal execution and federal intervention were often identical. The scope and 
intensity varied from case to case but ultimately military enforcement, temporary 
suspension of the targeted Member State’s constitution in parts or in its entirety and 
‘forced administration’ of a Member State could be authorised22. The ‘federal 
commissioner’ acting on behalf of the German Federation could in both a federal 
execution and a federal intervention temporarily take over the whole governmental 
apparatus of the Member State concerned. Notwithstanding that they can be difficult to 
tell apart in practice, federal execution and federal intervention are distinct from one 
another in theory with regard to their mode of authorisation.  
The federal execution is the embodiment of the executive coercive measures or 
sanctions through which the Union can act against one of its Member States to persuade 
                                                          
17 ibid 2. The Wiener Schlussakte can be accessed online via: 
http://www.documentarchiv.de/nzjh/wschlakte.html [last visited 15 August 2017]. 
18 Forsyth, Union of States, 42; Beaud, Théorie, 390-7; ER Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789 Band I: 
Reform und Restauration 1789 bis 1830 (Stuttgart, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1957) [herinafter DV I], 595-6, 
619-20; EN Roussakis, Friedrich List, the Zollverein, and the Uniting of Europe (Bruges, College of Europe, 
1968), 20. 
19 Huber, “Bundesexekution und Bundesintervention”, 3. 
20 The works of Ernst Rudolf Huber are not widely studied, at least not within Anglo-American academia, 
but he is one of the most important theorists of the federation in the 20th century. For an introduction to 
his writings, see Forsyth, Union of States, 155-9. 
21 Huber, “Bundesexekution und Bundesintervention”, 9. 
22 ibid 6-9, 18-27; Huber, DV I, 636.  
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it to fulfil the constitutional obligations that it has neglected23. A federal execution is thus 
an executive act decided on and authorised by the Union in order to force a Member 
State, which in some way presents a threat to the constitution of the Union, to comply 
with the federal constitution. Federal execution is meant to secure the unity, order and 
legal system of the Union against the reluctant or separatist state forces that can always 
be powerful in a federation24.  A federal execution is an act against the government of a 
Member State that has infringed the federal constitution and it is enforced against the will 
of the Member State in question25. During the federal execution, the Member State that 
is under federal execution will be deprived of its political rights at the federal level26. The 
federal executioner who enforces the federal execution in the non-complying Member 
State can act as a ‘commissarial dictator’ in that Member State, temporarily taking over 
the full powers and authority of the Member State government27.  
In contrast, the federal intervention is the embodiment of the coercive measures 
through which the Union is obligated to restore or maintain a Member State 
government—loyal to the federal constitution—if the internal security or order of the 
Member State or its constitution is under threat28.  Historically, a federal intervention was 
used by the German princes to strengthen their power positions vis-à-vis national-liberal 
insurgencies by allowing the princes to rely not only on their own executive powers but 
also those of all the other Member States. The federation will normally intervene on a 
formal request of the crisis-ridden Member State. However, if the Member State is 
incapable of requesting help because of the internal instability, the federation is equally 
obligated to intervene on behalf of the Member State to preserve its internal order and 
stability29.  
In theory, therefore, the federal execution and the federal intervention are clearly 
distinct from one another. Nevertheless, the sharp distinction between the federal 
execution and the federal intervention is impossible to uphold due to the fundamental 
mutualisation of risk in a federation. If the internal threat to the constitution of the 
Member State is understood as having effects beyond the boundaries of the Member State 
                                                          
23 Huber, DV I, 635; Huber, “Bundesexekution und Bundesintervention”, 6. The federal execution was 
included in all three German constitutions that succeeded the German Federation. In Article 19 of the 
1871 Imperial Constitution, in Article 48(1) of the ill-fated 1919 Weimar Constitution and in Article 37 of 
the 1949 German Basic Law. 
24 Huber, “Bundesexekution und Bundesintervention”, 7. 
25 Huber, DV I, 636. 
26 ibid.  
27 ibid 635-6. 
28 Huber, “Bundesexekution und Bundesintervention”, 4.  
29 ibid. 
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(which is arguably the case for most if not all serious crises of a Member State), the 
federation has a political—if not legal—right to intervene in the Member State concerned 
in the interest of the security and stability of the Union and its constitution as a whole30. 
Even in cases where the security interest of the Union is the dominating factor for a 
federal intervention, the Union is no less obligated to also preserve the constitution of the 
Member State concerned31. In this latter case—known as the ‘unrequested intervention’32—
where the Member State has not requested the assistance or even explicitly requested the 
federation not to intervene, the Union may have to rely on the fiction that it saves the 
constitutional order of the Member State33. 
If this proves untenable, i.e., due to persistent resistance by the Member State 
concerned, it is possible to make a formal link between the federal execution and the 
federal intervention by making it a duty of the Member State—by federal law—to inform 
the federation of internal threats to their constitutional orders as was done in the German 
Federation34. If the Member State chose to inform the Union of an internal instability and 
request assistance, the Union could act through a federal intervention; if the Member State 
chose not to inform the Union, the federation could intervene by way of a federal 
execution maintaining that the Member State had neglected its constitutional duty to 
inform the Union of internal instabilities35. In this way, the German Federation established 
a comprehensive apparatus of executive emergency powers capable of intervening in practically all 
internal affairs of the Member States.  
The executive emergency apparatus of the federal intervention and the federal 
execution has its foundation in federalism. It is created to resolve conflicts internal to the 
federation by way of federal public law. The raison d’être of this apparatus is that the 
Member States do not have to resort to the enforcement mechanisms of international 
law, such as state retaliation or war, that would be a threat to the public law of the Union. 
It is, in other words, an important way for the Union to protect the main principles of 
federalism. However, by intervening in the internal affairs of its Member States, the 
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31 ibid. 
32 ibid 10. 
33 ibid 10-1, 15-7. 
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executive emergency powers may destroy the foundational principles of federalism. 
Federal executive constitutional defence is therefore inherently contradictory36. 
The federal commissioner who acts either via a federal execution or a federal 
intervention will, if deemed necessary, have the authority to act as a constitutional dictator 
for the Member State concerned. During the federal intervention/execution, the federal 
commissioner becomes a kind of protector for the Member State37 and the Member State 
is degraded to a de facto dependency of the Union. Even if this is done on a request by the 
government of the Member State concerned—a ‘requested federal intervention’—this 
action can be a threat to the principle of federalism because the government of the 
Member State—de facto if not de jure—might be without a choice. The government that 
has requested a federal intervention, following Huber’s description, finds itself between 
the Scylla of the internal crisis it is incapable of solving and the Charybdis of the power 
and authority of the federal intervention38. If the Union decides to make an ‘unrequested 
federal intervention’ in the internal affairs of its Member States, the situation is even more 
grievous for the principles of federalism. In this case, the Union oversteps the principle 
of the autonomy of the Member States, not only de facto but also de jure, by declaring a 
state of exception on its behalf. This action is authorised in the name of the security and 
stability of the Union as a whole. It is a form of a ‘union-wide state of exception’ (Bundes-
Ausnahmezustand)39.  
Together, the federal execution and the federal intervention make up a 
comprehensive apparatus of executive emergency government of the federation that 
potentially gives the Union the possibility of intervening in all internal affairs of its 
Member States and declare a state of exception both for the Union at large and for the 
individual Member States. Despite the fact that this governmental apparatus is derived 
from the principles of federalism—it is meant to ensure that the Member States do not 
resort to state retaliation or armed conflict—it has an extremely unitary or statist effect40. 
The federal executive emergency government is constantly in danger of destroying the 
core principles of federalism: the constitutional balance between the Union and its 
Member States41.  
                                                          
36 For another argument of the contradictory nature of constitutional defence in a federal union, see AN 
Holcombe, “The Coercion of States in a Federal System” in AW MacMahon (ed) Federalism: Mature and 
Emergent (New York, Doubleday & Company, 1955), 137. 
37 Huber, “Bundesexekution und Bundesintervention”, 10. 
38 ibid. 
39 ibid 12. 
40 ibid 7. See also, Holcombe, “The Coercion of States in a Federal System”, 147-8. 
41 Holcombe, “The Coercion of States in a Federal System”, 153. 
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C: The Doctrine of States’ Rights in the Pre-Civil War United States 
The Founding Fathers of the US Constitution were acutely aware of the problems 
related to federal executive constitutional defence, especially the possibility of the 
employment of federal military force against a non-complying Member State42. In the 
Virginia Plan, presented to the Federal Convention 29 May 1787, a provision was included 
granting the new Congress the power “to call forth the force of the Union against any 
member of the union failing to fulfil its duty”43. However, a few days after presenting the 
plan, Madison, who was its chief author, suffered a change of heart and recommended 
that the clause was postponed. According to the meeting minutes,  
 
“Mr. Madison, observed that the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he 
doubted the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it when applied to people 
collectively and not individually.—A union of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to 
provide for its own destruction. The use of force agst [sic] a State would look more like a 
declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered 
by the party attached as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be 
bound. He hoped that such a system would be framed that might render this resource 
unnecessary”44. 
 
Instead of military coercion, Madison suggested what he termed a ‘congressional negative’ 
on state laws, by which he meant a congressional veto on state legislation45. This solution 
was not accepted by the Convention46. The question of military coercion of the states as 
a means of constitutional defence was hotly contested at the convention but eventually 
the majority of the delegates “preferred, and Madison and his associates ultimately 
accepted, the method of judicial review as that best suited to maintaining the supremacy 
of the constitution”47. Instead of executive constitutional defence, the Convention settled 
on judicial constitutional defence. The Constitution of the United States that came to be 
                                                          
42 ibid 140. 
43 ibid. See also JN Rakove “The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts” (1996-1997) Stan. 
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44 United States Congress, House of Representatives, Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the 
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adopted, however, did also include the federal ‘guarantee clause’48 (Chapter 4) and wide-
ranging presidential powers, through which the federal government ultimately could 
exercise some degree of executive constitutional defence on behalf of and against the 
States49. Nevertheless, compared to the ample possibilities for federal executive 
constitutional defence in Germany, the scope of the US guarantee clause was relatively 
limited.  
Federal constitutional defence—executive as well as judicial—is, however, highly 
controversial; something the history of all young federations attests to50. From the 
perspective of the Member States, it is in no way self-evident that the Union has a right 
to act as the guardian of their constitutions or as the guardian of the federal constitution 
at the expense of their autonomy and right of self-determination. The Member States of 
a federation therefore often claim the right to act as the guardian of their own constitution 
and the Union constitution against constitutional breaches by the Union institutions by 
way of judicial, legislative as well as executive measures. Whereas the most comprehensive 
theory of executive constitutional defence by federal institutions has been put forward to 
understand the praxis of the German Federation, the most comprehensive arguments for 
the Member States’ right to act as the guardian of the constitution has been put forward 
in the context of the early history of the United States.  
There are several examples in early US constitutional history where a State decided 
to defend itself by a wide array of means, including executive measures, from what it 
perceived as ultra vires acts of the federal government or the US Supreme Court, e.g., the 
reaction of Ohio to McCulloch v Maryland (1819), the reaction of Georgia to Cherokee Nation 
v Georgia (1831) and Worcester v Georgia (1831)51. These contestations of federal authority 
relied (rightly or wrongly) on the so-called ‘doctrine of ‘98’, namely the Kentucky and 
Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and 1799—drafted by James Madison and Thomas 
Jefferson—that insisted that the ultimate authority to decide on the constitutionality of 
federal law lay with the States52. The controversial nature of the Supreme Court’s authority 
to act as the guardian of the constitution is expressed in this way in the Kentucky 
                                                          
48 The Constitution of the United States, Article IV. 
49 For the use of the US guarantee clause as a means to constitutional defence, see Wiecek, The Guarantee 
Clause. For the use of the guarantee clause during the Reconstruction, see specifically ibid 166-210. 
50 For a study of contestation of federal authority in young federations, see LF Goldstein, Constituting 
Federal Sovereignty: The European Union in Comparative Context (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
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51 Goldstein, Constituting Federal Sovereignty, 21-31, 49-50. 
52 ibid 21. 
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Resolution: “as in all other cases of compact among powers having no common judge, 
each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of 
redress”. Following the Southern States’ interpretation of the ‘doctrine of ‘98’, the States 
had a right to declare void (nullify) federal law that they deemed to be unconstitutional53. 
In the United States Civil War, most Confederate States relied on an interpretation of the 
‘principle of 98’ and thus cited the ‘dangerous infractions of the Constitution’ by the 
Federal Government as one of the main reasons in their ‘Declarations of Causes Justifying 
Secession’54. The ‘Declaration of Causes Justifying Secession of South Carolina’, e.g., 
opens with the following statement:  
 
“The people of the State of South Carolina, in Convention assembled, on the 26th day 
of April, A.D., 1852, declared that the frequent violations of the Constitution of the 
United States, by the Federal Government, and its encroachments upon the reserved 
rights of the States, fully justified this State in then withdrawing from the Federal 
Union”55. 
 
The argument that the Member States, and not the Union, are the guardians of 
the constitution was, in the history of the theory of the federation, first put forward in a 
comprehensive manner by the political theorist and 7th Vice President of the United 
States, John C. Calhoun. Calhoun argued that the United States was a union of sovereign 
States constituted by a compact between them. Concluding part of his argument, Calhoun 
writes:  
 
“Taken all together, it follows, from what has been stated, that the constitution was 
ordained and established by the several States, as distinct, sovereign communities; and that it 
was ordained and established by them for themselves—for their common welfare and 
safety, as distinct and sovereign communities (...) the authority which ordained and established 
the constitution, was the joint and united authority of the States ratifying it; and that, 
                                                          
53 ibid. 
54 The “Declarations of Causes Justifying Secession” are available via: 
https://www.civilwar.org/learn/primary-sources/declaration-causes-seceding-states#South_Carolina [last 
accessed 20 November 2017]. See also RJ Friel, “Providing a Constitutional Framework for Withdrawing 
from the EU: The Article 59 of the Draft European Constitution” (2004) The International and Comparative 
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among the effects of their ratification; it became a contract between them; and, as a 
compact, binding on them; —but only as such”56.  
 
Calhoun argued against the doctrine of divided sovereignty57 that had been 
predominant in the early history of the United States58 and argued that sovereignty 
remained fully with the states-peoples of the Union59; not with the people of the United 
States constituting one nation. “There is, indeed, no such community, politically speaking, 
as the people of the United States, regarded in the light of, and as constituting one people 
or nation”, Calhoun forcefully argued60. For that reason, the citizens of the United States 
ultimately owed their allegiance to the States and not the Union61. The States, Calhoun 
maintained, had as an essential attribute of their sovereignty the right to judge the 
constitutionality of federal law and, if necessary, to nullify it62. In this way, the States would 
have an effective veto power regarding federal legislation63. Calhoun further argued that 
the States had a right to dissolve their relationship with the Union—the right to secede—
rather than submitting themselves to federal law they deemed to be unconstitutional64. 
The right of secession was the ultimate right of constitutional defence of the Member 
States. In a response to his contemporaneous adversary, the Senator of Massachusetts 
Daniel Webster65, Calhoun thus argued: 
 
                                                          
56 JC Calhoun, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States in RK Crallé (ed), The Works 
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Theory of Calhoun”, 584-5. 
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“I rest the right of a State to judge of the extent of its reserved powers, in the last resort, 
on higher grounds—that the constitution is a compact, to which the States are parties in 
their sovereign capacity; and that, as in all other cases of compact between parties having 
no common umpire, each has a right to judge for itself. To the truth of this proposition 
the Senator from Massachusetts has himself assented, if the constitution be a compact—
and that it is, I have shown, I trust, beyond the possibility of doubt. Having established 
that point, I now claim, as I stated I would do in the course of discussion, the admissions 
of the Senator, and among them, the right of secession and nullification, which he 
conceded would necessarily follow if the constitution be indeed a compact”66. 
 
Calhoun’s doctrine was enormously influential in American history, both with 
regard to the so-called ‘nullification crisis’ of 1832-1833 that he participated actively in 
and after his death (in 1850) in the Civil War. However, his controversial legacy is not 
merely American. The doctrine of States’ rights was appropriated by the so-called 
‘Bavarian Calhoun’67: the German constitutional theorist Max von Seydel68. Inspired by 
Calhoun’s writings, Seydel argued that the German Länder had merely delegated certain 
powers or functions to the federal government but that this delegation did not entail a 
transfer of sovereignty itself69. 
As was the case for the doctrine of federal intervention and federal execution, the 
doctrine of States’ rights is founded on the principles of federalism. Since the States have 
created the Union through a compact between themselves in order to preserve themselves 
politically, they have a right to nullify federal laws and ultimately to dissolve this same 
treaty as a means to constitutional self-defence if the constitution has been breached. 
Nevertheless, this form of constitutional guardianship—creating as many constitutional 
guardians as there are Member States—also presents a fundamental threat to the unity, 
stability and order of a federation and can ultimately lead to its collapse. This was 
Webster’s argument in response to Calhoun: “could anything”, Webster declared “[be] 
more preposterous, than to make a government for the whole Union, and yet leave its 
                                                          
66 JC Calhoun, Speech in Reply to Mr. Webster, on the Resolution Respecting the Rights of the States, Delivered in the 
Senate, Feb. 26th, 1833 printed in RK Crallé (ed) The Works of John C. Calhoun Volume II: Speeches of John C. 
Calhoun delivered in the House of Representatives and in the Senate of the United States (New York, D. Appleton and 
Company, 1881), 301-2. 
67 Forsyth, “The Relevance of Classical Approaches”, 36; Forsyth, Union of States, 136-8. 
68 Merriam, “The Political Theory of Calhoun”, 592.  
69 Palermo and Kössler, Comparative Federalism Constitutional Arrangements and Case Law, 87. A line of 
argument that today is manifest in the doctrine of the German Constitutional Court in, e.g., the Lisbon 
Ruling - 2 BvE 2/08 [2009]. 
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power subject, not to one interpretation, but to thirteen or twenty-four interpretations?”70. 
Constitutional defence by Member States—as is the case for constitutional defence by 
Union institutions—can ultimately be a fundamental threat to the federation by breaking 
it apart. The doctrine of States’ rights is therefore also confronted by the conundrum of 
federal constitutional defence by bringing the logic of the state into the federation.  
 
D: Competing Claims to Constitutional Guardianship  
In contrast to the authority of a state that has as its ultimate source the unitary 
political existence of the state expressed in the will of the people (or the prince), the 
federation, being a double political existence, has a twin source of public power: the 
political existence of the Union and the political existence of its Member States (Chapter 
1). Governmental authority in a federation can therefore be wielded legally—and 
ultimately extra-legally71—in the name of the security of the individual States and for the 
wellbeing of their citizens and in the name of the security of the Union and for the 
wellbeing of its citizens72. That is, authority can be wielded in the name of the people as 
one or the peoples as many; in the name of the ‘Union of States’ or in the ‘Union of States’. 
Due to the multiple constitutional orders of the federation that stand in a heterarchical 
relationship to one another of relative autonomy, there is no unequivocal answer to the 
question of who has the authority to act as the guardian of the constitution, what or which 
constitution(s) should be saved, and in the name of whom the emergency powers are 
authorised. The Union can, on the one hand, ultimately suspend the political autonomy 
of one or more of its Member States to defend the constitution and security of the Union 
as a whole. On the other hand, the Member State can ultimately suspend or nullify the 
constitutional order of the federation in whole or in part within its territory in order to 
protect its own constitutional order or stability, welfare or security.  
The conflict between these forms of constitutional defence—the doctrine of 
federal execution and federal intervention versus the doctrine of states’ rights—are 
manifest both in the case of the American Civil War where the Southern States’ attempt 
of secession was crushed by the Union army and in the case of the Austro-Prussian War 
that led to the collapse of the German Federation after a failed attempt to hinder Prussian 
                                                          
70 Speech by Daniel Webster as cited by TC Fischer, “Federalism in the European Community and the 
United States: A Rose by Any Other Name…” (1994) Fordham Int’l LJ 17(389), 431. 
71 Huber, “Bundesexekution und Bundesintervention”, 54-5. 
72 ibid. 
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secession via a federal execution73. Both sides, in both conflicts, could present strong and 
valid arguments founded on the principles of federalism and their respective 
constitutional orders74. Whereas the Member States ultimately had a right to secede as a 
means of constitutional defence, the Union ultimately had a right to intervene to preserve 
the order and stability of the Union. Both of these actions, though based on the logic of 
federalism, will, however, bring the federation to the brink of collapse by introducing the 
logic of the state into the federation. This is the most fundamental paradox of 
constitutional defence in a federal union of states.  
 
II: THE EMERGENCY GOVERNMENT OF THE EUROZONE 
 
A: Constitutional Defence Prior to the Eurozone Crisis 
In the EU, the Union institutions have not had the possibility of the German 
Federation, as a last resort, to enforce Union law via executive measures. In contrast to 
the German Federation, EU law does not allow the Union’s executive branch to, e.g., 
make use of ‘forced administration’ of a crisis-ridden Member State. The EU is not unique 
in this regard. As we saw earlier, executive enforcement was also discarded in the United 
States in favour of judicial review. Like the early United States, constitutional defence has 
in the EU primarily been a judicial matter. The unity, stability and order of the EU has 
been secured by the preliminary reference procedure75 and the infringement procedure76. 
The annulment procedure77 has, furthermore, provided a possibility for judicial review of 
EU law.  
When the importance of the federal balance for the stability of the federation is 
taken into account (Chapter 4), the US model of judicial constitutional defence is in many 
ways preferable to the German model of executive constitutional defence because it 
presents a comparatively minor threat to the political autonomy of the Member States. As 
Madison realised, the enforcement of the federal constitution by force “would look more 
like a declaration of war” and might lead to the dissolution of the federal union78. 
Unfortunately, judicial constitutional defence is limited regarding the kinds of crises it can 
                                                          
73 ibid 46, 55-6.   
74 ibid 52-6. 
75 Article 267 TFEU.  
76 Article 258 TFEU. 
77 Article 263 TFEU. 
78 United States Congress, House of Representatives, Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the 
American States, Session 69th Congress, 1st Session Volume Serial Set Vol. No. 8573, Session Vol. No.12 
(edited by CC Tansill), first published in 1926, 131, emphasis added. 
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deal with. War, secession, subversion, insurrection, natural or other unforeseen 
catastrophes and economic depressions might all demand an immediate response of executive 
measures.  Whereas a court retrospectively can authorise, legalise or otherwise justify 
executive acts of emergency politics, the court itself cannot act. Judicial constitutional 
defence alone is therefore incapable of dealing with fundamental internal threats to the 
constitutional order and stability of a federal union. Or, in the words of Rossiter: “If a 
situation can be dealt with judicially, it is probably not a crisis”79. With the outbreak of the 
Civil War, judicial constitutional defence could, e.g., no longer preserve the constitution 
and public order of the United States and executive constitutional defence was employed 
by Lincoln to repress the rebellious Southern States. Judicial constitutional defence, 
however “valuable and important it is for the defence against subversions and 
constitutional disorder” is, in the words of Huber, “incapable of safeguarding the Union 
as a whole against the area of conflict between the fundamental political existences and 
vital powers of the Union”80.  
Compared to other young federations, the history of the EU has until the outbreak 
of the Eurozone crisis been characterised by relative internal stability, lack of major crises, 
and surprisingly little contestation of Union authority81. Perhaps this can explain why the 
EU, until the Eurozone crisis, has been capable of surviving without a governmental 
apparatus for executive constitutional defence or its extra-legal employment. In notable 
comparison to the young United States, the contestation of the authority of the EU and 
the ECJ has, as shown by Leslie Goldstein’s detailed comparative study82, been sparse. In 
general, Member State courts have accepted the doctrines of primacy/supremacy and 
direct effect of EU law and have for the most part only insisted on their right to act as 
the guardian of the constitution as a theoretical possibility83. 
In her explanation for the relatively sparse constitutional contestation in the EU, 
Goldstein argues that by institutionalising a form of Member State veto, as recommended 
by Calhoun, the Member States could retain control of politically sensitive issues and were 
                                                          
79 Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 9. 
80 Huber, “Bundesexekution und Bundesintervention”, 1 my translation. 
81 Following Goldstein, France is the only Member State of the Original Six that repeatedly has defied 
European authority (Goldstein, Constituting Federal Sovereignty, 36-7). 
82 Goldstein, Constituting Federal Sovereignty, 14-42. 
83 ibid 20, 43. See, however, recent case from the German Constitutional Court on the European Arrest 
Warrant, BverfG - 2 BvR 2735/14 [2015]. See also the ‘Slovak Pension’ cases as summarised by J 
Komárek, “Playing with Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court’s Ultra Vires Revolution” 
(Verfassungsblog, 22 February 2012) and the Danish Supreme Court - 15/2014 Dansk Industri (DI) Acting 
for Ajos A/S vs. The Estate left by A as summarised by MR Madsen, HP Olsen, U Šadl, “Legal 
Disintegration? The Ruling of the Danish Supreme Court in AJOS” (Verfassungsblog, 30 January 2017). 
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therefore less likely to rebel against federal authority84. She furthermore highlights certain 
institutional features of the judicial structure of the EU—the equal representation of the 
Member States in the ECJ, the appointment of ECJ judges for a fixed number of years, 
and the use of national courts as European courts—as central reasons for the relative lack 
of Member State resistance85. Whether these institutional features of the EU were the 
decisive reasons for the sparse constitutional resistance and whether the Member States 
really were capable of reining in the power of EU law against politically sensitive issues 
remains controversial. If one accepts Fritz Scharpf’s work on the dynamic between 
negative and positive integration for instance, it seems hard to believe that the Member 
States were in actual fact capable of reining in the power of EU law against politically 
sensitive issues even before the Eurozone crisis86.  
Whatever the reasons for the relative lack of contestation of EU authority 
historically87, the Eurozone crisis has, at least temporarily, brought an end to the idea of 
European ‘constitutional tolerance’. The crisis has led to an escalation of the wave of 
constitutional contestations in Member State courts, political parties and in the public 
sphere that began with the end of the ‘permissive consensus’88. With the dawn of the 
Eurozone crisis, ‘Europe’ and ‘Brussels’—like ‘Washington’ in the US—had become one 
of the most important fault lines for political contestation. Furthermore, with the 
unfolding of the crisis, the EU’s lack of executive constitutional defence became apparent. 
Europe found itself in the most serious economic crisis since the Great Depression with 
few—if any—real emergency powers at the Union level. If executive constitutional 
defence was not deemed necessary earlier, it quickly became so.  
 
B: The Rise of European Emergency Rule 
Executive constitutional defence is not straightforwardly employed in the EU for 
a number of reasons. As we saw earlier, emergency government is often made legally 
possible either by having a direct provision for emergency government or by giving the 
                                                          
84 Goldstein, Constituting Federal Sovereignty, 43-4, 63. Goldstein here relies on Weiler’s argument in “The 
Transformation of Europe” (1991) 100 The Yale Law Journal, 8. 
85 Goldstein, Constituting Federal Sovereignty, 45-8, 62-3. 
86 See F Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford, OUP, 1999) Chapter 2. Whether 
they were under the impression that they could rein in the public powers of the Union is of course 
another matter. 
87 Another prominent explanation in EU law scholarship for the relative lack of contestation by domestic 
courts of EU authority is that the doctrine of the ECJ led to judicial empowerment in the Member States. 
See Weiler “The Transformation of Europe”, 2426; AM Burley and W Mattli, “Europe Before the Court: 
A Political Theory of Legal Integration” (1993) International Organization 47, 63-4. 
88 L Hooghe and G Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive 
Consensus to Constraining” (2009) British Journal of Political Science 39(1), 5. 
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governmental institutions the flexibility necessary to the exercise emergency government 
within the scope of the law. The EU governmental institutions did not have any of these 
options to any significant degree. Prior to the crisis, there was a very limited legal basis 
available for economic emergency politics beyond the scope of Article 122(2)89 and Article 
143 TFEU90 in the Treaties. And due to the rigidity and detailed nature of the EU Treaties, 
the narrow constitutional mandates of the governmental institution of the EU and the 
complex process of Treaty revision, the flexibility of the EU’s executive branch of 
government is highly restricted. In contrast to systems of parliamentary sovereignty where 
emergency government can be exercised within the boundaries of the constitution 
because of the lack of a strict separation between legislative and executive powers and the 
relative flexibility of cabinet91, the governmental institutions of the EU are not constituted 
with the flexibility that would allow them, in an unproblematic manner, to exercise 
emergency powers without going beyond their legal mandate.  
Emergency politics in the EU must therefore be authorised on more political 
grounds. The EU is not unique in that regard. Executive constitutional defence must often 
go beyond the constitution in order to save the political community. This was perhaps 
best expressed by Abraham Lincoln in response to critiques of his employment of 
emergency measures to repress the rebellious Southern States: 
 
“Every man thinks he has a right to live and every government thinks it has a right to 
live. Every man when driven to the wall by murderous assailants will override all laws to 
protect himself, and this is called the great right of self-defense. So every government, 
when driven to the wall by a rebellion, will trample down a constitution before it allow 
itself to be destroyed. This may not be constitutional law, but it is fact”92.   
 
                                                          
89 Article 122(2) TFEU reads: “Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with 
severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the Council, 
on a proposal from the Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Union financial assistance to 
the Member State concerned. The President of the Council shall inform the European Parliament of the 
decision taken”. In May 2010, the Council was able to extend help to the Greek financial authorities via 
Article 122 thus interpreting the financial crisis of 2008-2009 as an exceptional occurrence beyond the 
control of the Greek government, see W Schelkle, The Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity: Understanding 
the Euro Experiment (Oxford, OUP, 2017), 212, 141. 
90 Article 143 TFEU allows for the Union to provide assistance to a non-Eurozone Member State that is 
experiencing balance of payments difficulties that “jeopardise the functioning of the internal market or 
the implementation of the common commercial policy”. The three non-Eurozone bailouts—Hungary, 
Latvia and Romania—were all based on Article 143 TFEU, see C Kilpatrick, “Are the Bailouts Immune 
to EU Social Challenge Because They Are Not EU Law?” (2014) EuConst 10, 400. 
91 Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 135-6; 139; 154-8. 
92 Lincoln to Hodges, as cited by Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 11. 
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There is an argument to be made that the extension of executive powers will be of greater 
importance in federal systems than in unitary states because of the division of powers 
between the Union and the Member States93. The division of powers in a federation can 
have the implication that no one—neither the Union nor the Member States—can 
address the problem within the scope of the law. Whereas centralised states merely have 
to concentrate the powers already granted to government on fewer hands or transfer powers 
from civil authority to military authority94, federal systems will have to extend the powers 
available to government as such. A good historical example of this is the New Deal that 
led to a profound change to the US constitution and significantly altered and enlarged the 
powers of the US government95.  
Whether this can be upheld as a general rule or not, it has definitely been the case 
in the Eurozone crisis. Following the ‘no-bailout clause’ (Article 125 TFEU), the Union 
was not allowed to bail out a Member State on the brink of default and the ECB was 
forbidden from acting as a lender of last resort to sovereigns (Article 123 TFEU)96.  
However, seeing that the Member States had given up their old national currencies, they 
had lost one of their most important policy tools to deal with the crisis, namely, an 
independent monetary policy97. The possibility of, e.g., devaluation and (internal) 
Quantitative Easing and large scale fiscal investment based on deficit spending no longer 
existed for the Member States who had adopted the Euro. At the beginning of the 
Eurozone crisis, neither the EU nor the Member States had adequate powers available to 
them to deal with a recession of this scale.  
Despite these constraints, a permanent European governmental emergency 
apparatus has been instituted during the Eurozone crisis with a view to governing not 
only the crisis but also the future developments of the Eurozone and the EU. This 
governmental apparatus relies on a patchwork of legal instruments and governmental 
                                                          
93 “If successful constitutional dictatorship involves either a union of the ordinarily separated powers or a 
simple disregard of that hoary principle of constitutionalism, then it would seem axiomatic that the less 
rigidly a government conforms to the theory of the separation of powers, the more easily it can adapt 
itself to the rigors of any particular crisis” (Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 154). 
94 In France, the ‘state of siege’ is characterised by the transfer of powers from civil administration to 
military commanders. Similarly, martial law in Britain is characterised by the extension of military 
government to domestic areas and civil persons (Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 79-90, 140). 
95 B Ackerman, We the People II: Transformations, Part Three. 
96 P de Grauwe, “The European Central Bank as Lender of Last Resort in the Government Bond 
Markets” (2013) CESifo Economic Studies 59(3), 520–35. 
97 P de Grauwe, “The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone” (2011) CEPS Working Document 346. As has 
been pointed out by Waltraud Schelkle, the de facto constraint on the Member States’ monetary sovereignty 
predates the euro. Notwithstanding that the Member States de jure had more policy tools available to them 
under the ERM system, the ERM crisis of the 1992-1993 made it clear that they could not make use of 
them effectively: “The ERM crisis had shown most governments how little monetary sovereignty they 
had” (Schelkle, The Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity, 128-9, 181-2).  
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agreements of contested legal nature: the ‘Six Pack’, the ‘Two Pack’ and the ‘European 
Semester’ (all three formally EU law), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)98 and the 
‘Fiscal Compact’99 (both formally international law), the ‘Memoranda of Understanding’ 
(MoUs) specifying loan conditionality (the legal status of which is ‘liminal’/contested100), 
Banking Union101 and finally the ‘non-standard monetary policy instruments’ of the ECB, 
importantly the Outright Monetary Transactions  programme (OMT) and Quantitative 
Easing (QE). Following Claire Kilpatrick, I refer to this body of (legal) instruments as 
‘Eurocrisis law’102. 
Whereas the early history of constitutional defence in the EU is best understood 
on the basis of the US model of judicial constitutional defence, the emergency 
government of the Eurozone crisis is more readily comprehended on the basis of the 
model of executive constitutional defence of the German Federation. The emergency 
apparatus created allows EU institutions, first, to exercise emergency powers on behalf of a 
Member State ‘loyal to the Union’ that is incapable of dealing with an internal crisis 
(‘federal intervention’). Second, it allows EU institutions to act against a Member State that 
breaches EU law and threatens the stability of the Union (‘federal execution’). Both forms 
of emergency rule entail a significant interference in the ‘internal matters’ of the targeted 
Member State.  
Before the Eurozone crisis, there was a legal ban for a Member State, ‘loyal to the 
Union’ but in a crisis beyond its command, to ask for help from the Union or the other 
Member States beyond the limited scope of Articles 122 and 143 TFEU. There was, in 
short, only a limited possibility for a federal intervention. With the creation of the ESM 
in 2012, a permanent legal structure was put into place that allows for a federal 
intervention. Following the conclusion of the ESM Treaty, an ESM Member State that 
finds itself in a financial crisis beyond its control may request financial assistance in the 
form of a loan from the ESM103. When a request is made, the ESM Board of Governors 
shall entrust the Commission and the ECB with the task of assessing the emergency 
situation. In the ESM, the link between a threat to a Member State and a threat to the 
                                                          
98 And early in the crisis the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). 
99 Formally “The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union” (TSCG). 
100 Kilpatrick, “Are the Bailouts Immune…?”, 395-6, 409; C Kilpatrick, “The EU and Its Sovereign Debt 
Programmes: The Challenges of Liminal Legality” (2017) EUI Working Papers LAW 14. 
101 S de Rynck, “Banking on a Union: The Politics of Changing Eurozone Banking Supervision” (2016) 
Journal of European Public Policy 23(1), 119-35; Schelkle, The Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity, 217-22. 
102 C Kilpatrick, “Constitutions, Social Rights and Sovereign Debt States in Europe: A Challenging New 
Area of Constitutional Inquiry” (2015) EUI Working Papers Law 34. 
103 ESM Treaty, Article 13. 
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Union that always exists implicitly for federal interventions is made explicit. The ESM can 
only provide stability support if “indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the 
euro area as a whole and of its Member States”104. A federal intervention based on the 
ESM is therefore always linked to a ‘Eurozone-wide state of exception’ (i.e. a ‘Bundes-
Ausnahmezustand’).  
Perhaps because it arguably breaches EU law105—or so it seemed until the ECJ’s 
creative interpretation in Pringle106—, the ESM was (formally) created outside EU law. 
Nevertheless, as most other forms of emergency politics, the ESM is anchored in public 
law and exercised by public law institutions. The legal basis for the ESM is Article 136 
TFEU, amended ex-post facto to allow for the establishment of “a stability mechanism to 
be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole”107. 
Furthermore, the Commission and the ECB “perform the tasks provided for” in the ESM 
treaty108. The ESM is thus outside the public law structure of the EU but at the same time 
firmly anchored in it. It is a true, albeit unconventional, emergency regime: it suspends 
the public law norm but operates with the force of law through public law institutions. It 
is a form of “liminal legality” existing in the “contested border zone between law and 
non-law (…) and EU law and non-EU law”109. The narrative that the bailout-programmes 
formally fall outside EU law—and in case of the MoUs their formal a-legal nature—has, 
as will come clear, been used by EU institutions as well as Member State courts to 
immunise bailout conditionality from fundamental rights challenges110. It is an alternative 
way of creating a zone where the law is suspended but where public power can still be 
exercised with the force of law. 
The ESM works differently than the German federal intervention because de jure 
an EU ‘federal commissioner’ can neither (partially) suspend the targeted Member State’s 
constitution nor rely on ‘forced administration’. The ESM does, however, de facto allow 
                                                          
104 ESM Treaty, Article 12. 
105 As maintained by Thomas Pringle in C-370/12 - Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland and Others [2012], 
see J Tomkin, “Contradictions, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics: The Impacts of the 
Adoption of the ESM Treaty on the State of European Democracy” (2013) GLJ 14(1), 174-7. 
106 Tomkin, “Contradictions, Circumvention and Conceptual Gymnastics”, 187-8. 
107 Decision (EU) 2011/199, European Council Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member 
States whose currency is the euro.  
108 ESM Treaty, Preamble (10) and (17). 
109 Kilpatrick, “The EU and Its Sovereign Debt Programmes: the Challenges of Liminal Legality”, 3. 
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for just that because the price of an ESM loan is the ‘strict conditionality’ specified in a 
MoU negotiated between the ESM and the Member State concerned111. With the constant 
threat of cutting off funds, a Member State government and/or parliament requesting an 
ESM intervention is thus caught, paraphrasing the words of Huber, between the Scylla of 
defaulting and the Charybdis of the Troika (the Commission, the ECB and the IMF)112. 
The loss of political autonomy, it must be stressed, is not formal but material in nature since 
the ESM is a ‘requested intervention’. For that reason, the current President of the ECJ, 
Koen Lenaerts, can apparently without irony write the following:  
 
“a national parliament may, where the constitution requires its approval, reject the 
conditions attached to ESM financial assistance. Of course, in so doing, national 
parliaments must strike the right balance between the risks associated with default and 
the adoption of austerity measures that will inevitably give rise to discontent among the 
electorate”113.   
 
Setting aside the question of whether a Member State (or which Member States!) 
in actual fact would have been allowed to default seeing that a sovereign default might 
have led to contagion across the Eurozone, Lenaerts is correct in his analysis of the formal 
political autonomy of a Member State to reject ESM conditionality. Being ‘free to default’, 
the Member State’s governmental apparatus stays in place and submits itself ‘freely’ to the 
conditionality programmes attached to the ESM programme. That being said, from a 
more material perspective, voting in favour of defaulting is not a viable choice for most 
Member State parliaments. De facto, if not de jure, the Troika acting on behalf of the ESM 
therefore becomes a ‘protector’ for the bailout Member States as the federal 
commissioner did under the federal intervention in the German Federation.  
The role of the ECB and the Commission as ‘protectors’ is further strengthened 
by the ‘stricter version’ of the Stability and Growth Pact created during the crisis with the 
Six Pack, the Two Pack and the Fiscal Compact. The Two Pack, e.g., created the 
possibility for strengthening the economic and budgetary surveillance of Eurozone 
Member States who receive either external financial assistance under the EFSM114, the 
EFSF, the ESM, the IMF or another bilateral basis  or who “experience or are threatened 
with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability or to the sustainability of 
                                                          
111 ESM Treaty, Article 13(3) and 13(4). 
112 Huber, “Bundesexekution und Bundesintervention”, 10.  
113 Lenaerts, “EMU and the European Union’s Constitutional Framework”, 766. 
114 The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism. 
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their public finances, leading to potential adverse spill-over effects on other Member 
States in the euro area”115. It is for the Commission—not the Member State concerned—
to decide when the latter is the case116. If the formal request for assistance is what 
preserves the political autonomy of the Member States from a formal perspective, the 
Two Pack undermines this autonomy. Because of the potential spill-overs of a crisis 
internal to a Member State, the Two Pack allows European institutions to intervene in 
the internal fiscal affairs of EU Member States and subject them to ‘enhanced surveillance’ 
without a formal Member State request. The Two Pack, therefore allows the Commission 
to declare a form of ‘state of exception’ on behalf of its Member States. Whereas the ESM is a form 
of ‘requested federal intervention’, the Two Pack creates the possibility for a form of 
‘unrequested federal intervention’.  
A Member State subjected to ‘enhanced surveillance’ shall in cooperation with the 
Commission and the ECB “adopt measures aimed at addressing the sources or potential 
sources of difficulties”117. This is done by directing recommendations at the Member 
State, e.g., a macroeconomic adjustment programme. If the Member State concerned is 
“experiencing insufficient administrative capacity or significant problems in the 
implementation of the programme” it is obligated to seek “technical assistance from the 
Commission”118. A Member State subjected to ‘enhanced surveillance’ thus has a legal 
obligation to inform the Union if it is not capable of implementing the ECB’s and the 
Commission’s recommendations itself. In that case, the ECB and the Commission will 
supply “technical assistance” which “may include the establishment of a resident 
representative and supporting staff to advise authorities on the implementation of the 
programme”119. In this way, the Two Pack creates the possibility for the Commission and 
the ECB, through their resident representative, to exercise emergency public powers 
directly in and on the Member States subjected to ‘enhanced surveillance’. That is, the 
Two Pack creates the possibility of a ‘forced administration’. Similarly, if the Council, on 
a proposal by the Commission, decides that a Member State has an ‘excessive deficit’120, 
the Member State has a duty to present to the Council and the Commission “an economic 
                                                          
115 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the 
strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or 
threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, Article 1, 1(b) and Article 1,1(a). 
116 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013, Article 2, 1(a) 
117 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013, Article 3, 1. 
118 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013, Article 7, 8. 
119 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013, Article 7, 8, italics added. 
120 Article 126(6) TFEU and regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, Article 7. 
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partnership programme” that specifies “the policy measures and structural reforms that 
are needed to ensure an effective and lasting correction of the excessive deficit”121. The 
implementation of the programme shall be monitored by the Commission and the 
Council122. 
In case of serious non-compliance with the recommendations made in the 
different ‘adjustment programmes’ for the Member States, the Stability and Growth Pact 
has established a link between a ‘federal intervention’ and a ‘federal execution’ under 
Article 126(9)-(11) TFEU and strengthened by the ‘stricter’ Stability and Growth Pact. A 
Member State that persistently fails to take action in response to the recommendations by 
the relevant EU institutions—a Member State that resists a federal intervention—can, e.g., 
be required to lodge a deposit with the Commission amounting to 0.2 % of its GDP in 
the preceding year123, or it can have a fine imposed on it by the Commission amounting 
to 0.2 % of its GDP in the preceding year124. The federal intervention blends into the 
federal execution because, due to the mutualisation of risk, there is no internal affairs of 
the Member States that cannot become a Union matter. 
As is generally the case for emergency politics in the federation, in the concrete 
praxis of the government of the Eurozone crisis, it is not always clear who authorises the 
extended use of executive powers and for the sake of whom. This is, e.g., manifest in the 
ESM where stability support only can be granted to a crisis-ridden state if necessary to 
safeguard the Eurozone and its Member States125. The European governmental 
emergency apparatus is a form of ‘executive federalism’ that has strengthened the 
executive branch of government of the Union and, in many cases, of the Member States. 
This is, e.g., manifest in a widespread use of ‘rule by decree’ by Member State governments 
and the granting of wide ranging powers to government ministers126. As other forms of 
‘executive lawmaking’, Eurocrisis law has worked as a kind of ‘enabling act’127 transferring 
                                                          
121 Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on 
common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of 
excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, Article 9, 1. 
122 Regulation (EU) No 473/2013, Article 9, 6. 
123 Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 
on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, Article 4. See also, Regulation 
(EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on 
enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, Article 3. 
124 Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011, Article 6. 
125 ESM Treaty, Article 12. 
126 Marketou’s, “Greece: Constitutional Deconstruction and the Loss of National Sovereignty”, 190; LD 
Sanchez, “Spain: Dealing with the Economic Emergency”, 204-209; L Pierdominici, “Constitutional 
Change through Emergency Decrees”, 222-8; S Coutts, “Ireland: Traditional Procedures”, 233, 236 all in 
Constitutional Change through Euro-Crisis Law. See also D Tega, “Welfare Rights in Italy” in Social Rights in 
Times of Crisis, 53. 
127 Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 10. 
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legislative powers from parliaments to the European and Member State executives. The 
structure of the federal intervention furthermore allows a Member State government to 
repress internal opposition and enforce unpopular programmes128. Whereas the Princes 
in the German Federation could use the mechanism of the federal intervention to rely on 
the force of the collected armies of all the Länder to repress a national-liberal uprising in 
an individual Land, so has Eurozone crisis law been employed by some Member State 
governments to cut public finances and enforce labour law reforms that would have been 
difficult to get through Member State parliaments in ‘normal times’129. 
 
C: ‘Whatever It Takes to Preserve the Euro’ 
Before we turn to the contestation of the government of the Eurozone crisis, it 
seems important to discuss a significant manifestation of emergency rule that goes beyond 
both the federal intervention and the federal execution, namely, the ‘non-standard 
monetary policy instruments’ of the ECB such as the OMT and QE. These programmes 
have allowed the ECB to act as a lender of last resort to sovereigns and buy government 
securities in order to lower the interest rate and increase the money supply. These 
unconventional policy instruments were employed because the crisis measures already 
discussed proved insufficient to deal with the Eurozone crisis130. By 2012, the markets 
had started to seriously call into question the irreversibility of the euro within the crisis-
ridden Member States and to price in the likelihood of sovereign defaults. On this 
background, it was deemed necessary for someone to step in to relieve the fiscal 
authorities of the Member States and guarantee the survival of the Eurozone as a whole. 
When no other actor appeared on the stage, the ECB took up the slack and provided, in 
the words of Waltraud Schelkle, relief for Member State fiscal authorities “through the 
monetary back door”131. With the OMT and QE programmes, the ECB acted in order to 
ensure the survival of the Eurozone as a whole. 
                                                          
128 See, e.g., Marketou’s (“Greece: Constitutional Deconstruction and the Loss of National Sovereignty”, 
180-1) account of how the ‘anti-MoU forces’ were repressed in the Greek Parliament during the 2010 
bailout. 
129 ML Rodríguez (“Labour Rights in Crisis in the Eurozone: The Spanish Case”), e.g., argues that “the 
anti-crisis decisions are a mix of EU recommendations and/or impositions and national policies. This is 
the case because European authorities and the current Spanish Government, whether they state it or not, 
share the same political vision, the same economic ideology, and the same strategy to overcome the crisis 
(...) This mix between EU demands and contributions from the Spanish Government has led to a more 
authoritarian labour relations model” in Social Rights in Times of Crisis, 111. For a similar analysis of 
Portugal, see M Noguieira de Brito, “Putting Social Rights in Brackets? The Portuguese Experience with 
Welfare Challenges in Times of Crisis” in Social Rights in Times of Crisis, 68. 
130 Schelkle, The Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity, 214-5. 
131 Schelkle, “European Fiscal Union: From Monetary Backdoor to Parliamentary Main Entrance” (2012). 
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Neither the OMT nor QE fits the model of federal intervention and federal 
execution. In neither case does the ECB act (primarily) on behalf of an individual Member 
State or against a Member State. In contrast, these programmes are forms of emergency 
politics on behalf of the EU or the Eurozone as a whole and are motivated (solely) by a 
Union-wide state of exception. The announcement of the OMT-programme by Mario 
Draghi was prefaced by the so-called ‘whatever it takes’-speech that famously calmed the 
markets: “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the 
euro. And believe me, it will be enough”132. Both the OMT and the QE are highly 
controversial because the ECB arguably did not act within its mandate but went well 
beyond it in an attempt to safeguard the EU and the Eurozone as a whole (or so it seemed 
until the ECJ’s decision in Gauweiler133). The authority of these kinds of acts are wielded 
with reference to the need to safeguard the political community as whole134. The authority 
relied on tends to be derived from the very source of the law in popular will. Perhaps this 
is why the ECB in recent years has started to appeal directly to ‘the people of Europe’ in 
speeches and in its online self-descriptions135.  
This form of emergency authority is one of the most profound manifestations of 
raison d’état and it resembles more the emergency politics of a state than a federation. Or 
rather, the emergency rule of the ECB is undertaken as if the EU was a unitary state and 
the Member States were mere regions. In a speech by a Member of the Executive Board 
of the ECB, Benoît Cœuré, the emerging ‘statist nature’ of the Eurozone as a 
governmental unit was openly stated in the following way: “the notion that the euro is a 
currency without a state is in my view misguided. The euro is a currency with a state—
but it’s a state whose branches of government are not yet clearly defined”136. In this regard, 
the crisis government of the ECB resembles constitutionally (but not economically) that 
of President Roosevelt during the Great Depression. It is an arrogation of power in the 
                                                          
132 Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank at the Global Investment 
Conference in London 26 July 2012, available via:  
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html [last accessed 9 January 2018]. 
133 Case C-62/14 - Gauweiler and Others [2015]. 
134 In more material terms, however, the unconventional monetary policies of the ECB have, of course, 
benefitted some classes, groups, and states more than others. According to Blyth, the ‘rescue’ has in that 
sense been thought within a regime of ‘deflation, high profitability, and inequality’, and for that reason 
Blyth maintains that it has been ineffective, M Blyth, “Policies to Overcome Stagnation: The Crisis, and 
the Possible Futures, of All Things Euro” (2016) European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: 
Intervention 13(2). 
135 H Lokdam, “Is the European Central Bank Becoming a Central Bank for the People of Europe?” 
(Verfassungsblog, 24 April 2016). 
136 Speech by Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB: “Restoring Trust in Economic 
and Monetary Union” at the Forum Eco Libération ESCP (Paris, 1 December 2012). Available via: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp121201.en.html [last accessed 10 January 
2018]. 
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name of salus populi that pushes the federal union in the direction of a state by introducing 
a strong element of raison d’état.  
This is arguably more difficult to do in the EU than in the United States because 
of the ‘technical’ understanding of the mandates given to the governmental institutions 
of the EU (Chapter 3). In contrast to the US Presidency, the Commission and the ECB 
are not invested with a strong political mandate. The Commission and the ECB are 
primarily technical institutions; at least in relation to the Member States. Originally the US 
presidency was of course not meant to be the plebiscitarian office it is today137 (Chapter 
3). Nevertheless, despite still not being elected directly by the people of the United States 
but by the electoral committee, the US Presidency has through the leadership of 
Presidents such as Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson and Roosevelt unquestionably come to be 
invested with the authority of the nation.  
The ECB is a non-representative and non-elected technocratic institution and it 
can therefore—at best—rely on an indirect representation of the people(s) of Europe. 
Besides, even if the ECB could do that and thereby to some extent strengthen its crisis 
authority, this would simultaneously threaten the foundation of its main technical 
authority that presupposes political independence. As a technical institution, the ECB has 
all the powers necessary to execute its constitutional mandate, but it has no authority to 
give itself a new mandate. For that reason, it is difficult for the ECB to rely on the deeply 
political logic of constitutional dictatorship. In some of its rhetoric, the main aim of the 
ECB’s emergency measures is therefore down-graded to a mere ‘precondition’138 for the 
ECB to fulfil the legal mandate it has been given by Treaties and by “the people in its 
jurisdiction”—the people(s) of Europe—namely, securing price stability139. And it is on that 
ground that the ECJ defended the legality of the OMT programme in Gauweiler140. 
Nevertheless, while it in logical terms is correct that the continuous existence of the euro 
and a unitary monetary policy is a precondition for price stability in the Eurozone141, it is 
                                                          
137 Ackerman, We the People I, 67ff. 
138 The ECB thus argued that it was not capable of exercising its duties set out in the Treaties due to a 
disruption of the ‘monetary policy transmission mechanism’ because ‘unjustified fears of investors’ of a 
reversibility of the euro led to ‘unjustified interest spreads’. The purpose of the OMT, the ECB argued, 
was to ‘neutralise’ these unjustified spreads. See BVerfG – 2 BvR 2728/13a – OMT Reference [2014], §7. 
139 See, e.g., Cœuré: “Restoring Trust in Economic and Monetary Union”. 
140 C-62/14 - Gauweiler and Others [2015], §50. 
141 The ECJ had to construct its version of this argument in a more convoluted manner because it in 
Pringle had defined the aim of safeguarding the Eurozone as ‘economic policy’ belonging to the reserved 
competence of the Member States (C-370/12 - Pringle, §56). To justify the OMT programme, the ECJ 
argued that the OMT programme was within the scope of the ECB’s competence of ‘monetary policy’ 
because the programme aimed to rectify the ‘disrupted monetary policy transmission mechanism’ (C-
62/14 - Gauweiler §50). However, following the ECB, this ‘disruption’ was caused “by the demand for 
excessive risk premia for the bonds issued by certain Member States, such premia being intended to guard 
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less plausible that the right to act as constitutional guardian of the Eurozone is part of the 
‘technical mandate’ of price stability. During the crisis, the ECB has acted as a ‘reluctant 
sovereign’ for the Eurozone and granted itself new powers—as governmental institutions 
often do in times of crisis142. Nonetheless, it is still much more difficult for the ECB or 
the Commission to speak in the name of the people(s) of Europe to justify extra-legal 
constitutional defence than it is for the President of the United States143.  
 
III: THE CONTESTATION OF EU EMERGENCY RULE 
A: Authority and Austerity 
If the EU earlier could maintain a strong degree of constitutional tolerance by 
allowing the Member States to control politically sensitive issues, this is no longer the case 
after the Eurozone crisis. During the crisis, the EU has significantly extended the scope 
of its powers and its capacity to intervene in the ‘internal affairs’ of its Member States. 
The Troika has intervened in most if not all core ‘politically sensitive’ Member State 
competences: taxation, healthcare, education, pensions, labour law, unemployment 
benefits and military spending.  The demand for fiscal consolidation attached to the 
bailout programmes has led to de facto micro-management of deficit Member States and 
to significant cuts to the public sector, pensions and social benefits, and to a large degree 
dismantled collective bargaining.  
The austerity measures imposed have led to drastic changes in the political and 
social fabric of the bailout Member States: record high long-term unemployment, 
homelessness, poverty, labour exploitation hereunder child labour and human trafficking 
and restricted access to basic needs such a clean and affordable water144. The effects of 
austerity have not been spread evenly within the bailout states but have disproportionately 
been borne by the low-income families who depend more on public services and spend a 
higher proportion of their income on basic services and food145. The effects of austerity 
have furthermore disproportionately hit the marginalised and disadvantaged groups of 
                                                          
against the risk of a break-up of the euro area” (Gauweiler §72). Thus the ECB had to save the euro (i.e., to 
“dispel unjustified fears about the break-up of the euro area”, Gauweiler §76) in order to correct the 
disrupted ‘monetary policy transmission mechanism’ so it, in turn, could provide the constitutional 
mandate of price stability. Where there’s a will there’s a way. 
142 Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, 7. 
143 ibid 219. 
144 “Safeguarding Human Rights in Times of Economic Crisis” (2013) Issue Paper from Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 15-20. 
145 ibid 16. 
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society, importantly ethnic minorities, women and the young146. The austerity 
programmes have had significant consequences not only for social rights and workers’ 
rights, but also political rights and civil rights. The emergency government of the 
Eurozone crisis has bypassed the ordinary channels of government and has thereby 
enforced executive decisions without the usual scrutiny at the Member State level147. With 
regard to civil rights, the large-scale protests against austerity in Greece, Portugal and 
Spain have been repressed violently leading to concerns about the excessive use of force 
against demonstrators and infringements of the right to freedom of assembly and 
expression148. The austerity measures have furthermore led to a diminished access to 
justice, e.g., by cutting legal aid and increasing court fees149.  
Whereas the theory of federal emergency politics can explain how authority can 
be wielded in a crisis, it cannot explain why the emergency government of the Eurozone 
came in the form of austerity and not more expansionist policies. Unless austerity is 
understood as the exclusive or preeminent identity of the constitution of the EU, there is 
no legal reason to prioritise fiscal consolidation over, e.g., the protection of social rights and 
full employment also protected by the EU constitution150. It is, however, outside the scope 
of this thesis to answer the question of why the emergency government of the Eurozone 
crisis came to favour fiscal consolidation and not more expansionist policies like the New 
Deal. The aim of this chapter is to understand in what ways the federation as a political 
form allows for the generation of governmental authority in times of crisis and how that 
applies to the EU. Importantly, we have seen how central features of the new apparatus 
created to govern the Eurozone crisis adheres to federal emergency politics. The increased 
                                                          
146  ibid 7, 22-5; C Kilpatrick, “Are the Bailouts Immune to EU Social Challenge Because They Are Not 
EU Law”, 393-4; A Nolan, “Welfare Rights in the Eurozone: Ireland” in Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the 
Eurozone, 39-40; LD Sánchez “Deconstitutionalisation of Social Rights and the Quest for Efficiency”, 117 
in Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone.  
147 “Safeguarding Human Rights in Times of Economic Crisis”, 16. 
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149 ibid. 
150 From a legal perspective, it is not clear why fiscal consolidation should be given priority over the 
protection of the constitutional values of the Union set out in Article 2: “respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of 
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use of executive powers to govern the crisis relies on typical channels of authority of the 
federation in crisis, e.g., the federal intervention and the federal execution.  
As we saw earlier in the chapter, federal emergency politics, however, is inherently 
contested. Following the ‘doctrine of Calhoun’, it is the Member States who are the 
rightful guardians of both their own constitutions and the boundary of federal law. 
Similarly, the emergency government of the Eurozone crisis has led to a wave of 
contestations and resistance of the authority of EU institutions and the new ‘Eurocrisis 
law’. These new manifestations of opposition have taken many different forms: an 
avalanche of court cases, formation of new social movements and the rise of parties 
whose core political programme includes the abolition of the euro or a significant reform 
of the EU. Compared to earlier EU history, the magnitude of this wave of contestation is 
unprecedented. That being said, in comparison to notably the early history of the United 
States, the actual resistance has been surprisingly modest. No Member State has yet 
nullified/voided any of the Euro crisis measures. The instances of direct contestation of 
EU emergency authority are relatively few and none of them have succeeded in their aim. 
In the following, I will look into some of the more significant manifestations of resistance 
to the emergency government of the Eurozone crisis and discuss some of the reasons 
why most contestations have been unsuccessful.  
 
B: Judicial Contestation of Emergency Rule 
European courts—the ECJ and Member State courts acting in their dual capacity 
as national courts and European courts—have been an important site for the 
constitutional contestation of the emergency government of the Eurozone crisis. 
European courts are the main legal route available through which the constitutionality of 
‘Eurocrisis law’ can be contested. Throughout the history of European integration, the 
authority of the EU has, as we have seen, not been significantly contested by its Member 
States when compared to, e.g., the early history of the United States. However, the 
contestation of EU authority that has taken place has to a large degree been manifest in 
the ‘judicial dialogues,’ famous amongst EU law scholars, between Member State courts 
and the ECJ.  
On a fundamental level, these debates are about the question of ultimate authority, 
or Kompetenz-Kompetenz, claimed both by the ECJ and the Member State 
Supreme/Constitutional courts (Chapter 1). On the one hand, the ECJ has, with reference 
to the authority granted to it in the Treaties, asserted its right to decide on the validity of 
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EU law and the legality of all acts of the EU institutions.  On the other hand, referring to 
the principles of conferral, Member State courts have claimed ultimate jurisdiction over 
the question of the constitutionality of EU law stating that only they can determine 
whether the EU acts ultra vires. These positions highlight different aspects of the nature 
of the foundation of the EU: whereas the Member State courts ultimately will understand 
the foundations as treaty/contract, the ECJ will ultimately insists on it as constitution. From 
the perspective of the theory of the federation, there is nothing new in the overall issue 
of these debates. They mirror similar debates in the German Federation and the United 
States—e.g., the debate between Webster and Calhoun151. On a fundamental level, they 
reflect the heterarchical relationship between the dual political existences of the federation 
as a political form.  
Nonetheless, the concrete issues contested are always unique to an actual 
federation. One of the most important ‘judicial dialogues’ in the EU has to do with the 
protection of fundamental rights that make up the core of ‘value order’ constitutionalism 
to which a majority of the EU Member States belong (Chapter 4). Following EU law 
doctrine, EU law takes primacy over Member State law152, even Member State 
constitutional law including constitutionally protected fundamental rights153. Several 
Member State courts, however, have contested the ECJ’s claim of the unequivocal 
primacy or supremacy of EU law over Member State law with reference to concerns 
relating to fundamental rights protected by Member State constitutions154. They have 
therefore insisted on their right to submit EU law to constitutional review and ultimately 
to void EU law in case it breaches the core fundamental rights that lie at the heart of many 
of the constitutions of the Member States. The ECJ has not accepted the Member State 
courts’ right to void EU law on this basis. However, the ECJ has pledged itself to review 
EU law on the basis of analogous rights at the EU level155.  
As has been discussed extensively in this thesis, the EU has by most of its Member 
States—at least to some extent—been understood as an integral part of the realisation 
and consolidation of their own constitutional orders centred on fundamental rights and 
                                                          
151 Forsyth, Union of States, 119-32. 
152 C-6/64 - Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964]. 
153 C 11/70 - Internationale Handelsgesellschaft/Solange I [1970]. 
154 And later also the protection of democratic legitimacy (BverfG, Maastricht Decision – Brunner v European 
Union [1994] and BverfG - BvE 2/08 Lisbon Ruling [2009]) and Member State constitutional identity 
(BverfG - BvE 2/08 Lisbon Ruling [2009]; BverfG - BvR 2735/14 - EAW order [2015]). For the 
contestation of EU authority with reference to fundamental rights, see the Solange cases of the German 
Constitutional Court (BVerfG, IHT v Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel [1974] and Wunsche 
Handelsgesellschaft [1987]). 
155 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft/Solange I [1970]. 
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the notion of human dignity (Chapters 3-4). It is therefore in no way surprising that the 
protection of fundamental rights—part of the core or identity of most of the constitutions 
of the EU Member States—has been one of the important reasons for the delineation of 
EU authority by Member State courts. Following the theory of the federation, the EU 
Member States, after all, come together in a union to preserve their constitutional orders; 
not to destroy them.  
Due to the prominent position of not only political and civil rights but also social 
rights in both the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) and in the constitutional 
orders of many bailout Member States156, there is a clear possibility of judicial contestation 
of bailout conditionality with reference to fundamental rights breaches. And many cases 
have come in front of the Member State courts. However, despite the strong probability 
that the bailout conditionality actually breaches both the EUCFR and the social rights 
protected in many of the bailout Member States, surprisingly little contestation of EU 
authority has resulted from the Eurocrisis social rights jurisprudence. Despite the 
magnitude of cases lodged in front of Member State courts contesting the 
constitutionality of austerity measures, these cases have not led to any manifest 
contestation of the supremacy of EU law or the EU’s authority to exercise emergency 
rule.  
The primary reason for that is that the Member State courts and the European 
institutions tacitly have agreed to treat bailout conditionality as a matter internal to the Member 
States despite the obvious contradictory evidence. This has been done by treating the 
austerity conditionality attached to the bailouts as non-EU law157. For example, in a series 
of cases, the supreme administrative court in Greece, the Council of State, argued that 
pension cuts in Greece implemented as part of the bailout conditionality did not breach 
Article 34 EUCFR on social security and social assistance. The reason given by the 
Council of State was that the Charter only was binding on Member States when they are 
implementing EU law158 and not in cases of purely domestic measures to which it 
                                                          
156 See the Portuguese Constitution (1976), especially Chapter III: ‘Workers rights, freedoms and 
guarantees’ and Title III: ‘Economic, social and cultural rights and duties’; the Greek Constitution (1975) 
Articles 22-23, providing for especially workers’ rights; the Romanian Constitution (1991) Articles 32, 34, 
40, 43, 47 and 135; and the Constitution of Latvia (1922) Articles 106-122.  See also Kilpatrick, 
“Constitutions, Social Rights and Sovereign Debt States in Europe”, 5-6. 
157 Kilpatrick, “Constitutions, Social Rights and Sovereign Debt States in Europe”, 22-3; E 
Psychogiopoulou, “Welfare Rights in Crisis in Greece: The Role of Fundamental Rights Challenges” in 
Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental Rights’ Challenges, 9-11. 
158 Article 51(1) EUCFR: “The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only 
when they are implementing Union law”. 
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considered the cases at hand to belong159. This formalistic argument allows the domestic 
courts not to make a preliminary reference to the ECJ on the question of whether the 
bailout conditionality is in conformity with the EUCFR. A few cases on the compatibility 
of bailout conditionality with the EUCFR, however, have been referred to the ECJ by the 
Portuguese courts160 and Romanian courts161. However, in most of these cases, the ECJ 
maintained that it was without jurisdiction because it was not clear that the domestic laws 
in question in fact were implementing EU law162. In Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte and 
Others, the ECJ, e.g., argued that it clearly lacked jurisdiction because the request from the 
Portuguese Labour Court “did not contain any concrete element allowing to infer that 
the Portuguese law was aiming to apply Union law”163. Similar lines of arguments have 
been put forward by other EU institutions, including the Commission164 and the ECB, 
leading the European Parliament’s Economic Committee to state that it “Regrets that the 
programmes are not bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, the European Convention of Human Rights and the European Social Charter, 
due to the fact that they are not based on Union primary law”165.  
As shown by Claire Kilpatrick, the argument that the bailouts are not subject to 
legal challenges within the EU legal order because they are not EU law, is not convincing. 
Since the crisis, seven EU Member States have been bailed out. Three of these Member 
States—Hungary, Latvia and Romania—are non-Eurozone states and they have all, from 
a formal perspective, received assistance purely under EU law166. The loan conditions for 
Portugal and Ireland relied partly on the EFSM (established under EU law167) and the 
EFSF (the precursor to the ESM established under international law)168. These bailouts 
                                                          
159 Psychogiopoulou, “Welfare Rights in Crisis in Greece”, 11. 
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de Seguros e Afins v Fidelidade Mundial, 17-22 and in the two Romanian cases C-434/11 - Corpul Naţional al 
Poliţiştilor [2011], 16 and C-134/12 - Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor, 13 [2012].  
164 In the case of Greece “whenever the Troika’s requirements were contested, the creditors have claimed 
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“Greece: Constitutional Deconstruction and the Loss of National Sovereignty”, 185). 
165 EP Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs: “Report on the enquiry on the role and operations 
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166 Kilpatrick, “Are the Bailouts Immune…?”, 400. 
167 The EFSM was created on the basis of Article 122(2) TFEU (Kilpatrick, “The Challenges of Liminal 
Legality”, 2). 
168 Kilpatrick, “Are the Bailouts Immune…?”, 400; Kilpatrick, “The Challenges of Liminal Legality”, 2. 
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are therefore of a ‘mixed legal parentage’169 and as a consequence, even from a formal 
perspective, at least in part subject to EU law. Only the bailouts of Greece and Cyprus 
are based entirely on non-EU law sources: bilateral agreements, the ESFS and the ESM170. 
However, there is still in these cases an indirect link to EU law, e.g. the Two Pack 
regulation171. As we saw earlier in this chapter, the Two Pack allows the Commission and 
the ECB to subject a deficit Member State that receives external financial assistance under, 
e.g., the ESM, to ‘enhanced surveillance’ (linking the federal intervention with the federal 
execution). In this way, these bailouts are brought within the scope of EU law.  
Politically, the argument that the bailouts are not subject to any legal challenge 
within the EU legal order on grounds that they are not EU law is untenable. As was shown 
earlier in this chapter, ‘Eurocrisis law’ makes up a comprehensive emergency apparatus 
operating with the force of law. The different legal instruments of this apparatus are in 
their concrete use completely interrelated and it is therefore impossible to separate the 
obligations incurred by a bailout Member State under EU law and non-EU law172. 
Furthermore, the bailout conditionality is enforced by EU institutions, which also brings 
them within the scope of EU law173. As we have seen, the Commission and the ECB 
become de facto ‘protectors’ of deficit Member States and they can simultaneously enforce 
Eurocrisis law against and on behalf of a Member State with reference to a variety of legal 
sources; some of them EU law (e.g. the Two Pack) and some of them formally 
international law (e.g. the ESM).  
The use of international law is therefore better understood as the creation of 
something vaguely similar in structure to Ernst Frankel’s theory of the ‘dual state’174: it is 
a system that allows for the ‘norm’ (e.g. the ‘no bailout clause’ and the EUCFR) and the 
‘exception’ (e.g. bailouts and austerity) to coexist within the European constitutional 
order. Whereas the ‘normative state’ of EU law has never been (fully) suspended, by its 
side now exists the ‘prerogative state’ of ‘Eurocrisis law’ enabling the exercise of 
governmental power through measures and decrees not subject to the constraints of the 
                                                          
169 Kilpatrick, “Are the Bailouts Immune…?”, 400. 
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Treaties. The severing of the ties between the bailout conditionality and EU law—as 
fanciful as it may be—has worked as a legal justification for the immunisation of 
emergency politics from fundamental rights challenges under EU law. It has allowed the 
European institutions not to take unwanted responsibility for the political and social 
implication of the emergency government of the Eurozone crisis and to maintain the 
logic, however illusory, of market discipline. 
Whereas this might be understandable on grounds of political expediency, it is a 
little surprising, at least prima facie, that the tale of the non-EU law nature of the bailouts 
has generally also been adopted by Member State courts. Having disregarded the 
possibility that the Member State courts have accepted the tale because of a limited grasp 
of EU law175, Kilpatrick presents another theory for why that has been the case, namely 
“that not addressing the EU nature of the bailouts may have served to avoid what 
promised to be an open and highly charged conflict with the EU institutions and legal 
order, including the Court of Justice, by taking validity challenges against the EU 
components of bailout programmes”176. By not recognising bailout conditionality as EU 
law, the Member State courts have avoided an “undesired EU judicialization of the conflict 
between bailout sources and national constitutional rights”177. 
Kilpatrick’s theory is highly interesting from the perspective of the theory of 
emergency government in the federation. It suggests that in the case of the EU, the 
Member State courts have gone out of their way to avoid challenging federal authority 
despite having ample opportunity and perhaps even a legal obligation to do so. The 
Member State courts have, following this narrative, done what they could to avoid adding 
a constitutional crisis to the economic crisis. Instead of triggering something akin to the 
US nullification crisis of the 1830s, Member State courts have, by treating bailout 
conditionality as the implementation of international agreements or purely domestic 
measures, tacitly agreed to treat the question of the constitutionality of bailout conditionality as an 
‘internal affair’.  
In reviewing the constitutionality of the bailouts against domestic constitutional 
standards, most Member State courts have upheld their constitutionality. Politically, this 
is understandable since declaring the bailout conditionality unconstitutional presumably 
would endanger the continuation of the bailout, hence creating the possibility of a 
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sovereign default. The emergency situation alone makes it difficult for Member State 
courts to strike down bailout conditionality. This has, e.g., come out in Greek cases in 
which the Council of State has upheld the constitutionality of austerity measures with 
reference to the doctrine of the state of exception178. Similarly, the Irish Supreme Court 
has justified domestic austerity measures with reference to the constitutional mandate of 
the government to protect the national interest in the face of the most serious economic 
crisis in Ireland’s history179. Only the Portuguese Constitutional Court180 has in any 
significant way contested the constitutionality of national bailout measures leading to 
Portugal’s relatively swift exit from its bailout programme181. Nonethesless, even in this 
case, the Portuguese Court has not contested the necessity of austerity per se but only 
questioned the fairness of the distribution of the burden182. Notwithstanding the 
significant critique raised by EU institutions in response to the Portuguese cases, it would 
have been a qualitatively different problem if the Portuguese Constitutional Court had 
treated the bailout conditionality as EU law and thereby openly contested EU authority183. 
The only Member State court that has openly contested EU authority and insisted 
on its ultimate right to void EU law as a means to constitutional defence is the German 
Constitutional Court. In the now famous OMT reference, the German Constitutional 
Court argued that, subject to the ECJ’s interpretation, it considered the OMT programme 
to be ultra vires on the grounds that it was in breach of EU law184 and on the grounds that 
it transgressed the ‘principle of democracy’ central to the constitutional identity of 
Germany185. The reason given by the German Constitutional Court for the possible 
violation of the German constitutional identity is that the OMT might constrain the 
budgetary autonomy of the German Bundestag so that it no longer would remain “master 
of its decisions” and no longer could “exercise its budgetary autonomy under its own 
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responsibility”186. Following the reasoning of the German Constitutional Court, the 
possible implication of the OMT programme is not only an infringement of the 
constitutional and political autonomy of Germany but a deprivation of the right of the 
German people to elect their own representatives in a meaningful manner.  
It is in itself ironic that the only direct judicial challenge to the EU institutions’ 
exercise of emergency powers has been sustained by one of the Member States least 
affected by the Eurozone crisis or the emergency rule. Whatever the merits of the 
argument of the German Constitutional Court, it is certainly the case that the parliaments 
of bailout Member States to a much more significant degree have been deprived of the 
possibility of ‘exercising their budgetary autonomy under their own responsibility’. For 
the Member States governed by emergency measures, the only real question for the 
electorate has been who should implement the predefined austerity measures187. That is, 
if the people even were granted the right to elect their own representatives188. The 
implications of the emergency government of the Eurozone for the political autonomy 
and democratic rights of ‘deficit’ Member States and their peoples are much graver than 
they are for Germany. Whereas the constitutional courts of the bailout Member States—
where almost all political autonomy was lost de facto if not de jure—have gone out of their 
way to avoid a constitutional conflict, only the constitutional court of a relatively 
unscathed surplus Member State has dared to contest the authority of the emergency 
powers employed by EU institutions.  
There are several possible explanations for why this is the case. First, in contrast 
to the bailout Member States it was possible for the German Constitutional Court to 
contest EU emergency authority because the political consequence of voiding the OMT 
programme would (arguably) not be a collapse of the German economy. Second, the 
German economy is by far the most important of the Eurozone and without Germany’s 
support the OMT programme would not be credible. The purpose of the OMT reference 
can therefore be interpreted as a way for Germany to exercise its influence over the shape 
of the OMT programme189. When compared with the situations of the Constitutional and 
Supreme Courts of the bailout Member States, an open contestation of EU emergency 
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politics must have appeared to be a politically viable possibility for the German 
Constitutional Court. 
Be that as it may, the German Constitutional Court did not nullify the OMT 
programme. Following its own doctrine of only conducting ultra vires review of EU law 
on the basis of the principle of ‘openness towards European law’190, instead of simply 
voiding the OMT programme and forbidding the German Bundesbank to partake, the 
German Constitutional Court sent a reference to the ECJ in January 2014 on the question 
of whether the OMT programme is compatible with EU law191 if it complied with the 
‘implementation framework’ set out by the German Constitutional Court192. In contrast 
to the Portuguese and Romanian cases discussed above, the ECJ did not declare itself to 
be without jurisdiction on grounds of ‘liminal legality’ (non-law/non-EU law) of the crisis 
measures193. The reason for that might be that the German Court insisted on the 
possibility of taking preventive measures independently of an ECJ preliminary ruling194—
measures that might have endangered the OMT programme and hence the stability of the 
Eurozone. As is well known, the ECJ ruled that the OMT programme was not in breach 
of EU law and that it did not have to live up to the ‘implementation framework’ set out 
by the German Constitutional Court.  
In the end, the most direct judicial contestation of EU governmental authority 
came to nothing. The German Court accepted the interpretation of the ECJ and accepted 
the legality of the OMT. A nullification crisis was avoided; at least for a while. On 18 July 
2017 the German Constitutional Court announced195 that it was referring a very similar 
case to the ECJ on the constitutionality of the ECB’s deployment of QE during the 
crisis196. This case is still pending. 
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C: Political Contestation of the Emergency Government of the Eurozone 
By treating bailout conditionality as an ‘internal affair’, almost all judicial 
contestation of ‘Eurocrisis law’ and the EU’s emergency government of the Eurozone 
crisis has been neutralised or defeated; particularly the contestation of austerity in bailout 
Member States. However, the contestation of the emergency government of the 
Eurozone crisis has not merely been dealt with by courts. Austerity and emergency politics 
have been widely contested in bailout Member States in a more ‘political manner’—by 
political parties, labour unions and social movements197.  
This broader contestation of the emergency government of the Eurozone crisis 
has been united around being not merely against austerity but also the ‘post-political’ and 
‘post-democratic’198 manner through which the Eurozone crisis has been governed in the 
eyes of the protestors199. These movements have primarily understood the crisis as a 
political crisis manifest in the erosion of the legitimacy of the current democratic regimes200. 
The outrage has been directed against both domestic elites201 and European elites202. The 
central demand of these protestors has been to reclaim ‘real democracy’203 primarily on a 
domestic level204 but also to some extent on a European scale205. The language of these 
                                                          
197 CF Fominaya, “European Anti-Austerity and Pro-Democracy Protests in the Wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis” (2017) Social Movement Studies 16(1), 3-4. 
198 C Crouch, Post-Democracy, (Cambridge, Polity, 2004); P Mair, “Ruling the Void? The Hollowing of 
Western Democracy” (2006) New Left Review 42.   
199 Fominaya, “European Anti-Austerity and Pro-Democracy Protests in the Wake of the Global Financial 
Crisis, 3-4; Scholl and Freyberg-Inan, “Imagining Another Europe: Building a pan-European Counter-
Hegemonic Bloc around an Anti-Austerity Master Frame”, 118; D Della Porta, “Mobilizing Against the 
Crisis, Mobilizing for ‘Another Democracy’: Comparing Two Global Waves of Protest” (2012) Interface 4, 
276. 
200 Kaldor and Selchow, “The ‘Bubbling Up’ of Subterranean Politics in Europe”, 84-9; G Hayes, 
“Regimes of Austerity” (2017) Social Movement Studies 16(1), 28. 
201 M Kaldor and S Selchow, “The ‘Bubbling Up’ of Subterranean Politics in Europe” (2013) Journal of 
Civil Society (9)1, 85. Both Podemos and the 5 Star Movement famously describe the national elites as ‘La 
Casta’. 
202 E.g. the umbrella organisation Blockupy that directly contests EU imposed austerity and emergency 
politics in Frankfurt in front of the ECB and the Alter-Summit. See C Scholl and A Freyberg-Inan, 
“Imagining Another Europe: Building a Pan-European Counter-Hegemonic Bloc Around an Anti-
Austerity Master Frame” (2018) Comparative European Politics 16. Alter Summit’s 2013 Manifesto: “Roll 
Back Austerity and Claim Real Democracy!” is available via: 
http://www.altersummit.eu/manifeste/article/the-manifesto [last accessed 1 February 2018]. 
203 The slogan of the massive 2011 demonstrations (estimated participation 0.8-1.5 million) was ‘Real 
Democracy Now’ (¡Democracia Real YA!) (Kaldor and Selchow, “The ‘Bubbling Up’ of Subterranean 
Politics in Europe”, 79). 
204 Fominaya, “European Anti-Austerity and Pro-Democracy Protests in the Wake of the Global Financial 
Crisis”, 4-7; Kaldor and Selchow, “The ‘Bubbling Up’ of Subterranean Politics in Europe”, 91-5. 
205 See DiEM25’s Manifesto: “The European Union will be democratised. Or it will disintegrate!”, 
available via: https://diem25.org/manifesto-long/ [last accessed 1 February 2018]. See also, Scholl and 
Freyberg-Inan, “Imagining Another Europe: Building a Pan-European Counter-Hegemonic Bloc Around 
an Anti-Austerity Master Frame”, 118-9. 
214 
 
movements is that of ‘popular sovereignty’ and the primacy of the political (democracy) 
over the economy demanding an end to ‘necessity’ politics206. 
To begin with, the anti-austerity movement was primarily manifest in the 
‘indignant citizens’-movements such as the Spanish Indignados and the Greek 
Aganaktismenoi who adopted classical anarchist anti-statist tactics manifest in ‘horizontal’ 
politics of occupations and public assemblies207. However, over time the anti-austerity 
movements have mostly broken with the anti-statist view and adopted a more ‘radical 
reformist strategy’ combining electoral politics and referenda aiming for a radical political 
change through the ballot box and the recuperation of state democracy208. The European 
pro-democracy and anti-austerity movements have had a significant electoral impact in 
several Member States. The rise of Podemos, e.g., brought an end to the traditional two-
party system in Spain when the not even two years old party won 21% of the vote in the 
2015 election making it Spain’s third largest party209. 
Notwithstanding the significance of Podemos, the only case of a Member State 
government formed by an anti-austerity party during the Eurozone crisis is the Greek 
Syriza-led government elected in January 2015. Like Podemos, the election of Syriza into 
government also defied the bipartisan system that had prevailed since the transition to 
democracy210. The Syriza-led government—and the ‘Greek crisis’ of 2015—is of special 
interest because it is the only Member State government that has attempted to openly and 
directly contest the authority of the emergency government of the Eurozone on ‘state 
rights’ grounds. Whereas the OMT case is the main manifestation of a Member State 
court claiming the right to judicial constitutional defence against the EU, the Syriza-led 
government is the main case of a Member State government contesting the EU’s authority 
to govern the Eurozone crisis. The Syriza government is the only government that has 
put the bailout conditionality to a vote with the so-called referendum on austerity on 5 
July 2015.  
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In a structurally similar manner to the OMT case, the Syriza government 
contested EU authority with a reference to a breach of EU constitutional values and with 
reference to Greece as a sovereign democratic state. In the address Prime Minister Tsipras 
gave when the referendum was called211, he argued that the deal presented by the 
Eurogroup took “aim at Greek democracy and the Greek people” and contravened 
“Europe’s founding principles and values. The values of our common European project”.  
The proposals, Tsipras continued, “directly violate the European social acquis” and 
proved that the Eurogroup was not interested “in reaching a viable and beneficial 
agreement for all parties, but rather the humiliation of the Greek people”. The referendum 
was thus called on the basis of both Greece’s “Constitution and Europe’s democratic 
tradition” and clearly aimed at guarding both.  
In response to Tsipras’ announcement that a referendum on the bailout 
conditions was to be held, the EU employed a different kind of force to Greece than 
earlier economic sanctions. In what was widely interpreted as a deeply political move, the 
ECB decided to freeze the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to the Greek banking 
sector on which it had relied since 11 February 2015 resulting in the necessity for the 
Greek government to declare a bank holiday and impose capital controls212. Had the ECB 
cut ELA off completely, it would have had enormous political consequences for Greece, 
effectively forcing it to adopt its own currency and exit the Eurozone213. The ECB acting 
as a ‘federal executioner’ was in the Greek crisis in the possession of means that could 
have destroyed the Greek economy and forced it out of the Eurozone. 
As is well-known, the Greek people voted an overwhelming ‘no’ to the bailout 
conditionality—something that was not well received by European leaders and 
institutions. However, in a desperate attempt to keep Greece in the Eurozone, the Syriza 
government acceded to the Eurogroup’s demands. On 13 July 2015, Syriza committed to 
the harshest austerity programme Greece has yet seen214. That the bailout measures were 
even harsher than the one decided on in the referendum has widely been interpreted as a 
‘punishment’ of Greece for daring to contest the emergency government of the Eurozone 
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crisis or an attempt to force Greece to leave the Eurozone, something the Syriza 
government was not willing to let happen.  
In this way, the only direct political contestation of the emergency government of 
the Eurozone crisis was defeated. The Greek crisis is perhaps the clearest example of the 
contradictory nature of constitutional defence and the fragility of authority in a federal 
union of states. In the contest between the political rights of the European institutions 
and Greece to act as the guardian of the constitution, Greece lost and submitted itself to 
the will of the Eurogroup. That being said, this vindication of the rights of European 
institutions is incredibly fragile. To protect the stability and order of the Eurozone as a 
whole, the EU’s emergency government crushed the most important foundational 
principle that the EU as a federal union of states was meant to protect, namely, the 
political and constitutional autonomy of its Member States. This is a threat to the 
federation as a political form and hence the current constitutional character of the 
European Union.  
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Conclusion 
 
What type of political association is the European Union (EU)? From the start of 
the European integration process, this question has puzzled scholars. Because of its lack 
of a monopoly of violence and its limited competences, the EU is clearly not a new state. 
However, the EU has gone far beyond what was considered normal for organisations of 
international law by making laws that are directly binding in and on its Member States. 
Many different answers have been offered, but in the absence of an agreed response, most 
scholars implicitly avoid the issue by suggesting that the EU is ‘sui generis’. Because the 
EU cannot be made sense of either on the basis of international law or on the basis of 
domestic public law they conclude that it must be something new and unique. This thesis 
demonstrates that this conclusion is mistaken. It argues that, in contrast to what is 
commonly maintained, the EU is not an association ‘sui generis’. Rather, the EU belongs 
to the political form of the federation: a discrete form of political association on a par with, 
though differentiated from, the two other forms of political modernity, namely, the state 
and the empire. The federation is a political union of states founded on a federal treaty-constitution that 
does not absorb the Member States into a new federal state. The argument of the thesis is advanced 
in five chapters that each deal with a central aspect of the constitutional theory of the 
federation of importance to a proper understanding of the contemporary constitutional 
order of the EU.   
Chapter 1 identifies a number reasons why the federal constitutional nature of the 
EU has generally been overlooked in the literature. The main reason is that the EU is 
arguably the only federal union of states since the late-1800s. Constitutional debates about 
the federation have consequently been overlooked by constitutional theorists and the 
theory of the federation forgotten. The federation as a concept has consequentially taken 
on the new meaning of the federal state. For that reason, the federation as a political form 
is mistakenly identified with the federal state and the EU is wrongly conceptualised as an 
‘incomplete federation’. In contrast with the federal state, the federation is a political 
union of states that on a free basis constitute a common governmental structure and a 
common public law but who do not unite to the degree that they form a fully-fledged 
federal state.  
The conflation of the federation and the federal state leads to a misunderstanding 
of the constitutional foundations of the federation. In contrast to a state constitution, the 
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federation is not based on a unilateral act of a sovereign people but on a federal contract 
of international law (Bundesvertrag) between its Member States. This treaty is however also 
a constitution because it leads to a political change in the constitution of its Members by 
giving them the new status of ‘member-statehood’. The federal treaty is therefore always 
a constitutional treaty (Verfassungsvertrag) independently of whether it is conceptualised as 
such. The federal contract is legally a treaty but politically a constitution. Chapter 1 is thus 
concerned with the enigma of the EU, namely that it does not conform to the model of 
the state, and demonstrates how the theory of the federation can solve the mystery of its 
legal and political form. Central to this chapter is the problem of sovereignty, that is, the 
question of where and whether sovereignty persists in a federation and specifically in the 
EU.  
In contrast to the state, the federation and the structure of federal public law is 
not organised around the concept of sovereignty. As Chapter 1 demonstrates, there is an 
antinomy between the concept of sovereignty and the concept of the federation. This 
antinomy means that scholars tend either to trivialise or to deny the existence of 
sovereignty or the federation. 
On the one hand, the ‘sovereignty hunters’ will attempt to make sense of the 
concrete political associations of the federation by reducing them to the political form of 
the state: either one federal state (Bundesstaat) or the composite states (Staatenbund). The 
problem with this approach is that in protecting the distinction between public law and 
international law on which the theory of the state relies, it fails to account for the actual 
workings of concrete political associations. In order to preserve the public law theory of 
the state, two categories—Staatenbund (‘state federation’ or ‘confederation’) and Bundesstaat 
(‘federal state’)—are created that cannot account for the public law of any historical 
examples of federations. The desire for jurisprudential clarity leads to the 
oversimplification of reality. This way of thinking dominates the debate on the 
constitutional nature of the EU and contributes to the widespread idea of its uniqueness.  
On the other hand, there are scholars whose point of departure is the intricate 
governmental structure that regulates the exercise of public power in the EU, both by the 
Union institutions and its Member States, and on that basis conclude either that 
sovereignty is a myth conjured up in the minds of 19th century lawyers or that sovereignty 
can be reduced to the question of a bundle of competences. The latter approach has 
resulted in the widespread use of meaningless categories (from the perspective of public 
law at least) such as ‘monetary sovereignty’ and ‘fiscal sovereignty’. For these scholars, 
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sovereignty no longer has the connotation of legal and political autonomy and final 
authority (postestas) but is reduced to the question of capacity (potentia). In order to account 
for the day-to-day workings of the EU, these scholars have to deny or trivialise the 
concept of sovereignty.  
In Chapter 1, I argue that rather than taking either of these two unsatisfactory 
routes, the federation—and the EU as a manifestation thereof—must be recognized as a 
discrete political form. It is so precisely because it cannot be made sense of on the basis 
of sovereignty. In order to comprehend the federation and the EU we have to 
conceptualise political and public law orders without sovereignty. This means that we 
should treat the federation—and thus the EU—as an autonomous political form 
characterised by its own vices and virtues without having recourse to the prejudices of 
the state.  
The argument presented in Chapter 2 is that as actual constitutional projects, 
federations come into existence because of the impotence and instabilities of the state as 
a political form. States decide to come together in a federation because they for one reason 
or another are incapable of maintaining their own political autonomy and existence. The 
medieval and early modern federations were constituted between smaller states and free 
cities who pledged themselves to common and mutual defence against a strong 
(neighbouring) empire.  They were, therefore, ‘defence federations’. Common military 
defence, however, is not the only reason why states decide to come together and 
constitute among themselves a federal union. To ensure their autonomy and survival, 
states in the post-industrial revolution era needed to be able to govern and control larger 
internal markets. By allowing for the creation and expansion of internal markets, the 
federation evolved historically as an alternative to the empire. Whereas the empire relies 
on imperial conquest for the expansion of internal markets, the federation creates an 
internal market by mutual promises and pledges and not by acts of domination. The 
federations that emerged after the industrial revolution, which had the creation and 
government of internal markets and general mutual welfare as a central if not primary aim, 
are referred to as ‘economic federations’ or ‘welfare federations’.  
Chapter 2 demonstrates that the project of European integration—as with other 
federations—originates in the impotence of the state as a form of political association in 
the post-WWII era. The project of European Union was born out of a shared 
understanding among the political elites of the Original Six—with De Gaulle as the main 
if not only exception—that the nation-state was an unviable political form associated with 
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past atrocities. After WWII, projects of both ‘defence federation’ and ‘welfare federation’ 
were launched.  However, only the latter was successfully established with the Treaty of 
Rome. The European Economic Community (EEC) therefore emerged as an ‘economic 
federation’ with defence later added as a subordinate aim. That the EEC/EU emerged as 
an almost ‘pure’ economic federation is arguably an important reason why the federal 
constitutional nature of the EU has generally not been recognised in the literature. Despite 
the importance of the government of welfare for most if not all historical federations, the 
aim of welfare is not widely discussed in the literature and the ‘economic federation’ is 
not commonly recognised as a federal ‘sub-species’.  
Having discussed the origins of federal unions of states—the question of why 
states decide to come together in a federation—Chapter 3 lays out the main principles of 
federal public law: a public law structure which is not organised around the concept of 
sovereignty. In contrast to the state, the federation has a dual governmental structure 
consisting of the institutional structures of both the Union and the Member States and a 
dual source of authority: the political existence of the Union and the political existence of 
the Member States. Because of this duality, the federation is fundamentally different from 
the unity of the state that always has the relationship between people and government as 
the foundation for its authority. Moreover, the dual structure of the federation—the 
Union and the Member States—are not parallel and fully autonomous orders vis-à-vis 
one another. Rather, they are characterised by a ‘mixed autonomy’ or the principles of 
independence and interdependence. When states come together in a federation, they give 
birth to a new legal and political order (the Union) that is independent from the 
constitutional orders of the Member States. This new legal and political order, however, 
encompasses the Member States in their entirety at the same time as it is a component of 
the constitutional orders of the Member States. The constitutional order of the federation 
is in this way a new legal order and yet it is internal to its Member States. The internal 
multiplicity of the federation characterised by mixed autonomy relativizes the relationship 
between people and government that lies at the heart of the theory of the state.  
Neither of the component parts of the public law structure of the federation—
the institutional structures of the Union and the Member States—exercises public power 
in accordance with the classical theory of the state. Union institutions are, importantly, 
not indicative of a new ‘super state’. In contrast to a state, the federation is constituted to 
achieve the enumerated aims that the Member States came together to secure. The powers 
of the Union institutions are therefore always limited to these pre-given constitutional 
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aims. Union authority is in this way governed by the principles of teleology and 
specialisation. Becoming a Member State at the same time signals a radical transformation 
of the constitution of the Member State. The constitutional change of the Member States 
is not necessarily manifest in the change of any constitutional laws but rather in the 
transformation of the Member States’ constitutions in the positive sense, that is, the 
fundamental characteristics of how they govern themselves as political associations. The 
federal contract between the Member States on which all federations rely is a status 
contract that, like marriage, transforms the contracting parties by giving them a 
fundamental new status. Member-statehood, Chapter 3 explains, is in this way a distinct 
form of statehood which means that the Member States cannot be conceptualised as 
‘states’ in the classical sense of the term. In the context of the EU, member-statehood 
signals a form of ‘constrained statehood’ that should be understood as an integral part of 
the post-WWII constitutional imaginary of ‘constrained democracy’. The Original Six—
Germany, France, Italy and the BENELUX countries—albeit to different degrees, all 
wanted to protect themselves from ‘political extremism,’ manifest in fascism and 
communism, and European integration became an important means of doing that. For 
these states, with France being somewhat of an outlier, the constitutional internalisation 
of the demands pertaining to member-statehood have therefore been relatively 
unproblematic.  
A similar argument of a relatively unproblematic constitutional internalisation, 
Chapter 4 argues, can be advanced with regard to the acceding Member States of the 
1980s ‘Mediterranean Enlargements’ (Spain, Portugal and Greece). For these states, 
member-statehood in the EU has been understood as an important protection against the 
return of fascism and authoritarianism. It provides a means of realising their own 
understanding of constitutional autonomy by protecting themselves, via membership of 
the EU, from the return of dictatorship. This, however, is less the case for the other states 
that have acceded to the EU.  
For the ‘continuous democracies’ of the UK and Scandinavia (Denmark and 
Sweden), the constitutional imaginary of constrained democracy was never entrenched to 
any significant extent. In contrast to the Member States of both the ‘Original Six’ and the 
‘Mediterranean Enlargements’, the ‘continuous democracies’ neither experienced the 
collapse of their constitutional orders in the interwar period nor saw WWII as the 
watershed in their constitutional imaginaries. Not being marked by a fear of the political 
power of the people, these Member States retained parliamentary sovereignty as the 
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bedrock of their constitutional orders. The internalisation of the demands of member-
statehood—e.g. judicial review of parliamentary legislation to ensure conformity with EU 
law—has therefore to a large extent taken place via a process of ‘modernisation by stealth’ 
that brought these three states broadly, but not unproblematically, in line with the original 
Member States of the EU. The ‘continuous democracies’, however, are not the only states 
for whom the demands of member-statehood have not been easily internalised.  
Despite constituting themselves as liberal democracies after the collapse of 
Communism, the post-Communist countries are also not heavily influenced by the 
doctrine of ‘constrained democracy’. The watershed for the constitutional imaginary of 
these Member States is not the internal collapse of their constitutional orders but the 
collapse of the foreign empire or super power—the Soviet Union—they were ruled by 
for decades. These states are therefore not afraid of their own people and accordingly 
gave themselves constitutions with a strong accentuation of sovereignty. The 
constitutional internalisation of the demands of EU member-statehood for these states 
was achieved through the employment of the idea of ‘the return to Europe’ as a political 
myth allowing the Member States to give themselves radically new constitutional orders 
in the guise of a return to their—albeit fictitious—proud pre-imperial, democratic past. 
For these states, European integration was therefore perceived simultaneously as a path 
and a threat to democracy.  
The Member States of the EU are therefore characterised by a strong degree of 
heterogeneity with regard to their constitutional imaginaries. This constitutional 
heterogeneity, Chapter 4 argues, constitutes a significant challenge for the EU because all 
federations rely on the capacity to strike a balance between the two contradictory aims 
and forces that characterise all federations. These contradictory aims and forces are born 
of the curious sentiment that lies at the origin of all federal unions of states. On the one 
hand, the states come together in a federation because they want to preserve their own 
political identity and autonomy, that is, they want to remain who they are. On the other 
hand, the states come together in a federation as a rejection of the status quo and out of 
a desire to form an ‘ever-closer union’ with their future fellow Member States. This double 
telos of the federation is inherently contradictory and pulls the federation in two opposing 
directions. The federation is simultaneously directed towards unity and diversity, 
transformation and conservation, the past and the future. The only way the federation 
can balance these contradictory forces is via the persistence of a fundamental political 
homogeneity among Member States. This homogeneity among Member States is relative 
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to their own legal and political orders and self-perception. Member States need to be 
homogenous with regard to what they perceive to be politically salient and for that reason 
the content of the political homogeneity of the Member States will be specific to any given 
federation. In case of the EU, the political homogeneity professed by the constitutional 
order of the Union are the principles of ‘value order constitutionalism’ and ‘constrained 
democracy’.  
The EU, Chapter 4 explains, has attempted to govern this homogeneity by 
allowing Member States to accede to the Union only via the application of accession 
criteria. The purpose of accession criteria for a federation is to mould the acceding states 
in accordance with the self-image and aspirations—in short, the ideology—of the Union. 
It is a highly intrusive set of legal and political mechanisms that for the duration of the 
accession period reduce the acceding state to a dependency of the Union. Nevertheless, 
this process is not imperial because it is instigated on the basis of the free decision of the 
acceding state to join the Union with the promise of political equality after accession. 
Despite the intrusiveness of the EU accession process—especially in the case of the post-
Communist countries—it is not clear that the constitutional order of the Union and the 
values it claims to promote have been genuinely internalised by the post-Communist 
Member States.  
Another way in which the EU attempts to govern the constitutional homogeneity 
of its Member States is by a mechanism of constitutional defence manifest in the Article 
7 TEU procedure. This procedure is meant to allow the Union to sanction Member States 
in which there is a fundamental threat to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU on which 
the Union professes to be founded. The limited scope of Article 7 TEU together with the 
high political threshold for its triggering, however, means that it does not provide the EU 
with any legal possibility of intervening in the internal constitutional affairs of its Member 
States in order to prevent the rise of authoritarian constitutionalism. The EU therefore 
has limited legal possibilities of intervening in the internal constitutional affairs of Poland 
and Hungary, who in recent years have undergone radical constitutional changes that 
arguably put them at odds with the constitutional identity of the EU as defined by Article 
2 TEU. But Chapter 4 concludes that the legal limitations cannot be the only reason for 
the lack of exercise of constitutional defence by the Union. In response to the Eurozone 
crisis, the EU has to a large degree made use of extra-legal instruments of emergency 
politics that have allowed the Union—de facto if not de jure—to take more or less full 
control over the state apparatus of deficit Member States. 
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The problem of constitutional defence in the EU is further discussed in the 
context of the emergency government of the Eurozone in Chapter 5. The argument 
presented is that the government of the Eurozone crisis is a manifestation of a particular 
kind of emergency rule, namely, federal emergency politics or federal constitutional 
defence. In contrast to the state, the federation is a double political existence. This means 
that emergency politics can be exercised by a variety of different constitutional actors 
(Union institutional actors and Member State institutional actors) and wielded on behalf 
of different units (the Union and the Member States). In this way, the federation allows 
for a contest not merely between different institutions but also between the Union and 
its Member States. Although this contest can lead to intense conflicts, more often than 
not, federal emergency politics is a collaboration of the executive branches of government 
at the Union and at the Member State level. Federal emergency politics is a form of ‘mixed 
emergency rule’ that generally involves multiple actors and multiple claims to emergency 
authority. Chapter 5 lays out two theories of federal emergency politics and demonstrates 
in what ways they apply to the government of the Eurozone crisis. On the one hand, the 
doctrine of ‘federal intervention’ and ‘federal execution’ based on the theory and 
constitutional praxis of the 1815 German Federation and, on the other hand, the ‘doctrine 
of states rights’ that was influential in the early history of the United States and was most 
clearly expressed in the writings of John Calhoun.  
In the German Federation, the ‘federal execution’ authorised the use of executive 
measures against a non-complying Member State whereas the ‘federal intervention’ 
authorised the use of executive measures on behalf of a Member State incapable of dealing 
with an internal crisis. These constitutional mechanisms provided the possibility for 
German princes to rely not merely on their own military capacity but also on that of all 
their fellow Member States to repress the national liberal uprisings characterising the 
history of the German Federation. In this way, they were an important means for the 
preservation of the monarchical constitutional order in the German Federation and the 
power and authority of the German princes. Nevertheless, these mechanisms 
simultaneously gave the Union the authority to take over the complete control of the 
administration of the crisis-ridden Member State in question and de facto if not de jure 
reduce it to a mere administrative dependency. Chapter 5 demonstrates that central legal 
instruments employed by the EU in order to govern the Eurozone crisis conform to the 
theory of ‘federal intervention’ and ‘federal execution’. The emergency politics of the 
Eurozone crisis, and federal emergency politics in general, has provided the possibility for 
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Member State elites to rely not only on their own executive apparatus but also that of the 
Union at large to enforce unpopular decisions that would have been difficult to get 
through parliaments in ordinary times.  As was the case in the German Federation, the 
employment of this kind of emergency politics tends to have the consequence that the 
Member State in which federal emergency politics is employed—de facto if not de jure—is 
reduced to an administrative dependency. ‘Federal execution’ and ‘federal intervention’ as 
instruments of federal constitutional defence are in this way a consolidation of the 
Union’s right to act as the guardian of the constitution and a significant source of federal 
power against the Member States. 
The doctrine of states’ rights, in contrast, maintains that it is not the Union but 
the Member States that have the ultimate right to act as the guardian of the constitution. 
If a Member State deems that there has been a breach of the constitution, it has a right to 
nullify federal law on its territory and ultimately to secede as a means of constitutional 
defence. This doctrine provides strong ammunition for Member States who wish to 
contest federal authority. It was widely used in the early history of the United States, e.g., 
in the ‘nullification crisis’ of the 1830s and later in the Civil War. Despite the ample 
opportunity of EU Member State courts to rely on a version of this doctrine in order to 
contest the legality of ‘Eurocrisis law’—either with reference to a breach of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights or a breach of the fundamental rights protected by the 
constitutions of many ‘deficit Member States’—very little judicial contestation has taken 
place. Instead, both the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and Member State courts have 
to a large degree attempted to avoid an open constitutional conflict in the EU and the 
question of who ultimately decides, that is, the question of sovereignty. This has been 
done, for instance, by treating bailout conditionality as non-EU law. The only direct 
judicial challenge to the EU’s authority to govern the Eurozone crisis was launched by 
the German Constitutional Court in the OMT reference but in the end that Court—
arguably the most powerful and vocal court of the Union—submitted itself to will of the 
ECJ instead of triggering a potential constitutional crisis in the EU.  
Whereas the judicial contestation of the emergency government is conspicuous 
mostly for its absence, there has been a much broader political contestation of EU 
authority by social movements and political parties in the deficit Member States. 
Nevertheless, only one of these political parties, Syriza, having won the 2015 election in 
Greece, mounted a challenge to the emergency government of the Eurozone crisis with 
reference both to the constitutional and political values of Greece and the EU at large. At 
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the height of the Greek crisis, the Greek people voted overwhelmingly ‘no’ to the bailout 
conditionality in the so-called referendum on austerity. However, before a direct conflict 
between the will of the Greek people and EU could manifest itself, Syriza conceded to 
the Eurogroup’s demands and committed to the harshest austerity programme Greece 
has yet seen. The question of ultimate authority was in the end not raised, preserving, at 
least formally, the idea of the federal balance between the Union and the Member States 
on which the EU, as all federal unions of states, relies.  
In material terms, however, it is clear that the political autonomy of especially the 
deficit Member States has been eroded. Even in cases where emergency politics can be 
successfully employed without major contestation of Union authority on the part of the 
Member States, it nevertheless presents a threat to the survival of the federation as a 
political form. Emergency politics introduces a strong element of raison d’état that de facto 
if not de jure erodes the political autonomy of its Member States by reducing them to 
administrative dependencies. This is a highly centralising force that brings the EU closer 
to statehood—something that is recognised by officials of the European Central Bank.  
Finally, if previous federal unions of states can be invoked for the purpose of 
seeking to understand the future of the EU, the transformation from federal union to 
federal state—if it comes about—will not be a peaceful and unproblematic process. 
Switzerland, Germany and the United States all had civil wars on the path to statehood. 
Civil war is never a promising route to ensure the survival of a political association. And 
in the case of the EU it would be a direct betrayal of its founding promise of ‘peace and 
prosperity’ in Europe. 
 
  
227 
 
Bibliography 
 
Ackerman, Bruce: We the People I: Foundations (Cambridge MA, The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1991). 
- We the People II: Transformations (Cambridge MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1998).  
- “Three Path to Constitutionalism—and the Crisis of the European Union” (2015) 
B.J.Pol.S. 45.  
Adams, Maurice; Federico Fabbrini and Pierre Larouche (eds.): The Constitutionalization of 
European Budgetary Constraints (London, Hart Publishing, 2014). 
Adenauer, Konrad: World Indivisible—With Liberty and Justice for All (London, George Allen 
& Unwin Ltd, 1956). 
Agamben, Giorgio: Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 1998).  
- The State of Exception (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
Albi, Anneli: EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge, 
CUP, 2005). 
Algotsson, Karl-Goran: “From Majoritarian Democracy to Vertical Separation of Powers: 
Sweden and the European Union” (2001) Scandinavian Political Studies 29. 
Alter Summit: “Roll Back Austerity and Claim Real Democracy!”, 2013 Manifesto. 
Available via: http://www.altersummit.eu/manifeste/article/the-manifesto [last 
accessed 1 February 2018]. 
Arato, Andrew: Post Sovereign Constitution Making: Learning and Legitimacy (Oxford, OUP, 
2016). 
Arendt, Hannah: On Revolution (New York, Penguin, 2006 [1977]). 
- The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, A Harvest Book • Harcourt Inc, 1994 
[1951]). 
- “The Seeds of a Fascist International” in Hannah Arendt: Essays in Understanding: 
1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism (New York, Schocken Books, 1994). 
- “Approaches to the German Problem” (1945) Partisan Review 12(1). As reprinted in 
Hannah Arendt: Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and 
Totalitarianism (New York, Schocken Books, 1994). 
Avbelj, Matej: “Theory of European Union” (2011) European Law Review 36(6). 
- “The Legal Viability of European Integration in the Absence of Constitutional 
Hierarchy” in Daniel Augenstein (ed.): ‘Integration through Law’ Revisited: The Making 
of the European Polity (London, Routledge, 2012). 
Azzellini, Dario and Marina Sitrin: They Can’t Represent Us! Reinventing Democracy from Greece 
to Occupy (London, Verso, 2014).  
Azoulai, Loïc: “Introduction: The Question of Competence” in Loïc Azoulai (ed.): The 
Question of Competence in the European Union (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2014). 
Balibar, Étienne: “The Rise and Fall of the European Union: Temporalities and 
Teleologies” (2014) Constellations 21(2). 
Bánkuti, Miklós; Gábor Halmai and Kim Lane Scheppele: “Disabling the Constitution” 
(2012) Journal of Democracy 23(3). 
Beaud, Olivier: Théorie de la Fédération (Paris, PUF, 2007). 
- “Histoire. Fédération, l’Europe écrit ton nom” (Libération, 25 January 1995).  
- “Federation and Empire: About a Conceptual Distinction of Political Forms” in 
Amnon Lev (ed.): The Federal Idea: Public Law Between Governance and Political Life 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2016). 
228 
 
- “The Question of Nationality within a Federation: A Neglected Issue in Nationality 
Law” in Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil (eds.): Dual Nationality, Social Rights and 
Federal Citizenship in the U.S. and Europe: The Reinvention of Citizenship (New York and 
Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2002).  
- “La Répartition des Compétences dans une Fédération. Essai de Reformulation du 
Problème” (2016) Foundations of Public Law 16. 
Bednar, Jenna: The Robust Federation: Principles of Design (Cambridge, CUP, 2009). 
Benz, Arthur and Jörg Broschek: Federal Dynamics Continuity, Change, and the Varieties of 
Federalism (Oxford, OUP, 2013). 
Bertrand, Raymond: “The European Common Market Proposal” (1956) International 
Organisation 10(4).  
Beukers, Thomas; Bruno de Witte and Claire Kilpatrick (eds.): Constitutional Change through 
Euro-Crisis Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2017). 
Bickerton, Christopher J.: European Integration: From Nation-States to Member States (Oxford, 
OUP, 2012). 
Birmingham, Peg: Hannah Arendt and Human Rights, (Bloomington Indianapolis, Indiana 
University Press, 2006). 
Blank, Kermit; Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks: “European Integration from the 1980s: 
State-Centric v Multi-Level Governance” (1996) JCMS 34(341). 
Blyth, Mark: “Policies to Overcome Stagnation: The Crisis, and the Possible Futures, of 
All Things Euro” (2016) European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention 
13(2). 
Bogdandy, Armin von and Pál Sonnevend (eds.): Constitutional Crisis in the European 
Constitutional Area: Theory, Law and Politics in Hungary and Romania (London, Hart, 
2015). 
Bogdandy, Armin von; Matthias Kottmann, Carlino Antpöhler, Johanna Dickschen, 
Simon Hentrei and Maja Smrkolj: “Reverse Solange — Protecting the Essence of 
Fundamental Rights against EU Member States” (2012) CMLR 49. 
Bourgeois, Jacques HJ.: “The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and 
Challenges” in Joseph H.H. Weiler (ed.): The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards 
a Common Law of International Trade? (Oxford, OUP, 2001). 
Bowie, Robert R.: “The Process of Federating Europe” in Arthur W. MacMahon (ed.): 
Federalism: Mature and Emergent (New York, Doubleday & Company, 1955). 
Bowie, Robert R. (ed.): Studies in Federalism (Boston and Toronto, Little, Brown and 
Company, 1954). 
Bozo, Frédéric: Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance 
(Lanham MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001). 
Burgess, Michael: In Search of the Federal Spirit: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives in 
Comparative Federalism (Oxford, OUP, 2012).  
Burgess, Michael and Alain-G. Gagnon (eds.): Comparative Federalism and Federation (New 
York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). 
Burley, Anne-Marie and Walter Mattli: “Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of 
Legal Integration” (1993) International Organization 47. 
Calhoun, John C.: A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States in Richard 
K. Crallé (ed.): The Works of Calhoun Volume 1: A Disquisition on Government and A 
Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States (Charleston SC, Stem 
Power-Press of Walker and James, 1851). 
- “Speech in Support of the Veto Power”, delivered in the United States Senate on 
28 February 1842. 
- “Speech in Reply to Mr. Webster, on the Resolution Respecting the Rights of the 
States”, delivered in the United States Senate 26 February 1833. As printed in 
229 
 
Richard K. Crallé (ed.): The Works of John C. Calhoun Volume II: Speeches of John C. 
Calhoun delivered in the House of Representatives and in the Senate of the United States (New 
York, D. Appleton and Company, 1881). 
- “Calhoun’s South Carolina Exposition of 1828”. As reprinted in special issue by 
A.B. Hart and E. Channing (eds.): Constitutional Doctrines of Webster, Hayne and Calhoun 
in American History Leaflets: Colonial and Constitutional (Harvard University, 1896). 
Cappelletti, Mauro; Monica Seccombe and Joseph H.H. Weiler (eds.): Integration Through 
Law: Methods, Tools and Institutions: Vol. 1 Book 1: A Political, Legal and Economic 
Overview (Berlin, De Gruyter, 1986). 
Chalmers, Damian: “European Restatements of Sovereignty” (2013) LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers 10.  
Chiti, Edoardo and Pedro G. Teixeira: “The Constitutional Implications of the European 
Responses to the Financial and Public Debt Crisis” (2013) CMLR 50. 
Cisotta, Roberto and Daniele Gallo: “The Portuguese Constitutional Court Case Law and 
Austerity Measures: A Reappraisal” in Bruno de Witte and Claire Kilpatrick (eds.): 
Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental Rights’ Challenges 
(2014) EUI Working Paper Series LAW 5. 
Closa, Carlos: “Reinforcing EU Monitoring of the Rule of Law: Normative Arguments, 
Institutional Proposals and the Procedural Limitations” in Carlos Closa and Dimitry 
Kochenow (eds.): Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge, 
CUP, 2016). 
Closa, Carlos; Dimitry Kochenov and Joseph H.H. Weiler, “Reinforcing Rule of Law 
Oversight in the European Union” (2014) EUI Working Paper—RSCAS 25. 
Cœuré, Benoît (Member of the Executive Board of the ECB): “Restoring Trust in 
Economic and Monetary Union”, speech held at the Forum Eco Libération ESCP 
(Paris, 1 December 2012). Available via: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp121201.en.html [last 
accessed 10 January 2018]. 
Cohen, Jean: Globalization and Sovereignty—Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy and 
Constitutionalism (Cambridge, CUP, 2012). 
Common Market Law Review, editorial comment: “Editorial Comments, Hungary’s New 
Constitutional Order and ‘European Unity’” (2012) CMLR 49(3). 
Coutts, Stephen: “Ireland: Traditional Procedures” in Thomas Beukers, Bruno de Witte, 
and Claire Kilpatrick (eds.): Constitutional Change through Euro-Crisis Law (Cambridge, 
CUP, 2017). 
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights: “Safeguarding Human Rights in 
Times of Economic Crisis” (2013) Issue Paper from Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights. 
Craig, Paul: “Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and 
Constitutional Implications” in Maurice Adams, Federico Fabbrini and Pierre 
Larouche (eds.): The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (London, 
Hart Publishing, 2014). 
Cremona, Marise: “External Relations and External Competence of the European Union” 
in Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (eds.): The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, OUP, 
2011).  
- “Introduction” in Marise Cremona (ed.): The Enlargements of the European Union 
(Oxford, OUP, 2003). 
Crouch, Colin: Post-Democracy (Cambridge, Polity, 2004).  
Curtin, Deidre: “The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces” 
(1993) CMLR 30. 
230 
 
Davidson, Helen and Graeme Wearden: “Greek Debt Crisis: Deal Reached after 
Marathon All-Night Summit - As It Happened” (The Guardian, 13 July 2015).  
Davis, Solomon R.: The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time in Quest of Meaning 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 1978). 
Dawson, Mark and Floris de Witte: “Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-
Crisis” (2013) MLR 76(5). 
Dehousse, Renaud and Joseph H.H. Weiler: “EPC and the Single Act: From Soft Law to 
Hard Law?” in Martin Holland (ed.): The Future of European Political Cooperation (New 
York, Palgrave, 1991). 
Della Porta, Donnatella: “Mobilizing Against the Crisis, Mobilizing for ‘Another 
Democracy’: Comparing Two Global Waves of Protest” (2012) Interface 4.  
De Brito, Miguel-Noguieira: “Putting Social Rights in Brackets? The Portuguese 
Experience with Welfare Challenges in Times of Crisis” in Bruno de Witte and 
Claire Kilpatrick (eds.): Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of 
Fundamental Rights’ Challenges (2014) EUI Working Paper Series LAW 5. 
De Grauwe, Paul: “The European Central Bank as Lender of Last Resort in the 
Government Bond Markets” (2013) CESifo Economic Studies 59(3). 
- “The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone” (2011) CEPS Working Document 346. 
De Rynck, Stefan: “Banking on a Union: The Politics of Changing Eurozone Banking 
Supervision” (2016) Journal of European Public Policy 23(1). 
De Tocqueville, Alexis: Democracy in America (London, Penguin, 2003). 
De Witte, Bruno: “The EU as an International Legal Experiment” in Joseph H.H. Weiler 
and Gráinne de Búrca and Joseph H.H. Weiler (eds.): The Worlds of European 
Constitutionalism (Cambridge, CUP, 2012). 
De Witte, Bruno and Claire Kilpatrick (eds.): Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: 
The Role of Fundamental Rights’ Challenges (2014) EUI Working Paper Series LAW 5. 
De Witte, Floris: “Emancipation Through Law?” in Loïc Azoulai, Ségolène Barbou des 
Places and Etienne Pataut (eds.): Ideas of the Person and Personhood in EU Law (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2016). 
Diamond, Martin: “The Ends of Federalism” (1973) Publius: The Journal of Federalism 3(2). 
Dicey, Albert V.:  Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Indiapolis, Liberty 
Fund, 1982). 
DiEM25: “The European Union will be Democratised. Or it will Disintegrate!”, the 
Manifessto of DiEM25. Available via: https://diem25.org/manifesto-long/ [last 
accessed 1 February 2018].  
Draghi, Mario (President of the European Central Bank): “Verbatim of the Remarks made 
by Mario Draghi”, speech held at the Global Investment Conference in London on 
26 July 2012. Available via:  
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html [last 
accessed 9 January 2018]. 
Eeckhout, Piet: EU External Relations Law (Oxford Scholarship Online 2011). 
Elazar, Daniel J.: Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1987).  
Emerson, Rupert: State and Sovereignty in Modern Germany (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1928). 
The European Commission: “General Considerations on the Problems of Enlargement”, 
Communication sent by the Commission to the Council on 20 April 1978, 
COM(78)120. 
-  “A New EU Mechanism to Strengthen the Rule of Law”, Communication from 
the European Commission to the Council and the Parliament on 10 March 2014, 
COM(2014) 158 final/2. 
231 
 
-  “Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025”, White Paper on the Future of 
Europe (1 March 2017). 
-  “Rule of Law: European Commission Acts to Defend Judicial Independence in 
Poland”, press release (Brussels, 20 December 2017). 
-  “Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European 
Union regarding the Rule of Law in Poland—A Proposal for a Council Decision on 
the Determination of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by the Republic of Poland of 
the Rule of Law” (Brussels, 20 December 2017).  
European Parliament: “Referendums on EU Issues” (May 2016): 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/582041/EPRS_B
RI(2016)582041_EN.pdf  [last accessed on 5 March 2018]. 
European Parliament—Political Committee: Towards Political Union: A Selection of Documents 
with a Foreword by Mr. Emilio Battista (General Directorate of Parliamentary 
Documentation and Information, January 1964). 
Fabbrinni, Federico: “States’ Equality v States’ Power: The Euro-crisis, Inter-state 
Relations and the Paradox of Domination” (2015) Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies 17. 
Fabbrinni, Sergio: Which European Union: Europe after the Eurozone Crisis (Cambridge, CUP, 
2015). 
- “Intergovernmentalism in the European Union. A Comparative Federalism 
Perspective” (2017) Journal of European Public Policy 24(4). 
Faro, Antonio L.: “Fundamental Rights Challenges to Italian Labour Law Developments 
in the Time of Economic Crisis: An Overview” in Bruno de Witte and Claire 
Kilpatrick (eds.): Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental 
Rights’ Challenges (2014) EUI Working Paper Series LAW 5. 
Fenna, Alan and Hueglin, Thomas O.: Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry (Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 2006). 
Ferejohn, John and Pasquale Pasquino: “The Law of the Exception: A Typology of 
Emergency Powers” (2004) I•CON 2(2). 
Filippov, Mikhail; Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova: Designing Federalism: A Theory 
of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions (Cambridge, CUP, 2004). 
Fischer, Thomas C.: “Federalism in the European Community and the United States: A 
Rose by Any Other Name…” (1994) Fordham Int’l LJ 17(389). 
Fischer, John: “Prerequisites of Balance” in Arthur W. MacMahon (ed.): Federalism: Mature 
and Emergent (New York, Doubleday & Company, 1955). 
Føllesdal, Andreas: “Rawls in the Nordic Countries” (2002) European Journal of Political 
Theory 183. 
Føllesdal, Andreas and Marlene Wind, “Nordic Reluctance towards Judicial Review under 
Siege” (2009) Nordisk Tidsskrift for Menneskerettigheter 27(131). 
Fominaya, Cristina F.: “European Anti-Austerity and Pro-Democracy Protests in the 
Wake of the Global Financial Crisis” (2017) Social Movement Studies 16(1). 
Forsyth, Murray: Union of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederations (New York, Leicester 
University Press, 1981). 
- Federalism and Nationalism (Leister and London, Leicester University Press, 1989). 
- “Towards a New Concept of Confederation” in The Modern Concept of Confederation 
(Santorini, Venice Commission, 22-25 September 1994). 
- “The Relevance of Classical Approaches” in Joachim Jens Hesse, Klaus Goetz and 
Wright Hesse (eds.): Federalizing Europe? The Costs, Benefits, and Preconditions of Federal 
Political Systems (Oxford, OUP, 1996). 
232 
 
Fossum, John Erik and Markus Jachtenfuchs: “Federal Challenges and Challenges to 
Federalism. Insights from the EU and Federal States” (2017) Journal of European 
Public Policy 24(4). 
Frankel, Ernst: The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (New York, OUP, 
1941). 
Freeman, Edward A.: Greater Greece and Greater Britain and George Washington the Expander 
of England—Two Lectures with and Appendix (London, MacMillan and co., 1886). 
Friedrich, Carl J.: Trends in Federalism in Theory and Practice (London, Pall Mall Press, 1968). 
- “Admission of New States, Territorial Adjustment, and Secession” in Carl J. 
Friedrich and Robert R. Bowie (eds.): Studies in Federalism (Boston and Toronto, 
Little, Brown and Company, 1954). 
- “Federal Constitutional Theory and Emergent Proposals” in Arthur W. MacMahon 
(ed.): Federalism: Mature and Emergent (New York, Doubleday & Company, 1955). 
Friedrich, Carl J. and Robert R. Bowie (eds.): Studies in Federalism (Boston and Toronto, 
Little, Brown and Company, 1954). 
Friedrich, Carl F. and Arthur E. Sutherland: “Defence of the Constitutional Order” in 
Carl J. Friedrich and Robert R. Bowie (eds.): Studies in Federalism (Boston and 
Toronto, Little, Brown and Company, 1954). 
Friel, Raymond J.: “Providing a Constitutional Framework for Withdrawing from the EU: 
The Article 59 of the Draft European Constitution” (2004) The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 53(2). 
Fung, Brian: “Britons are Frantically Googling What the EU is After Voting to Leave It” 
(The Washington Post, 24 June 2016). 
Fursdon, Edward: The European Defence Community: A History (London, Macmillan, 1980). 
- “The Role of the European Defence Community” in Francis H. Heller and John 
R. Gillingham (eds.): NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of 
Europe (London, MacMillan, 1992). 
Galligan, Brian: “Comparative Federalism” in Roderick A.W. Rhodes; Sarah A. Binder 
and Bert A. Rockman (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (Oxford, 
OUP, 2006). 
Gellner, Ernest: Nations and Nationalism (Oxford, OUP, 1983).  
Gerbaudo, Paolo: “The Indignant Citizen: Anti-Austerity Movements in Southern 
Europe and the Anti-Oligarchic Reclaiming of Citizenship” (2017) Social Movement 
Studies 16(1). 
Goldman, Lawrence (ed.): The Federalist Papers (Oxford, OUP, 2008). 
Goldoni, Marco and Michael A. Wilkinson, “The Material Constitution” (2016) LSE Legal 
Studies Working Paper 20, forthcoming in the Modern Law Review. 
Goldstein, Leslie: Constituting Federal Sovereignty: The European Union in Comparative Context 
(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
Griffiths, Richard: Europe’s First Constitution: The European Political Community, 1952-1954 
(Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2000). 
Griffith, Richard T. and Alan Milward: “The Beyen Plan and the European Political 
Community” in Werner Maihofer (ed.): Noi si mura: Selected Working Papers of the 
European University Institute (Florence, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 1986).  
Grimm, Dieter: “Treaty or Constitution? The Legal Basis of the European Union after 
Maastricht” in John Erik Fossum, Erik Oddvar Eriksen and Agustín José 
Menéndez (eds.): Developing a Constitution for Europe (London, Routledge, 2004). 
- “Was the German Empire a Sovereign State?” in Sven Oliver Müller and 
Cornelius Torp (eds.): Imperial Germany Revisited: Continuing Debates and New 
Perspectives (New York, Berghahn Books, 2011).  
233 
 
- “Sovereignty in the European Union” in Johan van der Walt and Jeffrey Ellsworth 
(ed.) Constitutional Sovereignty and Social Solidarity in Europe (Bloomsbury, Nomos, 
2015). 
Habermas, Jürgen: The Crisis of the European Union—A Response (Cambridge, Polity Press, 
2012). 
- “What Does Socialism Mean Today? The Rectifying Revolution and the Need for 
New Thinking on the Left” (1990) New Left Review I/183. 
- “Why Europe Needs a Constitution” (2001) 11 New Left Review, 21. 
Halberstam, Daniel: “Systems and Institutional Pluralism” in Matej Avbelj and Jan 
Komárek (eds.): Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2012). 
Hall, Peter A. and Daniel Soskice (eds.): Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage (Oxford, OUP, 2001). 
Halmai, Gabór: “Legally Sophisticated Authoritarians: the Hungarian Lex CEU” 
(Verfassungsblog, 31 March 2017). 
Haltern, Ulrich and Joseph H.H. Weiler: “Constitutional or International? The 
Foundation of the Community Legal Order and the Question of Judicial 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz” in Anne Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet, Joseph H.H. 
Weiler (eds.): The European Courts and National Courts—Doctrine and Jurisprudence 
(Oxford, Hardt Publishing, 1998). 
Harryvan, Anjo G. and Jan van der Harst (eds.): Documents on European Union (London, 
MacMillan Press, 1997). 
Heller, Francis H. and John R. Gillingham (eds.): NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic 
Alliance and the Integration of Europe (London, MacMillan, 1992). 
Henderson, William O.: The Zollverein (Cambridge, CUP, 1939). 
Hirschl, Ran: “The Nordic Counternarrative: Democracy, Human Development, and 
Judicial Review” (2011) I•CON 9(2).  
Hobsbawm, Eric: Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, 
CUP, 1990). 
Holcombe, Arthur N.: “The Coercion of States in a Federal System” in Arthur W. 
MacMahon (ed.): Federalism: Mature and Emergent (New York, Doubleday & 
Company, 1955). 
Honig, Bonnie: Emergency Politics Paradox, Law, Democracy (Princeton, PUP, 2011). 
Hooghe, Lisbeth and Garry Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: 
From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus” (2009) British Journal of 
Political Science 39(1). 
Lenaerts, Koen: “EMU and the European Union’s Constitutional Framework” (2014) 
ELR 39. 
Lijphart, Arend: Patterns of Democracy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999). 
Höpner, Martin and Armin Schäfer: “Integration among Unequals” (2012) MPifG Paper 
12(5). 
Huber, Ernst R.: Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789, Band I: Reform und Restauration 1789 
bis 1830 (Stuttgart, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1957). 
- Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789, Band II: Der Kampf um Einheit und Freiheit, 1830 
bis 1850 (Stuttgart, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1968). 
- “Bundesexekution und Bundesintervention: Ein Beitrag zur Frage des 
Verfassungsschutzes im Deutschen Bund” (1953) AöR 79(1). 
Hughes, Christopher: Confederacies: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered in the University of Leicester 
8 November 1962 (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1963). 
Irving, Ronald E.M.: “Italy’s Christian Democrats and European Integration” (1976) 
International Affairs 52(3). 
234 
 
Isiksel, Turkuler: Europe's Functional Constitution: A Theory of Constitutionalism Beyond the State 
(Oxford, OUP, 2016). 
Jachtenfuchs, Markus: “The Governance Approach to European Integration” (2001) 
Journal of Common Market Studies 39(2). 
Jennings, William I.: A Federation for Western Europe (Cambridge, CUP, 1940). 
Joerges, Christian: “The European Economic Constitution and its Transformation 
through the Financial Crisis” (2015) ZenTra Working Papers in Transnational Studies. 
Kaiser, Wolfram: Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union (Cambridge, CUP, 
2007). 
Kaldor, Mary and Sabine Selchow: “The ‘Bubbling Up’ of Subterranean Politics in 
Europe” (2013) Journal of Civil Society (9)1. 
Kalyvas, Andreas: Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and 
Hannah Arendt (Cambridge, CUP, 2008). 
Kant, Immanuel: “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” (1795) available in Hans S. 
Reiss (ed.): Kant: Political Writings translated by Hugh B. Nisbet (Cambridge, CUP, 
1991). 
Karamouzi, Eirini: “A Strategy for Greece: Democratization and European Integration” 
(2015) Cahiers de la Méditerranée 90. 
Kaupa, Clemens: The Pluralist Character of the European Economic Constitution (London, Hart 
2016). 
Kelemen, Daniel R.: The Rules of Federalism: Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU and 
Beyond (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2004).  
Kilpatrick, Claire: “Are the Bailouts Immune to EU Social Challenge Because They Are 
Not EU Law?” (2014) EuConst 10. 
- “Constitutions, Social Rights and Sovereign Debt States in Europe: a Challenging 
New Area of Constitutional Inquiry” (2015) EUI Working Papers Law 34. 
Kirk, Lisbeth; Andrew Rettman and Nikolaj Nielsen: “EU to Spend €1.5bn a Year on 
Joint Defence” (EUobserver, Brussels, 7 June 2017). 
Koch, Henning: “Dansk Forfatningsret i Transnational Belysning” [“Danish 
Constitutional Law in Transnational Light”] (1999) Juristen 6. 
Kochenow, Dimitry: EU Enlargement and the Failure of Constitutionality: Preaccession 
Conditionality in the Fields of Democracy and the Rule of Law (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer 
Law International, 2008). 
Kochenov, Dimitry and Laurent Pech: “Upholding the Rule of Law in the EU: On the 
Commission’s ‘Pre-Article 7 Procedure’ as a Timid Step in the Right Direction” 
(2015) EUI Working papers—RSCAS 24. 
Komárek, Jan: “Playing with Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court’s Ultra Vires 
Revolution” (Verfassungsblog, 22 February 2012). 
- “Waiting for the Existential Revolution in Europe” (2014) I•CON (12)1.  
Kössler, Karl and Francesco Palermo: Comparative Federalism Constitutional Arrangements and 
Case Law (London, Hart Publishing, 2017). 
Kumm, Mattias: “Rethinking Constitutional Authority: On the Structure and Limits of 
Constitutional Pluralism” in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarék (eds.): Constitutional 
Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (London, Hart Publishing, 2012). 
Kühnhard, Ludger (ed.): The Reunification of Europe: Anti-totalitarian Courage and Political 
Renewal (Brussels, EPP-ED Group, 2009). 
Lang, Reginald D.: “The Germanic Confederation of 1815 and a European Confederation 
Today” (1946) South Atlantic Quarterly 45. 
Laursen, Finn: “Federalism: From Classical Theory to Modern Day Practice in the EU 
and Other Polities” in Finn Laursen (ed.): The EU and Federalism: Polities and Policies 
Compared (Farnham, Ashgate 2011). 
235 
 
Loewenstein, Karl: “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I” (1937) American 
Political Science Review 31(3). 
Lokdam, Hjalte: “Is the European Central Bank Becoming a Central Bank for the People 
of Europe?” (Verfassungsblog, 24 April 2016). 
Loughlin, Martin: “Political Jurisprudence” (2016) Jus Politicum 16: “Martin Loughlin’s 
Foundations of Public Law. A Critical Review”. 
- “The British Constitution: Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents” 
(2018) LSE Legal Studies Working Paper 2. 
- “The Silences of Constitutions” (2018) I•CON 16 (forthcoming). 
Loughlin, Martin and Neil Walker (eds.): The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power 
and Constitutional Form (Oxford, OUP, 2008). 
MacCormick, Neil: Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and Nation in the European 
Commonwealth (Oxford, OUP, 1999). 
- “Beyond the Sovereign State” (1993) MLR 56. 
- “The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now” (1995) ELJ 1(3). 
Machiavelli, Niccolò: The Prince, translated by George Bull (London, Penguin Books, 
2003). 
Madsen, Mikael R.; Henrik Palmer Olsen and Urška Šadl: “Legal Disintegration? The 
Ruling of the Danish Supreme Court in AJOS” (Verfassungsblog, 30 January 2017). 
Maduro, Miguel Poiares: “Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism” in Matej Avbelj and 
Jan Komárek (eds.): Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2012). 
Mair, Peter: “Ruling the Void? The Hollowing of Western Democracy” (2006) New Left 
Review 42.   
Mandelbraum, Michael: “Introduction” in Michael Mandelbaum and Shafiqul Islam 
(eds.): Making Markets: Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet 
States (New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993). 
Martinico, Giuseppe: “EU Crisis and Constitutional Mutations: A Review Article” (2014) 
Revista de Estudios Politícos 165. 
Marketou, Afroditi: “Greece: Constitutional Deconstruction and the Loss of National 
Sovereignty” in Thomas Beukers, Bruno de Witte, and Claire Kilpatrick (eds.): 
Constitutional Change through Euro-Crisis Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2017). 
Menon, Anand and Martin A Schain (eds.): Comparative Federalism: The European Union and 
the United States in Comparative Perspective (Oxford, OUP, 2006). 
Merriam, Charles E.: “The Political Theory of Calhoun” (1902) American Journal of Sociology 
7(5). 
Milward, Alan S: The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London, Routledge, 1992). 
Möllers, Christoph: “’We are (Afraid of) the People’: Constituent Power in German 
Constitutionalism” Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds.): The Paradox of 
Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford, OUP, 2008). 
Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws edited by Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller and Harold 
S. Stone (Cambridge, CUP, 1989). 
Morrison, Samuel E.: History of the United States (London, Oxford University Press, 1927). 
Müller, Jan-Werner: Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe (New 
Haven CT and London, Yale University Press, 2011). 
- “Beyond Militant Democracy?” (2012) New Left Review 73. 
- “Safeguarding Democracy Inside the EU: Brussels and the Future of Liberal Order” 
(2013) Transatlantic Academy 3. 
- “Protecting the Rule of Law (and Democracy!) in the EU: The Idea of a 
Copenhagen Commission” in Carlos Closa and Dimitry Kochenow (eds.): 
Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge, CUP, 2016). 
236 
 
- “Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law Inside Member States”. 
Available via: https://www.princeton.edu/~jmueller/ELJ-
Democracy%20Protection-JWMueller-pdf.pdf [last accessed 2 November 2017].  
Nergelius, Joakim: “The Nordic Countries and Constitutional Theory of the 21st Century” 
in Joakim Nergelius (ed.): Constitutionalism: New Challenges—European Law from a 
Nordic Perspective (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008). 
- “Judicial Review in Swedish Law—A Critical Analysis” (2009) Nordisk Tidsskrift for 
Menneskerettigheter 27(142). 
Nicolaïdis, Kalypso and Robert Howse (eds.): The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of 
Governance in the United States and the European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2001).  
Nolan, Aoife: “Welfare Rights in the Eurozone: Ireland” in Bruno de Witte and Claire 
Kilpatrick (eds.): Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental 
Rights’ Challenges (2014) EUI Working Paper Series LAW 5. 
Nuttall, Simon J.: European Political Co-operation (Oxford, OUP, 1992). 
Kjær, Poul F. and Niklas Olsen: “Conclusion and Perspectives: The Reconstitution of 
Europe” in Poul F. Kjær and Niklas Olsen (eds.): Critical Theories of Crisis in Europe: 
From Weimar to the Euro (London, Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016). 
Office for National Statistics: “Statistical bulletin: Divorces in England and Wales: 
2015”, available via: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarria
ges/divorce/bulletins/divorcesinenglandandwales/2015#how-long-do-marriages-
of-opposite-sex-couples-last [last visited 6 March 2018]. 
Onuf, Peter S.: Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1987). 
Oppenheimer, Andrew (ed.): The Relationship between European Community Law and National 
Law: The Cases (Cambridge, CUP, 1994). 
Pech, Laurent and Kim L. Scheppele, “Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the 
EU” (2017) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 19. 
Peers, Steeve: EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford, OUP, 2011). 
Pellet, Alain: “Les Fondements Juridiques Internationaux du Droit Communautaire” in 
Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law Vol. 5 Book 2 (The Hague, Kluwer 
Law International, 1997).  
Pescatore, Pierre: The Law of Integration: Emergence of a New Phenomenon in International 
Relations, Based on the Experience of the European Communities (Leiden, Sijthoof, 1974). 
Pierdominici, Leonardo: “Constitutional Change through Emergency Decrees” in 
Thomas Beukers, Bruno de Witte, and Claire Kilpatrick (eds.): Constitutional Change 
through Euro-Crisis Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2017). 
Phelan, William: In the Place of Inter-State Retaliation: The European Union’s Rejection of WTO-
style Trade Sanctions and Trade Remedies (Oxford, OUP, 2015). 
Podemos: Mover Ficha, [Eng. ‘Making a Move’], 2014 Manifesto. Available in unofficial 
English translation via: 
https://hiredknaves.wordpress.com/2014/01/20/podemos-translated-
manifesto/ [last accessed 1 February 2018]. 
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